tions of Vice President and President of the House of Peers which he has held successively since 1931 are traditionally regarded as requiring aloofness from politics. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of Hirota no recent Prime Minister has been better trained to deal with affairs from a world point of view. Konoye was on the staff of Prince Saionji, the principal Japanese delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference; he visited the United States in 1934, when he was received by the President and by the Secretary, and he had at that time a number of conferences with other statesmen, publicists and business leaders. Articles published by him upon his return to Japan and interviews given by him show that in the course of his American visit he obtained a good grasp of the American attitude toward Far Eastern questions. He has a strong tie with this country in that he has a son at Princeton. It should not be understood, however, that Konoye's selection for the premiership represents a triumph for liberalism. It is true that he himself is inclined toward liberalism, but his selection as Prime Minister is undoubtedly based upon the expectation that he will remain a neutral in politics. His selection, therefore, represents rather a compromise, and his Cabinet will probably be a coalition formed by the retention of the Ministers of War and of the Navy of the outgoing cabinet and the inclusion of representatives of the political parties. While it is not yet definite that he will succeed in forming a cabinet, there is little likelihood that he will fail. 894.00/743: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, June 3, 1937-5 p. m. [Received June 3-7: 42 a. m.] 145. My telegram No. 144, June 1, 10 p. m. We have just learned by telephone from the Foreign Office that Hirota has accepted the Foreign Affairs portfolio. The reappointment of Ministers of War and of the Navy has been confirmed. Kaya, now Vice Minister of Finance, has accepted the Ministry of Finance. It is generally expected that the formation of the new Cabinet will be completed before end of the day. GREW 894.00/744: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, June 4, 1937-1 p. m. [Received June 4-9:20 a. m.] 148. My telegram No. 145, June 3, 5 p. m. 1. As of early this morning Konoe required only the formal acceptance by Kaya of the Finance portfolio to complete formation of the new Cabinet. It is expected that after Kaya has ascertained the character of the economic policies to be followed by the new Cabinet he will give his acceptance, and that formal investiture of Cabinet will take place today. 2. The selection of Konoe as Premier has been popular, the comment most generally heard being that the selection of the person favored over all others by public opinion is a significant indication of trend toward more normal condition. However, in one of his first statements after receiving command to form a Cabinet, Konoe announced that, although he would endeavor to include in his Cabinet two members of the political parties (which he has done), they would be selected on the basis of their personal merits and not as representatives of the parties. This statement has perceptibly cooled the ardor with which the parties acclaimed the news of Konoe's appointment. There seems to be little doubt but that the parties now possess a destructive power, but their inability to put forward an intelligent and constructive program leads most observers to believe that Konoe's present great popularity warrants his avoiding too close a sort of association with the parties. 3. The disclosure of composition of the new Cabinet has had an adverse effect upon the enthusiastic response of the press to selection of Konoe. 4. Comment by press and by individuals is that the continuance in office of present Ministers of War and Navy indicates that increased armament and doctrine of "increasing power of industrial production" favored by the armed services are to be among the Cabinet's policies. In business circles the appointment to the Home Ministry of Baba, whose views on finance are considered to be unsound as well as unorthodox, is regarded with apprehension. Although it is reported that Kaya will if appointed follow the policies of his predecessor, it seems doubtful whether he has sufficient prestige and force to counteract the probable endeavors of Cabinet officers previously mentioned to give effect to policies leading toward more rigid state control over industry and toward uncontrollable financial inflation. 5. The collapse of the Hayashi Cabinet of itself has eliminated. certain elements of uncertainty and the formation of a new Cabinet will undoubtedly tend to stabilize political and economic conditions. I shall withhold further effort at interpreting significance of the present change of government until the policies of the Konoe Cabinet have been disclosed and discussed in the press. 6. I hope to have an opportunity to call next week on Hirota. 7. Please make available copies to Commerce and Treasury. To Peiping by mail. GREW 894.00/761 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 2608 TOKYO, September 29, 1937. [Received October 18.] SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatches No. 2519 of August 3, 1937, and No. 2551 of August 18, 1937,22 and to previous despatches concerning the trial of General Mazaki 23 and the participants in the Incident of February 26, 1936. For the alleged reason that the evidence was considered insufficient for conviction, on September 25, 1937, the Tokyo Court Martial acquitted General Jinzaburo Mazaki of the charge of having aided the rebels in the uprising of February 26, 1936. There is enclosed a clipping from the Japan Advertiser of September 26, 1937,2* containing the Tokyo Court Martial's statement with regard to its decision, as given in translation by Domei. It would appear from this statement that the Court Martial was in possession of ample evidence to convict General Mazaki not only of complicity in the Incident but also of having lent moral encouragement to the insurgents, if not of having given them active aid. For example, as admitted by the Court Martial, General Mazaki had full knowledge of the "Showa Restoration" movement as far back as the summer of 1935; he had frequent interviews with the plotters from December 1935 until the outbreak and was well aware of their aims; and he let it be known to the plotters that he was bitterly opposed to his dismissal in July 1935 from the post of Inspector General of Military Education and to the death sentence pronounced against Lt. Col. Aizawa on May 7, 1936, for the murder of Major General Nagata on August 12, 1935, thus contributing to the unrest of the insurgents. Furthermore, he was informed by one of the rebels at about four-thirty o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, that the Premier, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and others were to be attacked, and he subsequently interceded with the higher authorities of the War Office in favor of the insurgents, stating that he "understood very well the spirit in which the rebels had acted." It is probable that despite the apparently conclusive evidence against General Mazaki the Court Martial found it advisable to acquit him in view of his distinguished career and of the unfavorable repercussion that might have resulted from convicting him at this time of national emergency. 