strong forces in the western desert and only to be waiting for a favorable occasion to launch an attack on Egypt which in the opinion of many observers will probably be timed to coincide with activity in Syria and with intensive German air activity directed particularly against the British Fleet and the Canal Zone. In any candid appraisal of the present situation here mention should also be made of the apparent recent deterioration in British morale which manifests itself in widespread criticism of decisions of responsible officers; recrimination between the various service branches directed particularly at the R. A. F. for alleged failure to cooperate; intense bitterness on the part of New Zealanders and Australians, many of whom feel they were uselessly sacrificed in Greece and Crete and say openly that they have had enough of fighting under the British and want to go home; a feeling of defeatism which seems to have its principal asylum in the new generally accepted belief that the [apparent omission] by the British in Libya, Greece, Crete were largely the result of inadequacy of equipment and that further combat under similar circumstances will only yield the same result. Furthermore, this deterioration in morale has not been without effect on the Egyptians and has increased seriousness of problem of British resistance here in the face of possible defection among the population and even highly placed Egyptians, returns of which may well become articulate under increased Nazi pressure. It is, of course, conceivable that Hitler's plans may exclude an extension of action in this area or that he will postpone it for a matter of weeks. It is illogical, however, to assume that the threat is not immediate and in view of the gravity of the far-reaching consequences of an easy German success in the Middle East not only from the point of view of prestige but also from the more practical considerations of oil supplies, communications and the maintenance of strategical position essential for the prosecution of the war in this general area there would appear to be no other choice than to strengthen immediately the will and capacity to resist further Nazi aggression in the Mediterranean and Near East. The deterioration in morale, both British and Egyptian, would be counteracted by a more open participation in the war on the part of the United States and the capacity to resist would be immeasurably increased by the speedy development of more inspired and courageous leadership here and by the immediate arrival of needed war material. As regards the first two factors higher questions of policy are involved than can be evaluated from this point but in spite of all possible probing I am not satisfied that the immediate increase of equipment, particularly airplanes, is physically impossible and there is every reason to believe that with the arrival here by air in the immediate future of two hun dred bombers and the hundred fighters with supplies, an air superiority would accrue to the British which alone could give the advantage against the Germans. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/11750: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 7, 1941-1 p. m. [Received 4:10 p. m.] 670. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 663, June 6, 10 a. m. I have just been informed by highest aviation authorities here that greatest contribution that the United States could now make towards successful prosecution of the war would be immediate delivery by air direct or via carriers of bomber and fighter planes to the west coast of Africa for use there as well as at points further east and that such a delivery within 2 or 3 weeks might well prove crucial to the British stand in this area. I am told that a matter of great but secondary importance is the transport by air of experts from airplane works in the United States to assist in the assembling and conditioning of American planes already delivered to RAF Middle East or to arrive. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/12384: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 22, 1941-5 p. m. [Received June 23-11:45 p. m.] 796. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. From the standpoint of the potentialities of this area in the further prosecution of the war, I hope that the German attack on Soviet Russia will be regarded merely as furnishing a possible temporary respite during which the military machine here may be strengthened with all speed both for the purpose of resistance as well as for an eventual striking force against Nazi power in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East. To that end the measures already adopted should continue unabated and no additional effort, both in the United States and in the British Empire, should be spared. By the same token British air action against Germany should be accentuated and every advantage should be taken of the present Nazi concentration to the east without relying upon the strength, the duration and even the sincerity of Soviet resistance or without taking com fort from the thought that this last venture of Hitler's may bring his downfall. It is certain that no reliance can be placed on the continuity of Soviet policy for in the last analysis Stalin is no more the friend of democracy than is Hitler and his ultimate aim is that neither side win. KIRK 841.248/930: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 25, 1941-7 p. m. [Received June 28-3:35 p. m.] 822. Personal for Hopkins from Harriman. British plans for reorganization here recommend in cable to Prime Minister appointment of senior officer to coordinate and control supply for three services, including transport and maintenance facilities, etc. If approved we will be asked to have here man to deal with this officer and a committee working with him from three services and War Transport Ministry. He can be either competent civilian or high ranking officer. This set-up would give opportunity to insure better handling of American equipment and as we have