practicable and feasible and which would be helpful at this time. He asked if the Department would keep the Embassy informed of further developments in this regard and I said that it would be glad to do so. S[UMNER] W[ELLES] 740.0011 European War 1939/10391a Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary [WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1941. The Irish Minister called to see me this morning at my request. I communicated to him orally the contents of the Department's instruction No. 18, April 25, 6 p. m. to Minister Gray in Dublin. When he had heard the instructions communicated to Mr. Gray, Mr. Brennan seemed to be torn between two separate emotions-one of deep satisfaction at the decision to permit the Irish Government to obtain two ships to transport food supplies to Ireland, and the other of great annoyance at . . . the expression of the unwillingness of the United States to make available to Ireland munitions and military matériel so long as Ireland persisted in its present policy of noncooperation with Great Britain and the other nations resisting aggression. He said that if the British Government would only make a commitment that Great Britain would not invade Ireland, which it had steadily refused to do, Ireland could withdraw all of the troops now on its northern frontier and use them to great advantage in the southern part of the island in making plans to resist a threatened German invasion. The Minister then asked what this Government meant by "a more cooperative attitude towards Great Britain and the other nations resisting aggression". Since the tenor of his remarks at this stage made it clear to me that Mr. Brennan was under the misapprehension that the instructions to Mr. Gray had been sent after consultation with the British Government, I told him specifically that the phraseology used was solely that determined by the officials of this Government and that there had been no discussion of the matter with the British prior to the sending of this instruction, nor had there been any indication from the British Government that it hoped that such an instruction would be sent. Having made this clear, I said that the view of many of our own military and naval experts was that when a German attempt to invade Great Britain took place, the first step would be the invasion of Ireland. I asked the Minister in that connection and as in the nature of a reply to his inquiry, whether the Irish authorities had ever discussed cooperative measures with the British to go into effect should Germany attempt to invade Ireland. To this the Minister answered that Mr. de Valera had publicly stated that should Germany attempt to invade Ireland the Irish Government would request the British to come in and help them. I asked whether this meant that any definite plans for cooperation had been discussed or worked out. The Minister replied that no such conversations had taken place because if they had taken place, it would at once have become known to Germany and would probably result in an accelerated invasion of Ireland by Germany. I remarked that this seemed to me exactly the point of view which had been taken by all of the European governments now occupied by Germany, namely, that they would not agree to preliminary decisions as to the measures of cooperation to be undertaken in the event of an invasion and that, consequently, when actual invasion took place, no plans had been worked out and complete confusion resulted. I said we had seen the results of this policy only a few days ago in the case of Yugoslavia whose previous government had refused to discuss any form of military cooperation with Greece or Turkey or Great Britain and consequently the present government, when the invasion took place, was left to fight alone without any means. of effective cooperation from its allies. Mr. Brennan replied that any other policy on the part of the Irish Government would result in disunity among the Irish people, which he felt was the greatest evil which Ireland could confront. I said that I believed that the conversation we had just had made it clear that the Irish Government was determined, when and if an attempted invasion of Ireland by Germany took place, to meet that crisis without any previous preparation or consultation with other nations opposed to Germany. To that Mr. Brennan made no reply. The Minister told me that he expected that Mr. de Valera would send him a message immediately with regard to the negotiations for obtaining the merchant ships mentioned in the Department's instruction to Mr. Gray and that as soon as he received such word, he would communicate with me personally. S[UMNER] W[ELLES] 740.0011 European War 1939/10546: Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN, May 1, 1941-7 p. m. [Received 10: 10 p.m.] 42. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. April 28 I had a conversation with the Irish Prime Minister pursuant to your telegram No. 10 [179], April 10, and your telegram 18, April 25. I told him that I had been instructed some days ago to transmit certain views and to make inquiry as to certain statements of his and that before I carried out this instruction I had received a further one so that I would now discuss both matters. I then read what I entitled "Notes for Conversation with the Prime Minister". The first part of this impressed upon him our policy of aid for Great Britain and the determination of the American people and their Government to carry out this policy to the end of defeating the aggressors. The second part is as follows. "The information which I am instructed to request from you relates to a statement in your St. Patrick's Day broadcast recorded as follows 'that both sides in blockading each other were blockading us.' This statement, according to the official report December 16 debates in the Dail, was repeated by you in debate on April 3, 1941, and in substance was reiterated by the Vice Premier in the Senate on March 19th. It appears therefore to be a considered statement. If in fact it be such a considered statement is my Government to understand that it is the policy of the Irish Government to represent to the American people that Britain is blockading Ireland? The facts as known to the American Government appear not to support this view. Available statistics indicate that the value of Irish imports from Britain for the calendar year 1939 was generally speaking a normal average, although the war began in September; that for the calendar year 1940 the value of imports from Britain instead of diminishing actually increased to the extent of several hundred thousand pounds over 1939; that in spite of extremely adverse conditions created by British shortages and the German blockade Irish imports from Britain during the early months of the present year remained at approximately three quarters of the value of