22 Neither printed. 23 Formerly Japanese Inspector General of Military Education. 24 Not reprinted. The Nichi Nichi of September 25 quoted a War Office spokesman as having said that the disposal of General Mazaki's case had ended the consideration by the Tokyo Court Martial of the February 26 Incident. In this connection, it should be stated that Zei Nishida and Kazuteru Kita, who were sentenced to death on August 14, 1937 (Embassy's despatch No. 2551 of August 18, 1937), as ringleaders in the insurrection, were executed on August 19, as announced by the Ministry of War. Respectfully yours, 894.00/770 JOSEPH C. GREW The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 2722 TOKYO, January 6, 1938. [Received January 24.] SIR: Whatever may be the label put on the conflict with China,26 it has led to the placing of Japan on a war basis. About one million men are estimated to be with the colors, and every form of national effort is being subordinated to the attainment in as short a time as possible of military and political objectives in China. There is taking place, as a normal consequence of the mustering of Japan's material and spiritual resources, a change in virtually every aspect of Japanese life. There is a pervading consciousness of the consequence of failure in the present effort, and that consciousness, stimulated by the disapprobation and moral opposition of the greater part of the world, has developed a sense of national unity which does not nourish political factionalism. It is not being suggested that the decline of political parties in this country can be attributed entirely to the conflict with China, which in the larger sense began, not in July 1937, but on September 18, 1931; that trend really falls within a trend with a wave-length of far greater amplitude. Japan as a world power is still in a transitional stage. It renounced medievalism eighty years ago, and although amazing progress has been made in "things that are of the earth earthy", and although there have been advances in certain social problems, notably in the position of the womanhood of the country, there has not been sufficient time for dilution by purely natural processes of archaic spiritual and moral ideas. There are Japanese still living who wore armor and fought with bow and arrow. The "revolt of youth" after the World War was considered to be something of a phenomenon in America and Europe, but, ever since the middle of the Nineteenth Century there has been in Japan a chronic revolt of each new generation against its predecessor. The impact of events and new ideas 26 See vol. III, pp. 128 ff. varies with the individual and with the measure of medievalism he has inherited and assimilated. The political struggle in Japan, therefore, is primarily a struggle between generations, and not between classes. During a period of forty years after the establishment of the Diet in 1890, there appeared to be a substantial, if slow, progress out of military oligarchy, through bureaucracy, and toward constitutional democratic government. The first twenty years were the concluding decades of the Meiji Era, one of the most brilliant epochs in Japan's history, and from the point of view of progress they were the most important decades. Behind a "modern" political facade, an extra-constitutional group of powerful personages-the so-called Elder Statesmen-ruled the country, but as time passed and these personages grew older or died, men came who performed in plain view on the political stage. These flourished and gained influence, and around them collected the minor political fry. It was from such agglomerations that the "old line" parties developed. They were not, however, associations of persons animated by a common political objective, but rather they were loosely formed groups of which each member was bound to its leader under a tacit agreement by which the leader gave patronage and in return he was given support. In 1913 there occurred the first change of government arising out of defeat in the Lower House on a vote on a Government measure, and by force of repetition there evolved the beginnings of a tradition— for the Constitution is silent on this point-of a parliamentary system. A further impulse in this direction was given by a tendency which became marked during the second decade of this century for the parties to divide along the lines of conflict of interest between the industrial and agrarian elements of the population. Owing to circumstances which need not be gone into in this despatch, the landowning classes tended to support the Seiyukai, and the perversity of politics made the Minseito the instrument of their opponents. The two parties thrived so long as men with capacity for leadership, such as Count Kato and Mr. Hara, could be found to fill the shoes of such political geniuses as Count Okuma and Prince Ito; but when they died their places were taken by party wheel-horses with nothing to raise them above the common ruck. Personal leadership, the element which created parties and gave them cohesion, was lost, and they have since been beset with factional jealousies and strife. To add to their troubles the venality and corruption which existed on a wide scale in politics were brought to light by a series of prosecutions conducted with courage by the law-enforcing authorities against a number of politicians of no small importance, including former Cabinet officers. The disclosures of the immorality of the politicians, in contrast with the standards enforced among public servants, es |