740.0011 European War 1939/10388: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) WASHINGTON, April 30, 1941-8 p. m. 108. Your 349, April 27. Department approves of your action in this matter. 740.0011 European War 1939/10896: Telegram HULL The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, May 12, 1941–9 p. m. [Received May 14-2:40 a. m.] 472. My 465, May 12, noon.16 In taking note of the certain recent relaxation of tension in respect of the situation in the western desert I have gained the impression that, although it would appear that confidence may be based to a certain extent on factors of doubtful weight such as the effect of summer heat on desert operations, considered opinion in certain quarters finds reason for slightly increased confidence in the fact that from available information the enemy do not appear to have been able to strengthen their forces to the extent which had originally been feared and in the further consideration that the British have in fact improved their defensive position in that area. There is no intention however to minimize the continued preoccupation as to possible developments in that area. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/11256: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, May 23, 1941-10 a. m. [Received May 24-5:47 p. m.] 566. My 319, April 23, 11 a. m., and my 428, May 7, 5 p. m., last paragraph.17 The following is what I regard as an authentic statement of some of the deficiencies with which the British forces in the western desert have been and are contending as revealed by expert observation during the most part in that area: (1) Lack of sufficient armored firing vehicles of the cruiser and infantry type tank with experienced operators. (2) Lack of sufficient artillery of all categories. (3) Lack of airplanes and failure on the part of the Royal Air Force to cooperate with the armored units and artillery. 16 Not printed. 17 Latter not printed. (4) Insufficient spare parts for maintenance of vehicles in the field. (5) Defective operation of field telephone and wireless systems. (6) Defective repair of road used by supply columns. (7) Practice of committing forces in combat without holding out reserve troops. (8) Lack of proper intelligence as to the enemy's strength and capabilities. As a result of the foregoing deficiencies the attitude among the commanding British officers in the field was to remain on the defensive and not take the offensive. For what it may be worth, I add that a German officer who was taken prisoner during the latest operations in the western desert stated that the mission of the Axis forces in North Africa was to take Egypt in 80 days but did not divulge the date of expiration of the time limit. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/11459: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, May 29, 1941-11 a. m. [Received May 30-7 p. m.] 607. The fact that Aziz al Masri Pasha and the other political offenders mentioned in my 532, May 19, 4 p. m.,18 still remain at large continues to preoccupy the Egyptian authorities who are said not only to be intensifying their efforts to apprehend these fugitives but also to be taking steps to combat fifth column and general subversive activities which are said to have increased noticeably of late as a result of German successes in Greece, Libya and Crete and the extension of their activity into Syria and Iraq with the consequent internal repercussions. Significant developments along these lines may be seen in the transfer of . . . and efforts which are being made by the Prime Minister to establish the right of the Government to take legal action against members of Parliament in derogation of their constitutional immunity. As regards the general question of fifth column activity in Egypt British sources state that although there is a considerable amount of defeatist talk and pro-Axis propaganda emanating from both foreign colony sources and certain elements of the Egyptian population including the Turkish aristocracy and highly placed officials, there is little evidence of the organization of such activity on an important scale, a circumstance which the British are inclined to attribute largely to the effectiveness of measures taken to round up persons regarded as key enemy agents at the time of the entry of Germany and 18 Not printed. Italy into the war and the subsequent internment of a large number of suspects. On the other hand while disposed to minimize the importance of this locally conducted propaganda the British stress the considerable effect of radio broadcasts in Arabic from Bari and Berlin, particularly the latter which is admitted to be far more effective than British broadcasts for Near Eastern listeners owing partly to the manner of presentation but more particularly to the fact that Axis propagandists are in a better position to play on local prejudices such as anti-British and anti-Jewish feeling and also have a completely free hand to make the most extravagant promises irrespective of their intention or ability to fulfill them. In this latter connection it is known that it is being strongly urged in certain quarters that the British immediately make a declaration in respect of the national aspirations of the various counties of the Near East with a view to countering Axis propaganda and rallying the countries of the Near East to the cause of the democracies. It is understood, however, that those responsible for directing British Near Eastern policy while favoring such a declaration in principle are opposing its delivery until such time as the British may achieve a military success which would obviate the