ever, and which are known to be common in all negotiations between governments. Our government chose, however to consider it a waiver of the guarantee stipulation altogether, and adhered to that position, even when a demand for its. execution was repeated again and again. This circumstance makes it necessary to remove all doubt on the subject, and the following extract from Mr. Genet's instructions seems to do so. "France at this moment has a particular interest that requires us to be prepared to act with efficacy against England and Spain, if, as every circumstance announces, these po vers, in hatred of our principles, shall inake war upon us. The reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the two nations, stipulated in the 11th article of the treaty of 1778, must form an essential clause in the new treaty, to be concluded. The Executive council therefore instructs citizen Genet early to sound the American government on this point, and to make it an indispensable condition of a free trade to the French West-Indies."

By the above it is quite clear that, so far from intending to exonerate the United States from the guarantee, it was the direct aim of the French government to make it effectual in the very case which had occurred, a war with England.

On the 18th September, 293, Mr. Genet wrote to Mr, Jefferson, "that the Seeretary of War, to whom I communicated the wish of our government of the Windward Islands, to receive promptly some fire-arms and some cannons, which might put in a state of defence possessions guarantied by the United States, had the front to answer me, with an ironical carelessness, that the principles established by the President did not permit him to lend us so much as a pistol-that the Secretary of the Treasury, with whom I had a conversation on the proposition which I had made, to convert almost the whole American debt, [advances made by the French to aid in our Revolutionary war] by means of an operation of finance authorized by law, into flour, rice, grain, salted provisions, and other objects which France had the most pressing need, added to the refusal, the positive declaration, that even if it were practicable the United States could not consent to it, because England could not fail to consider this extraordinary reimbursement furnished to a nation with which she is at war, as an act of hostility." On the 6th of November, '93, the General and Extraordinary Commission of Guadaloupe, addressed to the Congress of the United States a formal demand for provisions, ammunition and men. The same demand had been some time before made of Mr. Genet. who, in his letter to Mr. Randolph of February 4th, 294, says, "I have informed them of the obstacles which prevented me from executing them; and, alarmed at the dangers in which this disappointment placed a source of riches, as precious to France as to the United States; they have conceived it a duty to present to you their situation, in colors most lively, &c."

On the 14th November, '94, Mr. Genet wrote to Mr. Jefferson, "I beg you to lay before the President of the United States as soon as possible, the decree and the enclosed note, and to obtain from him the earliest decision, either as to the guarantee I have claimed the fulfilment of for our colonies, or upon the mode of negotiation of the new treaty, &c." And only eighteen days after, on the 2d of December, Mr. Randolph wrote to Mr. Monroe, our minister to France, as follows: "The omission to demand its fulfilment [the guarantee] up to this day is a proof, that their policy did not approve of such measure: and in this they were wise; since we should have been less advantageous to them by associating in the war, than we have been in our neutral character." This truly extraordinary letter, while it explicitly denies the fact, just established, that a demand under the guarantee had been does not convey any thing like a denial that the state of affairs provided for had actually occurred. Had such a denial been made, it would have been entitled to no greater weight than that just stated: Because, on the 1st of January,'95, he again wrote to Mr. Monroe, "Would they [France] have hazarded a hint, that we must have no treaty of commerce with Great Britain? We should have quoted their own example, in having repelled by arms the meddling of other nations in their internal affairs." Thus proving, by the testimony of the Secretary himself, that the war on the part of France was defensive; which settles the question of casus fœderis: and hence, our plea for withholding the stipulated aid, because the war was offensive, results in a mere pretext. There are several more important facts appertaining to this point, which shall be the subject of my next number. A CLAIMANT.

*Neither "the decree and enclosed note," nor an answer to this letter, have been made public; the reader as well as the writer would doubtless derive much light from their perusal."

No. XIV.

In continuation of my last number, I shall state a few only of the many facts in relation to the guarantee of the French colonies.

In the instructions to Mr. Monroe of 10th June, 294, he is charged to declare to France that "we are unable to give her aid of men or money." The plea of inability was a direct admission of obligation:-the more degrading, because known to be unsound, and ineffectual, as a shield from responsibility, if even true. Because if the matter stipulated were ever so unfavorable, or even impossible, the right of France to have the unfavorable stipulation executed, or the impossible one com pensated, would be in full force. Vattel, book 3, ch. 6, sec. 94, says: "To refuse an ally the succors due to him, without a just dispensation, is doing him an injury, and there being a natural obligation of repairing the damage caused by our fault, and especially by our injustice, we are bound to indemnify an ally for all the losses he may have sustained from our unjust refusal."

