tion and to the attention of those associated with me could have been cured and even avoided if there had been a unified high military command with recognized authority from London and with broad responsibility for operations in this area. I am convinced therefore that there must be established in this theater of war and established immediately a supreme British military command with jurisdiction and authority over all operations in this area, over all services involved in those operations and over all installations, maintenance and tributary organizations affecting supplies, transportation and communications connected with the prosecution of the war in the Middle East. In this way and in this way only can coordination and leadership be obtained. The natural reaction to the foregoing observations is that even if the cursory statement of the case is true and if a remedy lies along the lines indicated it is not for us to interfere. I personally, however, am unable to accept that argument as final. In the broadest sense we know that the entire existence of our country has been staked on victory and on a victory that is not too long deferred. In particular we are pouring into this area material that is hard earned and that can ill be spared from other fields. Both of these elements are being jeopardized by defective organization which could be cured or at least improved by courageous and drastic reorganization. I submit that it is our right and our duty to make this situation clear to the British and to urge with all vigor the necessary reforms. If those reforms are not effected and effected immediately it is my profound conviction that all our efforts here will prove futile and all our material aid sheer waste. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/15254: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, September 18, 1941-5 p. m. [Received September 20-8:40 a. m.] 1422. My 1410, September 17, 10 p. m. I am confidentially informed that the British Ambassador yesterday furnished the Egyptian Prime Minister at the latter's request a written statement to the effect that the declaration of Cairo as an open city would be contrary to the successful prosecution of the war. The Ambassador is said to have added that he trusted that the Prime Minister shared this view and would so express himself in any further discussion of the matter in such a way as to make it clear that he was expressing his own opinion rather than merely communicating the British view. The Ambassador is also understood to have informed the Prime Minister that the matter of bombing Rome in reprisal for the raid on Cairo during the night of September 15-16 had been taken under advisement, but that it was deemed inadvisable to take retaliatory action at this time in the light of certain other considerations affecting the war effort. The Prime Minister is said to have replied that under the circumstances he would not press the matter further. It may be observed that news reports from London appearing in today's press here give the impression that the bombing of Rome is contemplated. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/15218: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) WASHINGTON, September 27, 1941-6 p. m. 516. Your 1421, September 18, 4 p. m., is being considered with great care. Please furnish urgently a summary statement of the principal types of wastage of supplies and loss of time, traced as definitely as possible to causes. HULL 740.0011 European War 1939/15597: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, October 1, 1941-7 p. m. [Received October 4-11: 55 a. m.] 1503. Department's 516, September 30 [27]. In stating the conviction that in the absence of a unified command in this theater our aid will prove a waste, I had especially in mind the belief based on results in the past and conditions at present that when the time comes to make use of the material which we are sending and propose to send in apparently ever-increasing quantities that material will be wasted if the present state of disorganization continues and is allowed to prevail, especially in an action undertaken under the divided responsibility which now marks the military direction in this area. In reply to the Department's request for a summarized statement of wastage of American supplies, I find certain instances which are to be included in a separate telegram.33 I wish to point out, however, that the principal significance of these instances in the present consideration is that they may be regarded as symptomatic of a state of affairs wherein a defective organization impedes attempts to make preparations for future eventualities and jeopardizes the chance of success in prospective operations. In fact the lack of coordination "Telegram No. 1512, October 3, noon, not printed. and unified direction has in the past not only reduced the effectiveness of all planning but has adversely affected the procurement of supplies as well as transport, installations and maintenance of material in this area with the consequent impairment of the scope and quality of preparedness. It is true that the situation here is complicated owing to the restrictions inherent in operating on the territory of Egypt, a sovereign state which is not technically a belligerent, but those considerations are not of the essence. The gravity of the situation here lies in the fact that lack of coordination among the various services operating in this theater have impaired and continue to impair the effectiveness of the war machine and the assumption is that only a single responsibility will galvanize that machine into a positive force. I should profoundly deplore any impression which might be created by any consideration or derived from any source which would result in a decrease in the flow of material to this area for not only should that flow be maintained but it should be increased. The vital importance of strengthening the Middle East theater needs no further emphasis. We cannot know for certain that the next move will be in this direction but we do know that successful operation from this base could turn the scales in favor of the Allies throughout the entire Mediterranean area. At present the extent of our aid is the supply of essential material to this base and we must continue that aid. There are clear indications that the defective organization here is jeopardizing that aid and that advice is needed to avoid that danger. I submit therefore that we shall prove derelict in our war effort if we do not proffer that counsel and so take the initiative in helping the British to help themselves. