The British Chiefs of Staff are essentially responsible for furnishing the British forces in the Near East with reinforcements, equipment and supplies. About 50 percent of all combat airplanes made in this country are allocated to the British under existing schedules. It is not considered practicable at the present time further to reduce deliveries to our own forces, as provision for the minimum requirements of our Air Force program would be adversely affected by such a course. WELLES 740.0011 European War 1939/13269: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, July 17, 1941-9 a. m. [Received July 18-9: 15 a. m.] 968. I appreciate very much the comments contained in Department's 292, July 14, 10 p. m., but I must point out that I am unable to concur in the view of the War Department that the urgency of the situation in this area should be regarded as having been relieved by the Russo-German conflict. I still believe, as stated in my 796, June 22, that from the point of view of defense, strong reinforcements are essential in this area until it is proved that Hitler will be stopped in the East or that if victorious there he will not move in this direction and I submit that, from the point of view of offense, increased strength in Egypt would enable the British to deal an immediate and effective blow to the Axis by extending their military action along the North African coast. It is on the foregoing account that I urge that any curtailment in the shipment of equipment to this area be based solely on the actual and insuperable deficiency of that material and not on the assumption that it may not be needed here. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/14166: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, August 19, 1941-noon. [Received August 20-1: 27 p. m.] 1184. My 968, July 17, 9 a. m. The opinion is being circulated here that owing to the present lack of trained personnel and of mechanized equipment the British will not be in a sufficiently strong position to undertake large scale operations in this area until November. If, therefore, it is in fact necessary to delay action until that time or even until later, the possibility should be envisaged that the strength now calculated for an offensive to the west may not be adequate even for defensive purposes in the face of the situation which may develop. It is conceivable that Hitler may decide not to pursue the Russian campaign in the face of continued resistance and in that event he could at a given moment cease the offensive in the East. Thereupon after a reasonable time for recuperation and preparation the German command could undertake a movement southwest through Turkey or Iran to synchronize with an attack by the Axis forces on the Canal Zone not only through the western desert but also from the sea. Speculation may be indulged in indefinitely as to the various contingencies which might alter the manner of the execution of such an undertaking or even eliminate it altogether but as long a[s it 1]ies within the realm of possibility the situation with which the British forces in this area may be confronted as a consequence thereof must be taken into consideration. The fact presents itself therefore that if it is true that it is impossible to build up at once adequate striking power in the Middle East to undertake a successful offensive against the Axis Powers while the Russian campaign is at its height, the measure of preparedness to be effective a few months hence should not be based on the scale of an eventual campaign in the western desert now, but on the necessity of withstanding a possible Axis attack on Egypt on two or three fronts with forces surpassing those previously encountered. KIRK 841.24/717: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, September 2, 1941—5 p. m. [Received September 3-8:22 a. m.] 1274. The numerous telegrams from Colonel Piburn, Lend-Lease representative here, have described the conditions affecting the discharge of American vessels at Red Sea ports and although improvements in those conditions have been effected and constant efforts are apparently being exerted with a view to further amelioration I feel that the general situation is far from satisfactory with special reference to the speedy and efficient discharge of cargo and quick turnabout of the vessels in question. I urgently recommend therefore that the Maritime Commission send here immediately a ranking representative of American nationality with expert knowledge of all problems relating to the carriage of material on American vessels proceeding from United States ports to this area in order that an intensive study of those problems from this angle may be made and on the basis thereof recommendations be submitted for a more effective supply of muchneeded equipment to Middle East. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/14922: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, September 9, 1941-5 p. m. [Received September 10-9: 55 p. m.] 1312. My 877, July 3, 9 p. m. [7 p. m.] The Legation is confidentially advised by a British Embassy source that the British authorities here are somewhat concerned by a recent recrudescence of underground agitation for the declaration of Cairo as an open city and that the British Ambassador has drawn up a memorandum for submission to the Egyptian Prime Minister in which the following arguments are adduced for not making such a declaration: 1. Past experience demonstrates that German policy is based entirely on expediency and that the Germans only observe agreements as long as it is in their interest to do so. 2. Cairo is the nerve center of Egypt particularly from the standpoint of communications and the withdrawal of British headquarters therefrom would seriously impede the war effort. 3. Even though the British military personnel now in Cairo were withdrawn there would still remain numerous installations such as telephone and telegraph centrals and railway facilities which although non-military in character would constitute legitimate military objectives. 4. Precedent in the Canal Zone and in Alexandria reveals that Axis air attacks are often made in areas where no military objectives exist in order to terrify the population and disrupt normal life. 5. Agitation for declaring Cairo an open city diverts attention from the necessity of taking adequate air raid precaution measures. 