Since the President's statement appeared, Mr. De Valera has dealt with this matter. Speaking at Ennis, County Clare, on Saturday, June 28, 1941, he stated: "We have pledged to defend ourselves against attack no matter from what quarter it comes. That is our duty from the point of view of neutrality. It is to our interests to do that and nobody can have the slightest doubt that it is our intention to defend ourselves to the utmost against attack no matter from whom it comes." In the course of a statement in Dail Eireann on Tuesday, July 8, 1941, Mr. De Valera said: "Our determination to resist attack in all circumstances had been frequently repeated and made abundantly clear." In a debate in Dail Eireann on the same day members of the Opposition commented on President Roosevelt's statement and also referred to Ireland's determination to resist attack from any quarter. General Mulcahy, a leader of the Opposition, said: "We could not afford to allow such a misunderstanding. The Taoiseach (Mr. De Valera) should tell President Roosevelt that our policy was complete neutrality and that we intended to resist all aggressors." Mr. James Dillon, another Opposition leader, said: "Opportunities should be taken to express to President Roosevelt the firm resolution of this country to meet with all the resources at its disposal aggression whence ever it might come.” Mr. De Valera in replying to this on Wednesday, the 9th July 1941 said: "If one fact were universally known it was that the nation was neutral and had organized all means at its disposal to defend itself against attack coming from any quarter. That was known to every State represented here and to every State in which we were represented." In view of the foregoing the Minister finds it difficult to understand how the President could have made a statement so much in conflict with the repeated declarations of the Irish Government on this matter and, in view of the embarrassment caused to his Government, he is instructed to inquire how President Roosevelt's statement is to be interpreted. 841D.24/70: Telegram The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State DUBLIN, July 21, 1941-8 p. m. [Received 11:40 p. m.] 75. Saturday, July 18, I called upon the Prime Minister at his request. He asked me if I could explain the meaning of the remark attributed to the President to the effect that he had no proof that arms supplied to Ireland would be used against the Germans. Mr. de Valera had intimated in the Dail the day before that I must know of his repeated public assurances that Ireland would resist any aggressor. I told him that the reported text of all his pronouncements on this subject had been sent to Washington with the comment that there was no doubt that he meant what he said. Further, that I had never in my despatches to you discussed the subject of undertakings except as I had discussed them with him relative to my personal change of position regarding obtaining arms for Ireland as set out in the memorandum of my conversation with him on January 22,33 a copy of which he has. I said that I had no knowledge as to whether the President made the observation in question and that if he had made it I had no information as to its having any special significance beyond its plain meaning. He stressed the point that it seemed unreasonable to 34 further undertakings he had repeatedly made in public think there is a possibility that if there were arms available and the condition of obtaining them was an explicit agreement to be in the war full associate affording purpose of facilities except expeditionary forces, the moment was attacked by Germany he would [?] 35 I suggested that without [apparent omission] but judging from the unfolding of events it looked as if the British with American technical employees intended to make a fortress of Ulster and not to concern themselves further about Ireland, that the help that we mentioned was not infantry for the defense of the island but air and sea bases for the battle of the Atlantic. He asked me if I thought we contemplated taking over base in Ulster. I said that all I knew was what I read in the papers attributed to Mr. Willkie, but that I would not say that it might not be a possibility. He said that in that case his Government would be concerned since, although they recognized the de facto occupation of the six counties by Great Britain, they could not waive their right of sovereignty over that territory. I said that this was a suggestion which I could not entertain and one which he must take up with you through his own Minister. I took occasion to try to impress upon the Prime Minister, what I have tried to impress upon other members of his Government and opposition without success, that the Irish extremists in America along with other anti-British groups were creating the impression that Ireland was anti-British and that Mr. Aiken's addresses to them had strengthened this impression and that he must prepare himself for 33 Not printed, but see telegram No. 14, January 25, 5 p. m., from the Minister in Ireland, p. 217. 24 The remainder of this sentence is apparently garbled. 85 Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President in 1940. He ap a very general loss of American sympathy if nothing worse. peared unaware of the possibilities latent in an investigation of these subversive groups. GRAY 841D.24/70: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray) WASHINGTON, July 31, 1941-7 p. m. 40. Your 75, July 21, 8 p. m. Department received note dated July 15 from Irish Legation on this subject and on July 30 made the following reply: "The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Ireland and refers to the Irish Legation's note dated July 15, 1941 concerning a statement understood to have been made by the President on June 27, 1941 on the attitude of the Irish Government in the event of an attack by Germany. The Irish Minister states that he has been instructed to inquire how the President's statement is to be interpreted. The American Government has been aware of the firm policy of the Irish Government, proclaimed by Prime Minister De Valera as early as 1935, not to allow its territory under any conditions whatever to be used as a base of attack against Great Britain. The American Government has also been aware of the determination of the Irish Government, repeatedly declared by Mr. De Valera since the outbreak of hostilities, to defend itself against aggression from any quarter. The American Government realizes fully the strategic