That our reluctance to furnish the required aid, arose out of the apprehension of inducing hostility from England, is openly avowed in numerous instances. We had a perfect right to furnish the aid. In such a case, Vattel says, "The succors furnished to my enemy are the payment of a debt; they do me no wrong in discharging it, and consequently give me no just cause to make war on them." And again, "We have already seen that when a sovereign furnishes the moderate succor due in virtue of a former defensive alliance, he does not associate himself in the war. Therefore he may fulfil his engagements, and yet observe an exact neutrality. Of this Europe affords frequent instances.' Book 3, ch. 7, sec. 105. If England therefore, contemplated making war upon us, beyond the seizure of our ships and seamen, which she then practised, she would not have waited for the performance of an act on our part, which could afford her no justification. And we could have met a complaint. if indeed her dignity would stoop to make one, by the production of her own example; and the following declaration of her prime minister, lord Grenville, to her minister in France, lord Malmsbury, dated london July 20, '97: "Your lordship well knows that it is a principle universally recognised in the public law of Europe, that when one of the parties in a defensive alliance furnishes to his ally the stipulated succors, those succours remain entirely at the disposal of the requiring party, to be employed wherever he shall judge proper, subject only to the limitations of the treaty which before existed; and if the amount of those succors is not increased beyond that engaged for, nor the means of using them extended by new facilities, the party furnishing the stipulated assistance is not understood to violate the laws of neutrality."

During the whole of Mr. Monroe's mission to France, the guarantee stipulation was a never ending source of embarrassment to him. He admits that he declined to demand the repeal of the French obnoxious decrees under which our vessels had been seized, lest it should give rise to a counter demand to execute the guarantee: and for the same reason, he abstained from asking for certain favours of diplomatic aid, though specially charged by his instructions so to do. And further, as a motive to induce their silence on that point, he formally proposed to relinquish, what was of great value to our commerce during the war, the principle and stipulation in our treaty of 1778, that free ships make free goods. On a particular occasion he was pressed by the French government to answer the question, whether he demanded the execution of the treaty of commerce? He found it necessary to evade the question, lest it was intended to found upon his answer, the demand of aid under the treaty of alliance.

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Nor were these difficulties confined to Mr. Monroe; they were no less active in this country. On the 11th of August, '95, Mr. Adet wrote to Mr. Randolph, that his government had ordered him to claim the literal execution of the treaties." Similar demands were subsequently made; and various complaints, of which the transportation of horses, provisions, &c. in American vessels for the English forces acting against the French colonies, and the impressment of our seamen on board of British ships of war to be employed against them, were, perhaps, the most conspicuous. In '97, Messrs. C. C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbrige Gerry, were appointed envoys extraordinary to France and in their instructions, dated the 15th of July of that year, we find the following: "In such revision [of the treaties] the first object that will attract your attention, is the reciprocal guarantee, in the 11th article of the treaty of alliance. This guarantee we are perfectly willing to re

nounce. The guarantee by France of the liberty, sovereignty and independence of the United States, will add nothing to our security: while, on the contrary, our guarantee of the possessions of France in America, will perpetually expose us to the risk and expense of war, or to disputes and questions concerning our national faith. When Mr. Genet was sent as the minister of the French republic to the United States, its situation was embarrassed, and the success of its measures problematical. In such circumstances it was natural that France should turn her eyes to the mutual guarantee: and accordingly it was required, in Mr. Genet's instructions, to be an essential clause in the new treaty,' which he was to propose: and on the ground that it nearly concerned the peace and prosperity of the French nation, that a people whose resources increase beyond all calculation, and whom nature had placed so near their rich colonies should become interested, by their own engagements, in the preservation of those islands.' But, at this time, France, powerful by her victories, and secure in her triumphs, may less regard the reciprocal guarantee with the United States, and be willing to relinquish it. As a substitute for the reciprocal gua rantee may be proposed a mutual renunciation of the same territories and possessions that were subjects of the guarantee and renunciation in the 6th and 11th articles of the treaty of alliance. Such a renunciation on our part would obviate the reason assigned in the instructions to Mr. Genet before cited, of future danger from the rapidly growing power of the United States. But if France insists on the mutual guarantee, it will be necessary to aim at some modification of it. The existing engagement is of that kind which, by writers on the law of nations is called a general guarantee of course the casus fœderis can never occur except in a defensive war. The nature of this obligation is understood to be, that when a war really and truly defensive exists, the engaging nation is bound to furnish an effectual and adequate defence, in co-operation with the power attacked: whence it follows, that the nation may be required in some circumstances, to bring forward its whole force. The nature and extent of the succours demandable not being ascertained, engagements of this kind are dangerous on account of their uncertainty: there is always hazard of doing too much or too little, and of course of being involved in involuntary rupture. Specific succours have the advantage of certainty, and are less liable to occasion war. On the other hand, a general guarantee allows a latitude for the exercise of judgment and discretion. On the part of the United States, instead of troops or ships of war, it will be convenient to stipulate for a moderate sum of money or quantity of provisions; at the option of France: the provisions to be delivered at our ports, in any future defensive wars. The sum of money, or its value in provisions, ought not to exceed two hundred thousand dollars a year, during any such wars. The reciprocal stipulation, on the part of France, may be to furnish annually the like sum of money, or an equivalent in military stores and clothing for troops, at the option of the United States, to be delivered in the ports of France. Particular caution, however, must be used, in discussing this subject, not to admit any claims, on the ground of the guarantee, in relation to the existing war, as we do not allow that the casus fœderis applies to it."*