increasing investment this area I would strongly recommend complying with request if made. Although I do not suggest representatives of our services and Maritime Commission should report to this man, he should be senior in standing and available to help them get results and also coordinate their activities. Robinson, representative of Maritime Commission, I like and he is considered competent, but naturally his effectiveness on major matters is limited because he is a British subject. The Army should have a representative charged with responsibility to cooperate with British in use and maintenance of American equipment separate from normal function of Military Attaché. Consider Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Piburn now observer here thoroughly competent to fill this position. General Royce's 21a comments on Air Corps representatives follows which please pass on to General Arnold: 22 "It is believed that insufficient officers of Air Corps are now in Egypt. Captain Perrin is now performing normal intelligence work with air force agencies and gives practically no time to maintenance activities. Major Duke is engaged in making a survey in the Egyptian Army. Two junior officers Meng and Momyer are trying to be 21a Presumably Gen. Ralph Royce, Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, London. 22 Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces. of some help to R. A. F. units erecting American aircraft. No officers here of sufficient rank properly to contact the higher R. A. F. officers and no one who has any direct communication with you except through M. I. D.23 Loss of Brower, 24 who did a great work here, is very much felt and he should be replaced by an officer of similar ability as soon as possible. Also recommended that at least two officers of bombardment, pursuit, observation and maintenance be sent as additional observers who may also help with American equipment." I know Air Marshal Tedder 25 would greatly appreciate acceptance Royce's recommendations. Please discuss substance this cable and advise reactions and if acceptable in principle whether it should be carried out in form of a special Lend-Lease mission or a set-up similar to line in London or through strengthening the service attachés' offices and expanding their duties. [Harriman.] KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/12384: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) WASHINGTON, June 26, 1941-4 p. m. 244. Your 796, June 22, 5 p. m. You may be sure that this Government has fully in mind the points mentioned in your telegram under reference, and that everything is being done to provide effective assistance to the British forces in the Middle East at the greatest rate possible. I appreciate your message and hope you will continue to send me your views and recommendations as to the general situation. WELLES 740.0011 European War 1939/12523: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 26, 1941-4 p. m. [Received 8:30 p. m.] 819. My 812, June 24, 6 p. m.26 This morning's press reports that in the course of a debate [in?] the Senate yesterday on air raid measures the Prime Minister stated that he had discussed with the British authorities the matter of declaring Cairo an open city and Military Intelligence Division. 24 Col. Gerald E. Brower, former air observer and Assistant Military Attaché in Egypt, who was killed at El Obeid, April 20, 1941. 25 Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, commanding the Royal Air Force in the Middle East. 26 Not printed. 409021-59- -19 that he hoped to be able to report at an early date the successful conclusion of these negotiations. The Legation understands in this connection that plans were in an advanced stage about a month ago for the transfer of British general headquarters from Cairo to the canal area but that the project was allowed to drop owing to events taking a less immediately critical turn. It may be noted in this connection that aside from such benefit as might accrue to the British by meeting Egyptian wishes in respect to declaring Cairo an open city, the opinion prevails in certain quarters here that a considerable improvement in the efficient functioning of British general headquarters might be effected by its removal from Cairo to a place where social amenities would impinge to a lesser degree on professional activity. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/12838: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, July 2, 1941-10 a. m. [Received July 6-8:10 a. m.] 27 858. My 819, June 25 [26], 4 p. m. The Legation is confidentially informed that the British Ambassador has recently been approached indirectly by the Wafd " regarding the declaration of Cairo and other places in Egypt as open cities. Although the move is regarded essentially as a political maneuver of the Wafd to regain political prestige the British appear to be somewhat perturbed owing to the serious consequences which might result if the Wafd deviated from its policy of inactive opposition and undertook a campaign of active opposition to the Government and the British on an issue so potentially inflammable as the open city question. As a consequence the Embassy is understood to be consulting with the British military on the matter but as far as is known no decision has as yet been reached. It is understood in this connection that certain British circles would prefer the maintenance of the policy of attempting to avert an attack on Cairo by threatening to bomb Rome in retaliation but that it is a question whether under existing circumstances such a threat would be as effective as in the past in respect to Cairo or as it was believed to have been in assuring the protection of Athens. As regards the general question of agitation for return of the Wafd to power the following are reasons which the British [apparent omission] for opposing such action at this time: (1) the desire to avoid giving offense to the palace which is anti-Wafdist; (2) the disruptive 27 Egyptian Nationalist Party. |