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fore arrive at New York towards the end of the current month, or early in October, 1941.
It is hoped that the particulars given above will, under the special circumstances, be held to be a sufficient compliance with the requirements outlined in the Note of August 19th, 1941, from the State Department.48
The Minister would be grateful for such courtesies and free entry privileges as can be extended to the delegation upon their arrival in New York.
[These trade agreement exploratory discussions were carried on for some time but did not lead to the opening of actual negotiations, apparently because of critical war conditions and the handling of wartime trade through lend-lease operations.]
OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CANADIAN MILITARY MISSION IN WASHINGTON
The Canadian Legation to the Department of State1
1. The Canadian Government desire to establish a Canadian Military Mission in Washington, and wish to secure the approval of the Government of the United States for this course.
2. The proposal has already been communicated to the United Kingdom Government, and has been discussed with the representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff who are now in Washington.
3. The Canadian Government feel very strongly that the recommendations concerning their representation in Washington which were made in the ABC2 Report (Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 1) are inadequate. They consider that problems of joint action in the western Atlantic, and possibly in the eastern Pacific, can best be handled by the establishment of a separate organization rather than by any method of Canadian representation on the United Kingdom Mission. The activities of a Canadian Mission would be primarily directed towards these problems.
4. The Canadian Government would consider the possibility of appointing as members of a Canadian Military Mission the Service members of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
5. The Canadian Government would be most happy to receive a similar United States Military Mission in Ottawa.
6. The Canadian Government are intimately concerned in any questions affecting the defence of Newfoundland, and hope that consideration of any such questions as between the United Kingdom Mission and the United States authorities will be deferred until adequate Canadian representation has been arranged. It will be recalled that these matters are covered by the Protocol between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of March 27, 1941,3 and are under consideration by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
1Handed to Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, by Mr. Hume Wrong, Minister-Counselor of the Canadian Legation, on July 1.
American, British, and Canadian.
3 See bracketed note, p. 85.
7. Pending the approval of the United States Government for the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission, and in the interim period before the Mission can be established, the Canadian Service Attachés in Washington will maintain the closest possible liaison with the British Mission. It is hoped that the United States authorities will agree that they should attend joint meetings between the British Mission and the United States Service Departments. If this is acceptable, it will be understood that the Canadian Service Attachés are acting in their capacity as such, and not as members of the British Mission.
The Secretary of the Navy (Knox) to the Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941. SIR: The Navy Department has given careful consideration to the procedure to be followed in effecting cooperation between the military authorities of Canada and the United States, both in the preparation of plans and in the conduct of operations in which military cooperation is involved.
As the result of the Ogdensburg Declaration of 17 August 1940 * there now exists the Permanent Joint Board on Defense which is the established agency for consideration of matters pertaining to the joint defense of the two nations. Matters of a purely military nature are handled through the military, naval and air attachés in Ottawa and Washington. In addition to the foregoing, it may be desirable at times to arrange conferences between special representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations and of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff concerned on military matters of sufficient importance to require special representation. The ease of travel between Ottawa and Washington facilitates the holding of such conferences.
In the opinion of the Navy Department the foregoing methods of military consultation are adequate to present needs, and the establishment of a Military Mission is unnecessary. Moreover, its establishment would offer a precedent for the establishment of similar Military Missions by certain other British Dominions and by the American Republics. For the last named reason the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission is not desirable.
The presence of the appropriate Canadian representatives at conferences between the Navy Department and the British Joint Staff Mission in which Canadian interests are involved is agreeable to the Navy Department.
The Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and President Roosevelt, meeting at Ogdensburg, New York, on August 17, 1940, issued a joint statement, released to the press the following day, of their agreement to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defense. For text of the statement, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, p. 146.
The Navy Department intends to be represented in Canada only by its Naval Attaché,5 plus Despatch Officers who may be charged with liaison duties with respect to shipping. However, if the Canadian Government should insist on a stronger military representation in Washington, the Navy Department will offer no objection to the establishment, in Washington, of permanent offices for the Canadian military members of the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Under this plan, military cooperation between the United States Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff," and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, would be effected through the medium of this Board.
The Canadian Government can be assured that it will be consulted before the United States takes any action on matters which may affect Canadian responsibilities with respect to the defense of Newfoundland. Respectfully, FRANK KNOX
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)
[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1941.
Mr. Wrong, Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation, called at the Department today at my request to discuss the Canadian proposal which was informally put forward on July 18 to establish a Canadian Military Mission in Washington.
I explained to Mr. Wrong that we had immediately upon receipt of his proposal taken it up with the War and Navy Departments; that in so doing we had commented that from the standpoint of general policy the Department of State would welcome the establishment of such a Canadian mission in Washington but that recognizing that this was primarily a military matter we would be disposed to defer to the judgment of the Service Departments in it.
I then told Mr. Wrong that replies had now been received from the War and Navy Departments,10 the latter one having just reached me. I explained that the War and Navy Departments had collaborated with one another in studying this question and in preparing their replies; that the replies were, although identical in substance, different in the amount of details that were set forth regarding the reasons for an adverse decision. I stated that for purposes of discussion it therefore seemed to me desirable to use as a basis the Navy Department's letter of
July 21, 1941. I then went over the Navy Department's letter of July 21 with Mr. Wrong sentence by sentence and he took a number of notes concerning it. I told Mr. Wrong it seemed to us that the Navy Department had made out a convincing case against the desirability of establishing a Canadian Military Mission in Washington.
Mr. Wrong said that he would send a report along these lines to the Canadian Government. He expressed appreciation for the friendly and informal way in which we had dealt with this matter and inquired whether if his Government had further observations to make we would be disposed to give consideration to them. I replied that of course we would give the fullest consideration to any further observations or representations which the Canadian Government might wish to make. J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]
The Minister in Canada (Moffat) to the Secretary of State
OTTAWA, August 18, 1941-noon. [Received 1:38 p. m.]
218. For Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department's mail instruction No. 574 of July 30.12 The Prime Minister, in saying good-by before starting for London tomorrow, told me that there is only one matter in the field of Canadian-American relations that is seriously troubling him at the moment: namely prolonged refusal to allow Canada to have her own military mission in Washington. Mr. King felt that our decision was probably based on service considerations but in his opinion much more is involved. I have sensed for some time here the feeling that Canadian contacts with American military and naval authorities are more and more being funneled through British channels coupled with an unfortunate suspicion that the British in Washington had been consciously sidetracking the Canadians.
In any event Mr. King believes that Canadian relations both vis-à-vis the United States and the United Kingdom would be on a sounder basis if a Canadian military mission were accepted in Washington and that public opinion in Canada would have greater confidence if Canadian military mission representation in the United States were on as direct and as independent a basis as would be implicit in the sending and receiving of such a mission. He urged with great earnestness that the American Government reconsider its rejection of the Canadian request and that in the reconsideration at least as much weight be given to the political considerations involved as to service considerations.
12 Not printed.