implication that it was being made under duress. In the meantime the question is being mooted as to whether the same results might not be attained by the delivery in secret of assurances to responsible leaders destined to satisfy the Nationalist aims among the people of this area and in this conception the role of the United States is envisaged as the one country whose ascendency will be unchallenged when the foundations are laid for a durable peace. In summary it may be said that although there are certain evidences of loosely organized Axis propaganda in Egypt and although recent German successes have tended to accentuate defeatist and fifth column activity and to necessitate the taking of more stringent restrictive measures by the Egyptian Government, the situation here is not regarded as critical for the moment. It is generally believed, however, that the situation might quickly become ominous should subsequent developments make it. KIRK 841.24/5601: Telegram The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State LONDON, June 3, 1941-2 p. m. [Received June 3-9: 33 a. m.] 2252. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person. "I am finding it necessary to build up a much stronger organization of the rear ward services in the Middle East to sustain the large forces now gathering in and about the Nile Valley and an important mission is going out by air, comprising high military and civilian experts. We must consider the formation of a well-equipped base, either at Port Sudan (as your son suggested) or/and at Massawa near which lies the town of Asmara with its fine buildings in order to arrange for the reception of American materials which you are sending to us in increasing quantities. American tanks and American aircraft require a good sprinkling of American civilian volunteer personnel to instruct us in their use and help keep them serviceable. I should be grateful if you would allow Averell Harriman 19 to go out with the mission as independent observer, taking with him one or two of his own assistants. He would then be able to advise upon the best measures to be taken to ensure the most efficient use of all that you are sending. He is quite willing to go; indeed, he would like it. The trip might take him 6 weeks but it would be well worth it." JOHNSON 841.24/560: Telegram The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State LONDON, June 3, 1941-4 p. m. [Received June 3-2:30 p. m.] 2255. Personal for the President from Harriman. The Prime Minister has cabled you today requesting your approval my accompanying British group being sent to Middle East to deal with supply problems there. He wants to avoid delays in connection with American equipment and have plans made for facilities and enough American personnel to insure proper use and maintenance. He is familiar with the way we have been working out similar problems with the British Ministries and services here. It is my fear, and I believe well grounded, that unless the matter is taken in hand now there will be congestion at the ports and delays in all other ways which will minimize the value of the supplies you are sending. In addition, the Prime Minister is desirous of getting an independent view of the transportation and supply problems there. I am ready and anxious to go as there is an essential job to be done. The work of this office is so organized that it can carry on. I would expect to arrange that final responsibility during my absence be di 19 W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with the rank of Minister, responsible for expediting lend-lease aid to the British Empire. vided between the Military and Naval Attachés. We have been working so closely together that they are familiar with the activities of this office. I would plan to take with me General Royce on aviation and Colonel Green on tanks and motor vehicles. I can cover details of the transportation problems myself. It is my opinion that on balance my next 6 weeks could be more productive on this trip than in London. [Harriman.] JOHNSON 841.24/560%: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) WASHINGTON, June 3, 1941-11 p. m. 1937. For Johnson and Harriman from Hopkins.20 President approves your accompanying British group to the Middle-east. Good luck. [Hopkins.] HULL 740.0011 European War 1939/11748: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 6, 1941-10 a. m. [Received June 8-1:05 p. m.] 663. The lull in military activity following the termination of the Crete campaign has given rise to speculation as to when and where the next major action in this area may take place and attention in this connection is now centering particularly on the possibility of an early attempt of the British to occupy Syria in advance of the Germans.21 It is pointed out, however, that in the absence of a stronger and better equipped Allied invading force decision in the matter is rendered difficult by apprehension as to the attitude of the French Army and the native population in Syria as well as to the opposition which the Germans might be able to bring to bear. Although the preparations in process point to an immediate action in this direction the delay which has already occurred has given rise to the fear that if it is further postponed while awaiting a propitious moment the consequences will be the entire loss of such initiative as the British and Free French may now have in the matter. In the meantime the Germans are believed to have been able to increase their already 20 Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility at this time for Lend-Lease affairs. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 725 ff. |