those for the corresponding months of the previous year. Furthermore from the best sources of information available substantially all imports that you have been receiving for a considerable period have come from England or in British ships or neutral ships convoyed by British sea power although you have made no contribution to the safety of British sea-borne commerce. It is further on record that your Government has announced the sinking by Germany of various Irish vessels and of attacks on others but no charge has been made that Britain has attacked your shipping." At this point he flushed angrily and shouted that it was impertinent to question the statements of a head of a state. I said that I would not argue that but that I wished to point out that he had made his statement at a time of tense feeling in America when anti-British elements to whom he chiefly appealed had attempted to defeat the present administration, the Lend and Lease Law, and was now engaged in sabotaging our Aid for Britain policy; that he could not expect that support given these elements could be ignored. I then continued from my "notes": "Unless therefore there is some interpretation of your statement other than its plain meaning it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in omitting to state these pertinent facts in the course of a broadcast purporting as head of the Irish Government to inform the American people of conditions in Ireland and in framing your statement as you did you intended to put a responsibility on Great Britain for Irish privations equal to that imposed on Germany and to withhold credit from Great Britain for her services in supplying you in the measure that she has. The effect of creating such an impression on your American audience as you must see, whether or not it was so intended, could only be to excite antagonism against that nation which it is our national policy to aid, and thus to weaken popular support in America for that policy. It is obvious that in the present emergency policies antagonistic to the British war effort are antagonistic to American interests." He then calmed down and said that the plain meaning of the statement showed that there was no intent to incite anti-British sentiment. I proceeded to read a paraphrase of your telegram No. 18 which I entitled Memorandum for Conversation with the Prime Minister. At the end he said... that Aiken like himself realized that a German victory would be a calamity for Ireland though he could not do more about it than he [apparent omission] doing. A long discussion followed on this line. He stated that Under Secretary and Churchill's reference to the ports excited anti-British sentiment. He also said that he had evidence from high Irish civil servants that Great Britain was preparing to shut down on supplies and that he had made the statement in the broadcast because he wanted to show Great Britain that he knew they were contemplating a blockade. This seems at variance with his contention that no anti-British significance attached to the broadcast statement. He asked me what we wanted him to do about the statement. I said we had no wish to embarrass him and that I would report that I was assured that he had no intention of inciting American sentiment against Great Britain and that would be the end of it. He said that certain of his friends thought that I was more British than the British and would do better to mind American interests. I replied that for the duration of the present emergency I considered British interests the same as American interests. He said that he understood that though others did not. I asked him to send for me when he had come to a decision about the two views and handed him a copy of the memorandum I had read. I think the effect of a stiff attitude will be sobering. It is the only way to impress him that there are realities closing in upon him. No one has ever taken this line with him. He always outmaneuvered Chamberlain.20 I no longer hope to get anything from him by generosity and conciliation. He must be made to realize that it is possible that a situation is approaching in which if it be essential to survival his ports will be seized with the approval of the liberal sentiment of the world, that he will have only the choice of fighting on the side of Great Britain or Germany. 20 Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, May 28, 1937, to May 10, 1940. The Under Secretary's memorandum of conversation with Aiken just received. Very helpful here. Full report by mail. GRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/11291 The Irish Legation to the Department of State The following is the text of the reply: WASHINGTON, May 15, 1941. On April 28th, the American Minister, under instructions from his Government,21 read to Mr. de Valera a memorandum which he subsequently left with him. [Here follows a summation of the contents of the memorandum read by Minister Gray to Mr. de Valera.] The Irish Government appreciates the frank recognition by the Government of the United States of Ireland's right and determination to preserve its neutrality. They have never felt that the United States would adopt any other attitude. They are consequently at a loss to understand what it is intended to convey by the statement "there is a clear distinction between such a policy and one which at least potentially affords real encouragement to the Government of Germany". They can only assume that there is some fundamental misunderstanding as to Ireland's neutrality and her attitude towards Great Britain at the present time. The fact is that notwithstanding difficulties inherent in situation by partition, the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain had steadily improved down to the beginning of the war. A considerable degree of co-operation exists between the two Countries and the resulting friendliness, so far as Ireland is concerned, has continued to the present moment. As early as 1935 the Irish Government had declared it to be their firm policy not to allow their territory to be used as a basis of attack on Britain. In consequence of this and for the first time in several centuries, Britain whilst engaged in a continental war has not had to reckon with a hostile Ireland. In fact in a number of ways Ireland has given Britain very real help. Our neutrality has been a benevolent one, and consequently we have leaned on the side of helpful and sympathetic understanding. The Irish Government intends to maintain their attitude of friendliness to Great Britain, but their primary duty-like that of all Governments-is to provide for safety of their own nation and people. Participation in the present war, or acts likely to lead to involvement in war, are inconsistent with that duty and are therefore out of the question. 21 See telegram No. 18, April 25, 6 p. m., to the Minister in Ireland, p. 226. |