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After our non-compliance with the repeated and earnest demands of aid, it was very natural to cover the refusal with an injunction "not to admit any claims❞ in consequence thereof. We were not prepared to acknowledge, what no sovereign or nation ever did, that we knowingly and therefore willingly violated a positive solemn stipulation. Nor does the expression as we do not allow that the casus fœ deris applies to it, amount to a denial. It merely imports that, as both parties had a right to judge, so we will not "admit claims, or "allow" that we stand committed, before the other party at least demands compensation. In short, the terms used are softened down to the lowest grade of objection, which a decent regard for self respect could dictate.

But, admitting for a moment, to avoid all obscurity, that the casus fœderis never did exist, and that France was therefore without a claim to compensation on that score, still we find the President deemed the purchase prospectively of the guarantee article alone, a great object to the United States at the annual cost of two

*The very first sentence in these instructions, contains the following: "It is known to you, that this affection rose to enthusiasm, when the war was kindled between France and the powers of Europe, which were combined against her, for the purpose of restoring the monarchy, &c. Thus the Secretary of State who wrote these instructions, Mr. Pickering here admits the casus fœderis expressly.

hundred thousand dollars. This was the first bid of the purchaser, and by him called "moderate"-what was the probable price of the holder?

If to the French estimate of the then present value, be added the estimate of our responsibilities already incurred, involving the sum total of several of her richest Islands, the two sums together-truly immense, will make the actual value of the abrogation of that article. A CLAIMANT.

No. XV.

IN March, '94, Congress laid an embargo on all merchant vessels and letters of marque in the ports of the United States; this act remained in force for sixty days, and during its existence was loudly complained of and protested against by the French minister. Our government repeatedly hinted that this measure was aimed at Great Britain; but that plea did not absolve us from the claim of France to comTM pensation, especially as in an analagous case, the Bordeaux embargo before cited, we had claimed a like compensation from her, which was admitted, and a decree promptly enacted for our indemnity. But the circumstances under which this embargo was laid, connected with the known fact, that France was closely pressed for food, operated to inflame the jealousy of the French minister, which is thus noticed by the Secretary of State in his instructions to Mr. Monroe, of June 10th, 94. "There is reason to believe that the embargo, when it was first laid, excited uneasy sensations in the breast of the French minister. For it so happened that the moment before its operation, pretty considerable shipments of four were made to the British West Indies, and a snow called La Camille, laden with flour for France, was arrested near New-Castle, on the Delaware, after she had quitted the port of Philadelphia." These uneasy sensations were not confined to the breast of the French minister, as is shewn by the next sentence of the instructions: "My letters to Mr. Fauchet will explain the case of La Camille, and all his complaints about the embargo.

While the English captured all provision vessels, including many American, which overstocked them with food, in addition to which they purchased in our ports merely to keep it from the French, confessedly to starve them, we permitted large quantities, shipped on English account in American vessels, to leave our waters for the British Islands, and suddenly restrained like shipments to France, not only in the La Camille after clearing and sailing upon her voyage, but many other vessels likewise. The French minister could not be made to understand how the measure was aimed at the English. On another similar occasion, when horses and provisions were shipped on English account in American vessels, the French minister put the question to the Secretary of State, after protesting against the act, "Whether in a British fleet and army destined for a military expedition against the French colonies, our vessels so laden, following in the train and bearing sup plies for such military force, would not make a part of it?" In answer the Secretary says, "I confess to you that the question presents some difficulty, but as the case does not exist, it is not necessary for me to answer it. I am not informed what is the custom of the maratime powers in this respect." This question, put hypothetically, was the fact though not known here at the time; not only were our vessels so used, but our seamen were constantly and in great numbers forced on board the English ships of war, and used in many expeditions of that kind. In one instance the entire crews of upwards of 20 vessels were so taken from an out port in St. Domingo.