6. Agitation of this type constitutes an ideal opening for Axis propaganda designed to stir up trouble between the British and the Egyptians. In reporting the foregoing, I may add that leaving aside the question of the safety of the inhabitants of Cairo and the propaganda effect of the open city issue, the view is held in certain circles, including some British military, that from the standpoint of military efficiency it was an initial mistake to establish British headquarters in Cairo and that even at this late date its transfer would be desirable. It may be noted in this connection that an air alarm in Rome during the night of September 6-7 is reported in today's local press in such a way as to suggest a connection between that event and the recent bombing of a suburb of Cairo (see Legation's 1285, September 4, 5 p. m.32) and reference was made to the warning said to have been given the Axis at the beginning of the Greek campaign that if Athens or Cairo were attacked Rome would be bombed. "Not printed. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/15216: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, September 17, 1941-10 p.m. [Received September 19-9:55 a. m.] 1410. My 1312, September 9, 5 p. m. I am confidentially informed that the air raid on Cairo during the night of September 15-16 has given rise to increased agitation for the declaration of Cairo as an open city and that this matter was again taken up by the Prime Minister with the British Ambassador yesterday. When the latter expressed himself as opposed to such a declaration the Prime Minister is said to have requested a formal statement of the views of the British Government in the matter and it is believed that, should it be decided to furnish such a statement, it will probably follow the lines of the memorandum recently submitted by the Embassy to the Prime Minister of which the contents were summarized in my telegram under reference. In discussing this general question with the Foreign Minister 32a this morning he told me that in a recent off the record discussion with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he had expressed the opinion that it would be inexpedient to declare Cairo be [an?] open city because of its being the transportation and communication center of the country but that a good case could be made for attempting to obtain recognition of Cairo as a holy city. I may add in this connection, although the Foreign Minister did not so inform me, that the Egyptian Government is said to have recently approached certain Near Eastern countries including Turkey and Saudi Arabia with the suggestion that they urge upon the German Government the taking of appropriate measures for immunizing Cairo from bombing. Similar overtures are said to have been made through the Swedish Government which is in charge of German interests in Egypt. It may be further noted in this respect that the local press is said to have been requested by the censorship authorities to refrain from sensational display or treatment of news of the recent raid and that it has also been intimated to correspondents that reference to possible retaliatory bombing of Rome would be inopportune since this is a matter of high policy depending for decision on London. On the other hand it is understood that the press is being encouraged to use this event as a means of stimulating greater public interest in air raid precaution measures. KIRK 32a Salib Samy. 740.0011 European War 1939/15218: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, September 18, 1941-4 p. m. [Received September 20-12: 50 a. m.] 1421. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Since the month of June I have on several occasions called attention to the fact that the achievements of the armed forces of Britain in the Middle East have been restricted and the efficacy of the war effort has been impaired by the lack of coordination among the various services and the absence of a unified command. During the interval attempts have apparently been made from London to remedy these defects. The Commander-in-Chief has been changed, a Minister of State has been established here and minor alterations in system and personnel have been effected. In so far as can be observed, however, no real improvement has ensued and although it might be assumed that sufficient time has elapsed to produce apparent results the changes up to the present seem to constitute makeshift measures which have merely duplicated mechanism without improving efficiency. It is true that the Russian campaign relieved this area of the threat of immediate attack. The possibility must be faced, however, that from one cause or another the German concentration on that front may in a few weeks be reduced and judging from the past Hitler, so long as the war lasts, must direct elsewhere his armies or his air force or portions thereof and the timing for such a move would be determined by the necessity of preparation for renewed effort which as regards the air force might be accomplished in a brief interval. There is no intent to determine the point to which that effort may be directed but the fact cannot be ignored that this area is at least indicated and that it would constitute a favorable theater for winter operations. On that assumption the strengthening of the war machine in the Middle East is essential for even if it may not be required to withstand a major attack it can serve as an offensive instrument to assault the enemy over an extended radius. The strengthening of the machine through the increase in men and the accelerated flow of material especially from the United States is, it must be assumed, progressing within the limits of capabilities. That however is not enough. Those men and that material must be used to the maximum advantage. The record of past months proves that such has not been the case and many supplies have been wasted and much time has been lost. It would be useless to attempt to enumerate all the causes of this failure and futile to place the blame. The constructive step is to seek a remedy and I can only say that the most flagrant defects in administration here which have come to my atten |