With a Christian civilization nearly 2000 years old, and with a consistent record of fighting for freedom longer perhaps than that of any other nation, Ireland has long proved her devotion to the cause of justice and freedom of the human spirit, and no one can deny she has contributed her share to the moral foundation on which the laws of men and of nations are built. But at this moment Ireland's survival as a nation and the safety of the remnant of her long persecuted people depends on the maintenance of her neutrality. The Irish Government believe that the American Government would not lead their people into war or into the risk of war if America were in the same defenseless position as Ireland is, and they feel that it is hardly just to urge Ireland to a course which other nations, in similar circumstances, would be quick to reject. The Irish people have made no attempts to dictate to any other people what their national policy should be, and they do no more than claim themselves the same absolute right to judge and decide the manner best calculated to safeguard their own vital interests. The Irish Government are grateful for the reference to the traditional and intimate friendship between the American and Irish peoples, and for the offer of negotiations with a view to the acquisition of two cargo ships. Ireland's needs for the ships is great and possession of them might well mean the difference between extreme hardship and a hardship which would be tolerable. The manner, however, in which the offer is made and the suggestion of certain implied conditions render it impossible for the Irish Government to accept. They cannot agree that the estimate of Mr. Aiken's attitude and the criticism directed against him is just. Nor have we had any communication which would support the contention that prior to Mr. Aiken's arrival negotiations in regard to food and ships had been proceeding satisfactorily. In the view of the Irish Government based on long experience and intimate knowledge of Mr. Aiken as a colleague, he is not less welldisposed to Great Britain than the other members of the Irish Government, although of course like them he regards it as his duty to place the interests of his own country first. The Irish Government regards it as a matter for deep regret that officials of the United States Government concerned should have come to a different conclusion. 740.0011 European War 1939/11035: Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN, May 17, 1941-4 p. m. [Received May 17-3: 13 p. m.] 46. I received last night a transcript of the message which the Prime Minister sent to Brennan to deliver to you as an answer to my in 409021-59-16 structed conversation with him on April 28 as reported in my telegram No. 42, May 1, 7 p. m. After a few introductory sentences I today made acknowledgment to Mr. de Valera in the following manner: I have received a copy of the memorandum 22 which you have instructed your Minister in Washington to read to the Secretary of State in reply to our conversation of April 28 last. Thank you for your courtesy in sending me this. It is of course beyond my province to comment upon your reply or to forecast the impression that it may make upon my Government but it makes clear to me the tragedy of the divergence of our national viewpoints and of our mutual misunderstanding of each other's position. Unless I misinterpret American public opinion the great American majority fail to appreciate the political difficulties that would confront you were you to take a more anti-Axis position and also the sacrifices of civilian life and property which German reprisals would probably impose. On the other hand Irish public opinion seems not to realize that the American people are engaged in a conflict for survival as a free nation, a conflict which they are as reluctant to enter as are the Irish people. In the view of American public opinion Irish survival depends upon the outcome of this conflict equally with American survival and the circumstance that Ireland would benefit by American sacrifices yet withhold not merely help but sympathy engenders a regrettable bitterness and a tendency in the American newspapers to question rights under international law claimed by those who disclaim responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of international law. We have discussed these points repeatedly and with great frankness. I touch upon them again because, unless some formula of reconciliation of the two views be found, I fear our traditional relation is imperiled. Personally I refuse to believe that any situation is hopeless to men of good will. I am informed most confidentially that an Irish opposition leader has delivered a memorandum to the Prime Minister demanding Aiken's recall and warning him that the opposition will not support a policy that antagonizes America. GRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/11202 : Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN [undated.] [Received May 22, 1941-3: 35 p. m.] 52. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. There is still no editorial or Government comment on the President's offer of two ships and wheat. 22 Supra. Informed authoritatively that Duff Cooper's 23 statement regarding respect of Irish neutrality was made without the knowledge of the Cabinet. I am also informed confidentially from Irish sources conscription is likely to be applied to Northern Ireland this week and that Irish Government anticipate serious trouble both in the North and South when Irish Catholic Nationalists are drafted. Have checked this information with British sources and hear conscription is likely to be imminent. This is likely to have reactions here that might create political embarrassment to us in the present phase of the situation. It is possible that this Government would exploit them to the full. Can discover no reason why Ulster conscription should not wait for several months. It will also seriously hamper the opposition on which we must rely. GRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/11272: Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN, May 24, 1941-1 p. m. [Received 2:50 p. m.] 54. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I am confidentially informed that Mr. Churchill 23a intends on Friday next to announce the operation of conscription in Ulster. The Irish Nationalist Conference in the North yesterday adopted this pledge: "Denying the right of the Churchill Government to enforce compulsory conscription in Ireland we pledge ourselves solemnly to one another to resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal consonant with the law of God." Eire Government leaders yesterday conferred with leaders of both opposition parties. This is the news leader this morning. Opposition leaders yesterday informed me that conscription without a conscientious objector's escape clause for minority Catholic nationalists will constitute a major irretrievable and probably fatal political blunder at this time and play directly into de Valera's hands with grave possibilities for American interests. They predict draft riots, the escape of draft dodgers to Southern Ireland who will be acclaimed as hero martyrs by three-quarters of the population and the fomenting of trouble by Republicans and Fifth Columnists. The clearest headed leader predicts that de Valera will seize the opportunity to escape from economic and political realities by proclaiming himself the leader of the oppressed minority and with the blessings of 23 Alfred Duff Cooper, British Minister of Information. the Cardinal will rouse anti-British feeling and call a Holy War. I think it a very likely prediction. All classes of opinion here unite in condemning the move as calamitous. It appears to be a repetition of the same fatal blunder made during the last war. The weak and failing Ulster Government is probably seeking to sustain itself by provoking a crisis. Unless Great Britain is prepared from a military point of view to seize the whole country it appears to be madness. So little can be gained and so much lost. Eighty thousand Irish volunteers in British Army will be disaffected, there will be no material number of Nationalist conscripts, a government, a popular majority and an army inclined to be friendly to Great Britain rather than to the Axis will become definitely hostile, possibly giving active aid to Germany and most important of all the pro-British opposition will be helpless and the opportunity for dividing the country on the question of the ports will be lost for the duration [apparent. omission]. The effect on Irish-American opinion at this juncture is not for me to estimate. This is a grave situation. I talked with Winant 24 last night. He had heard no discussion of the matter. I shall probably acquaint the Irish Prime Minister with the purport of this telegram and ask him for constructive suggestions. However justified our complaints of Irish-American pressure group methods opposing our aid for Britain policy I believe our interest and Irish interests the same in this matter. If the Secretary and Under Secretary are not immediately available please rush this to the President. GRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/11291 The Department of State to the Irish Legation MEMORANDUM The Secretary of State has read the memorandum which the Irish Minister left at the Department on May 15, 1941 and notes the interpretations placed upon the memorandum which the American Minister at Dublin left with Prime Minister de Valera on April 28 and the divergence of views which the Irish Minister apparently believes exists between the Irish and American Governments. The offer of the American Government made through the American Minister in Dublin on April 28 to enter into negotiations with the Irish Government for the acquisition by the latter of two freight vessels was made unconditionally and based only upon the close and traditional friendship between the American and the Irish peoples. It was made, despite an acute shipping shortage, through a sincere 24 John G. Winant, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom. desire on the part of the United States to aid in the transportation of essential food supplies to Ireland and to alleviate the situation of the Irish people in their present difficult circumstances. It is needless to repeat here that the United States has no desire to attempt to influence the Irish Government in the direction of its national policies, including measures looking to the safety of the Irish nation and people. In a like manner the American Government feels certain that, with regard to the question of arms, munitions, and war supplies, the Irish Government does not question the policy of the American Government in retaining these articles for its own defense or sharing them with those nations now defending themselves against aggression and whose defense is deemed vital to the defense of the United States. The American Government reaffirms its desire at all times to give every consideration to the needs of the Irish people and to the requests of the Irish Government. WASHINGTON, May 24, 1941. 740.0011 European War 1939/11288: Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN, May 25, 1941-8 p. m. [Received May 26-1:06 a. m.] 55. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Reference my telegram No. 54, May 24, 1 p. m. After sending this telegram yesterday I sent the Prime Minister the purport of the three recent telegrams on this subject, obviously reserving certain details. I said that if he were interested I would be glad to receive constructive suggestions by telephone. At 5 o'clock he telephoned apparently grateful for my good offices. He said it was exactly such a presentation of the subject as he would make if he were himself dealing with it objectively. He had no suggestions. I said I would be glad to work with him and would keep him informed if I had word from my Government. His friendly tone pleased and surprised me as only last Tuesday I am informed he told an opposition leader that I had misrepresented Ireland to you, that if the situation were not so tense and if I were not a friend of the President he would ask for my recall. At 8 o'clock he telephoned asking me to call him. I called him at 11:30. His tone had changed, he said that I had asked for constructive suggestions and he wished now to make it clear that my proposal of a so-called escape clause for Catholics would not be satisfactory, that he could not accept conscription for Irishmen. I said, "Do you mean that Orangemen cannot conscript each other?" He evaded this point |