ཧཱུྃ་ ་ ་

In June, '94, upon the earnest recommendation of the President, Congress, after six months discussion, passed an act making penal the fitting out privateers in the ports of the United States. This law originated in the Senate, and passed that House by a very small majority, after great opposition to the sixth section, viz: "That it shall not be lawful to sell within the United States, any vessel or goods captured from a prince or state, or from the subjects or citizens of a prince or state with which the United States are at peace, which vessel or goods shall have been captured by any other foreign prince or state, or by the subjects or citizens of such prince or state, unless such vessel and goods shall have been first carried into a port or place within the territory of the prince or state to which the captors belong; but such vessel and goods shall be carried out of the United States, by those who shall have brought them in. And the sale of any vessel or goods prohibited as

aforesaid, shall be utterly void." But the House of Representatives struck out the entire section, and so amended, it became a law. As this section contained no penalty or disqualification, the naked question of admission ant sale was at issue, and as Congress had expressly refused to prohibit, so they had as clearly conveyed their intention to admit and sell. Had this section been retained in the law, it would not have covered the restoration of prize made by the President before its date: and within a few days after this law was passed, the President ordered the restitution to British subjects of several prizes, and caused to be instituted legal process against a citizen of the United States, to recover from him one he held by purchase, with a view to her restoration to the British owner.

The corvette Cassius belonging to the French government was seized in the port of Philadelphia, and after being acquitted again and again, was held to answer for offences alleged to have been committed on the seas. The French minister abandoned her to the United States. Several other French armed vessels, some of them also belonging to the government, were from time to time seized and held to answer for like charges.

The governor of Guadaloupe was arrested in the United States and detained two years; he had in his official character seized an American vessel in that island Jaden with counter revolutionary writings from Philadelphia. This act induced the Executive Directory to pass the following decree: "The minister of foreign affairs will declare to citizen Monroe, minister plenipotentiary of the United States, that if the federal government does not put a stop to the procedure against citizen Collet, and does not refer those who sue him before the government and his natural judges in France, the Executive Directory will take the necessary measures, that reprisals shall be used for reparation of all the injuries of the American government, and of its agents, towards the French citizens and government." But it is not my intention to detail the complaints of France, nor am I even able to enumerate them-probably the extensive collection of documents, 840 octavo pages, lately laid before the Senate by the President, does not contain the whole by some hundreds; those I have referred to are only secondary in character and small in amount, but it seemed necessary to dispose of them before I enter upon those of a more enlarged and serious nature, particularlyMr. Jay's treaty, an act by which the ties with France were severed, and in place of good feeling, all the evils she could invent were heaped upon us, And, in order that this act may stand upon its own merits, I cite the following extract to show the state of our claims upon France, and also the general relations existing between the two nations at the time of its date. Extract from the President's message to Congress, of 28th February, '95. "Our minister near the French republic has urged compensation for the injuries which our commerce has sustained from captures by French cruisers, from the nonfulfilment of the contracts of the agents of that republic with our citizens, and from the embargo at Bordeaux. He has also pressed an allowance for the money voted by Congress for relieving the inhabitants of St. Domingo. It affords me the highest pleasure to inform Congress that perfect harmony reigns between the two republics; and that those claims are in a train of being discussed with candor, and of being amicably adjusted." A CLAIMANT.

No. XVI.

In attempting to give a view of our treaty with Great Britain, of the 19th Novem ber, '94, usually called Mr. Jay's treaty, the necessity for citing the prominent parts of the instructions under which he acted is obvious, particularly as this is the first time they have been submitted to the public view. It will be recollected that the House of Representatives, when that treaty was under consideration, called upon the President by resolution and also by deputation for a copy of them, which was refused. They point out as the primary object of the mission, to demand compen sation for vexations and spoliations committed under the several British instruc tions of June 8th, '93, November 6th, 293, and January 8th, '94-and, the execution of the clause of the treaty of peace, of '83 which relates to the giving us

*The spoliations under these instructions were not less than ten times the extent of those committed by the French up to that period.