position which Ireland occupies and the constant danger of an attack from Germany either against Ireland alone or as a part of a broader campaign against the whole British Isles. In these circumstances, and in view of the close and traditional friendship between both the peoples and Governments of the United States and Ireland, the American Government has desired at all times to assist in every feasible way the building up of the defenses of Ireland. The President, however, while not doubting that Ireland would use the means at its disposal to resist any German invasion, has not felt with certainty that Ireland unassisted could successfully repel a determined German attack. In such event, arms provided to Ireland would not only reduce the available supplies so urgently needed by the United States and Great Britain but would in all probability fall into the hands of Germany. The American Government has, therefore, to contemplate the possibility that any effort on its part to assist Ireland by the provision of arms might in the end merely add to the power of the very nation in whose defeat the United States has pledged its full material assistance. The President has been all the more impressed with this possibility since, according to his understanding, no arrangements have been completed between the Irish and the British Governments, in the way of staff talks or otherwise, for cooperation between their respective forces in repelling any attempted invasion of Ireland by Germany. It is perhaps unnecessary to refer to the long list of countries in Europe which, in the hope of remaining neutral, have neglected their defense plans only to fall victims, one after another, of wanton German aggression. The Irish Government is already aware of the conclusion reached by the American Government that all military and naval matériel now produced in the United States and not required by the National rearmament program must continue to be made available to the British Empire and to nations engaged in resisting aggression. The American Government perceives no grounds on which it can reach a different decision at this time." WELLES 841D.48/57 The Secretary of State to the Irish Minister (Brennan) [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1941. SIR: I have the honor to refer to your conversation of July 15 with Mr. Welles in which you expressed the hope of the Irish Government that the United States might find it possible to sell or charter to the Irish Government four or five ships in addition to the two ships for which the Irish Government is now negotiating. The Department of State in consultation with other appropriate agencies of this Government has given very thorough and sympathetic consideration to your request. I deeply regret, however, that under present conditions and in view of the shipping requirements of the United States, it has not been found possible to make available to the Irish Government additional vessels either through sale or charter. As the Department stated in its memorandum of May 24, 1941, the offer of the American Government to make available to the Irish Government two freight vessels was made in the face of an acute shipping shortage in the United States and only because this Government desired to aid in the transportation of essential food supplies to Ireland and to alleviate the situation of the Irish people in their present difficult circumstances. This Government desires now, as always, to give every consideration to the needs of Ireland and it is a matter of regret that the present shipping situation makes it impossible to go further in meeting the request presented in behalf of the Irish Government. I hope, however, that the delivery of the two vessels mentioned above may be completed at an early date and that they will help appreciably in the solution of Ireland's supply problem. Accept [etc.] For the Secretary of State: 841D.48/72 The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Secretary of State WASHINGTON, 22 September, 1941. The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to The Honourable the Secretary of State, and has the honour to refer to the proposed purchase by the Irish Government of two ships from the American Government, which matter has been handled in such an extraordinary manner that it has now, after four months negotiations, reached an impasse to the bitter disappointment of the Irish Government. On May 20th, President Roosevelt made a public statement to the effect that the United States Government would make available by sale or charter two cargo ships to the Irish Government. The State Department at once showed active interest in the matter and throughout the subsequent negotiations they maintained that interest, and gave considerable help. The Minister in his first interview with the Maritime Commission made it clear that the Irish Government desired to purchase these ships. As a result of various interviews in which Mr. Joseph Brennan, Irish Vice Consul in New York acted for the Legation, the Commission agreed on June 9th to sell to the Irish Government two ships, the West Neris and the West Hematite, which were then being reconditioned at New Orleans, at a price not exceeding $70 per dead weight ton. On the strength of these arrangements the Irish Government had the vessels inspected, and sent from Ireland two crews to man them. These crews arrived at New Orleans before the repairs were finished. Also the Irish Government had incurred the expense of degaussing the ships. Meanwhile the method of payment had been the subject of prolonged discussions between the Legation and the State Department on the one hand, and between the State Department and the Maritime Commission on the other, but these discussions did not hold up matters because the ships were not yet ready. On August 23rd, a contract for the sale of the two ships was submitted by the Maritime Commission to the Legation for signature. This contract mentioned no price but stated that the ships were to be paid for in dollars or Irish currency. The Irish Consul General who had been authorized to sign on behalf of Irish Shipping Limited raised the points that there was no warranty of seaworthiness in the contract, and that the price of $70 per ton should be included. While these points were being discussed it transpired that the Maritime Commission discovered the contract was illegal and that they could not sell except by competitive tender or by Lease Lend. They offered to deal with the matter under the provisions of the Lease Lend |