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the United States for 1905, p. 680.) In the official protocol of the Conference, of April 2, 1906, Mr. White is quoted as saying: “The American Delegation urges the Conference to be willing to propose the vote, that H. Shereefian Majesty continue in the good work inaugurated by his father and maintained by His Majesty himself in reference to his Jewish subjects, and that he see to it that his government does not neglect any occasion to make known to its functionaries that the Sultan maintains that the Jews of his Empire and all his subjects, without distinction of faith, should be treated with justice and equality.” Representatives of all the Powers participating in the Conference supported the proposal of Mr. White and the resolution offered by him was unanimously adopted by the delegates of the Powers. (Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités, II Series, Vol. 34, Pt. 1, pp. 229–230.)

It is respectfully submitted that, regardless of the present status of the General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras,60 the Government of the United States, in proposing the resolution which was adopted unanimously by the Conference, assumed a moral responsibility for the equal treatment of all subjects of the Protectorate of French Morocco. This equal treatment is obviously violated by the extension to Morocco of the anti-Jewish discriminatory decree already referred to.

My colleagues and I express the hope that, should a favorable opportunity present itself, the Government of the United States will make appropriate representations to the French Government on the basis of the resolution adopted at the Algeciras Conference upon the initiative of the Government of the United States. Respectfully yours,


881.4016/13 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the American Jewish

Committee (Morris D. Waldman)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1941. MY DEAR MR. WALDMAN: In your letter of March 31, 1941, you raised certain questions regarding anti-Jewish legislation in the French Zone of Morocco. In the Department's reply of April 11, 1941,61 you were informed that the American Legation at Tangier had been requested to submit a report on the matter. This report 61 has now been received and, together with the relevant documents in



Signed April 7, 1906, Foreign Relations, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.
Not printed.

the Department's archives, has been given careful study. As a result

a of this study the following facts have been developed :

1. The proposal of the American delegation at the Algeciras Conference, referred to in your letter of March 31, 1941, was in no sense a demand or requirement that the Sultan of Morocco should give a guarantee of equality of treatment of Jews and other subjects in Morocco, but was merely an expression of a wish or trust that the Sultan continue the good policy which he had carried on after the reign of his father with respect to such persons in Morocco. In this connection it may be noted that the word "Voeu" appearing in the resolution does not mean “vote”, but “wish”, “desire”, or “trust”.

2. At the Algeciras Conference Mr. White was directed to urge “the consideration of guarantees of religious and racial tolerance in Morocco” (Foreign Relations, 1905, page 680) as you suggest. A subsequent instruction (Foreign Relations, 1906, (pt. 2], page 1487) cancelled that instruction; and this cancellation was apparently due to the express request of representative Jews in Morocco who expressed themselves as satisfied with their treatment by the Sultan. The text of the telegram which Secretary Root sent to Mr. White on March 28, 1906, was as follows:

“In view of the statement in your dispatch of January 30 6 and Mr. Einstein's report and Mr. Pimienta's suggestion, we do not consider it necessary or desirable that you should present the subject of the treatment of Jews in Morocco to the conference as directed by the special instructions to you on that subject. You need not present the subject to the conference at all. You are, however, at liberty to ask for an expression in the sense of your dispatch of January 20,64 and in general conformity to the views of Mr. Pimienta, if, upon further consultation, you are of the opinion that it would be of practical benefit.”

In the circumstances, as outlined above, I believe you will agree that the proceedings of the Algeciras Conference and the instructions given the American delegate, which are, of course, public knowledge, do not provide a satisfactory basis for action by this Government along the lines suggested in your letter of March 31, 1941.

So far as the general question of religious freedom is concerned, the attitude of this Government is well known to all the European Powers through numerous authoritative statements which have been made. A further statement at this time, as you will readily understand, is not likely to accomplish any useful result, and it seems probable that any real progress in this direction must await a general solution of the European problem.

63 Foreign Relations, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1471. 64 Not printed.

For the present, bearing in mind particularly the situation in the French Zone of Morocco, it seems clear that all that can be done is to see that all practicable measures are taken for the proper protection of American interests should any American citizen or protégé be affected by the legislation to which you referred in your letter of March 31. I should add that up to the present the Department has not been informed that any American ressortissants have been affected by the legislation in question. Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Assistant Secretary



867N.01/1740 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

(Murray) ?

[WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1941. While calling on another matter a day or two ago, Mr. Nevile Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, inquired what we knew of the American Palestine Committee which had recently been formed in this country. I explained that we understood it to be a committee made up of senators, congressmen, two or three Cabinet members, and other prominent citizens, which had been organized by certain Zionist interests in this country. In that respect it was similar to, if not a continuation of, a committee of the same name formed some years ago to influence American opinion during one of the crises in Palestine. Mr. Butler said that from their point of view he felt that the formation of this committee was particularly unfortunate at this time and that if the Embassy had not been so occupied with other matters it would have made an effort to talk to some of the prospective members of the committee and explain to them some of the dangers inherent in such an organization. In explanation of this statement, Mr. Butler said that he was most fearful that the formation of this committee would be broadcast by the Germans and the Italians throughout the Arab world and would serve further to stir up difficulties with the British in Iraq and other Arab countries. Mr. Butler added that he hoped as occasion arose officials of the Department could explain this to any members of the committee with whom it was possible to discuss the question.

In this general connection I believe you will be interested in certain information which Mr. Harold Hoskins of FC has recently obtained during discussions in New York. Mr. Hoskins went to New York to discuss with the leaders of certain Syrian organizations there their

* For previous correspondence on this general subject, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, pp. 830 ff.

* Addressed to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Under Secretary of State Welles, and the Secretary of State. * Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

attitude toward this country and toward the war, and I quote below the pertinent section of his report:

"From talks with the heads of all three organizations listed above, as well as with various individual Syrians, it is evident that this group is extremely loyal to the United States, anxious in every way to cooperate with the Government, and welcomes the idea of any request by the Government for their active efforts.

“None of these organizations is asking the United States Government to do anything for the Arabs, but all appear equally anxious that the United States Government should not take any position officially in support of the Zionist movement that calls for a political Jewish state in Palestine when, even today, 80 per cent of Palestine's population is Arab, not Jewish.

*The leaders in these organizations would not, for instance, be interested in supporting short wave broadcasts from the United States to the Near East unless they had assurances that no pro-Zionist position was contemplated by the United States Government.

“Most Syrians, particularly the members of the Arab National League, favor the development of some form of independent federated Arab state in the Near East along the lines perhaps of the Iraq and Egyptian states, and they realize that such an Arab federation would require the backing of some foreign power. Naturally they would prefer this supporting power to be the United States, but since this seems unlikely they definitely prefer British to German support.

“In fact, the only fear expressed by any of the Syrians interviewed was that the British, by being too pro-Zionist in Palestine, would antagonize the 70,000,000 people of the Arab-speaking world and would thus give the German propaganda its opportunity to gain the support that it could not otherwise obtain.”

I believe it is impossible to overemphasize the difficulties which can be caused the British through the Arab-speaking world by propaganda issued by the Axis Powers to the effect that Great Britain and the United States are supporting the Jewish National Home in Palestine to the detriment of the Arab peoples.*


Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1941. We have been revolving the Arabian problem. The salient facts seem to be:

• Assistant Secretary Berle made the following observations on April 29: "Mr. Nevile Butler made this same observation to me the other day. About the only thing to be done now is to play the matter down a little. I have spoken to Senator Wagner's office (he himself was in Florida). I have likewise suggested to the White House that the President do not send a message of greeting to the American Palestine Committee dinner."

* Addressed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) and Under Secretary of State Welles.

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