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/156231: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, October 5, 1941-8 a. m. [Received 8:43 a. m.] 4730. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person. "1. I have heard from Halifax 34 of his talks with you and Harry 35 about the Middle East. I take a favourable view of the near future there. I am sending Mr. Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, to represent us at the International Labour Office Convention to be held on 27th instant, at which I understand you will be present. He will bring 35a 34 Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States. 35 Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt. 35a Clement R. Attlee. you a long letter from me 36 dealing with matters of the utmost secrecy and importance, which I cannot trust to the cables. He will also be able to give you full information about our organization in Cairo. Meanwhile you should know that I arranged some time ago that General Auchinleck should have complete authority over the air as well as over the Army whenever major operations are impending or in progress. The Lord Privy Seal will start by air around 23rd, and I trust you will be able to see him on arrival. I can only spare him for a fortnight on account of Parliamentary business. 38 2. Max and Averell 37 seem to have had great success at Moscow, and now the vital thing is to act up to our bargain in early deliveries. Hitler evidently feels the draught. We made almost exactly 2,000 aircraft in September, and I think our first line strength tonight is slightly ahead of the Germans. Besides this the Russian Air Force is still very formidable. 3. All my best wishes and kindest regards. How I wish we could have another talk." WINANT 841.24/1035: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, November 28, 1941-9 a. m. [Received November 30-12: 35 a. m.] 1856. My 1821, November 22, 4 p. m.39 An American military observer who has just returned from the western desert confirms reports that had reached the Legation through other sources regarding the satisfactory performance of American tanks which are said not only to have stood up remarkably well from a mechanical point of view but also to have given a good account of themselves in encounters with heavier German tanks.40 Military Attaché is sending detailed reports. KIRK Dated October 20, 1941; for text, see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, p. 544. 37 Lord Beaverbrook, British Minister of Supply, and W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom. 38 See vol. I, pp. 825–851, passim. 39 Not printed. Telegram No. 5596, November 21, 10 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, transmitted a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt reporting on the success of British tank forces, including one brigade with all American tanks, against German and Italian tank forces in the western desert (740.0011 European War 1939/16797%). 740.0011 European War 1939/17476: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, December 12, 1941-5 p. m. [Received December 13-5:35 p. m.] 1948. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. I fully realize that the principal concentration of our efforts must be in the Far East. The fact still prevails, however, that this theater is an essential factor in connection with operation either defensive or offensive in the area extending from West Africa to the Black Sea, that as such it must be held at all costs and that the next few months offer on the one hand the probability of attacks by the Axis Powers against this base and on the other an opportunity for effective action against Axis objectives by specialized forces established at the base. I must, therefore, urge not only that priority be maintained for the further development of the military, strength of this sector either for defensive or offensive purpose but that consideration be given to the possible operation of American Units in West and North Africa against Axis territory and forces within striking distance. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/17883: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, December 22, 1941-5 p. m. [Received December 23-12: 39 p. m.] 1999. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 1948, December 12, 5 p. m. The protracted process of liquidating the situation in Cyrenaica has given rise to the conjecture that the occasion is thereby afforded for a possible counter-move on the part of the Axis in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas and in so far as this particular theater is concerned the view is being expressed that the most plausible form which any such move might take would be a mass air attack supported by naval units based from Axis territories in the Mediterranean. In this view the intent would be disorganize and paralyze the British force in Egypt and so contrive a victory of both practical and psychological importance. From information available here there is nothing tangible to show that such a move is in preparation. Reports are circulating that Nazi air units have been withdrawn from the Russian front and it is said that extensive ground organizations are being prepared in Italy and adjacent territories to receive increased air force at a moment's notice. Furthermore within the past few days attacks have been made by 409021-59-20 |