gency is that the Department arrange to rush with all speed to Egyptian waters sufficient vessels to transport approximately 1,400 Americans to the United States, of which 100 would be from Syria, 300 from Egypt, 1,000 from Palestine (900 Jews), and possibly some from Turkey. This suggestion, however, is offered with every reserve as in addition to the obvious technical difficulties involved it offers the very real objection of attempting to concentrate a large number of Americans in Egypt, an actual theater of war. KIRK 383.1115/53: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941-8 p. m. 154. Your 455, May 10, 4 p. m. Your views are entirely approved. Countries, like Egypt, to which Americans might be evacuated from other countries would, of course, expect that provisions would be made by this Government for the support of such Americans to prevent them from becoming public charges. Neither the Department nor the Red Cross is in a position to maintain Americans abroad. With respect to repatriation, the Red Cross considers repatriation a matter of governmental concern while the Department, in the absence of authority and the necessary funds from Congress for repatriation, must take the position that each individual must provide his own transportation expenses, from his own resources or from those obtained from relatives, friends or employers in the United States whom the Department, if desired, will approach in their behalf for the necessary funds. It may be added that even were the Department in a position to further the evacuation of Americans from one locality to another that would be inadvisable in the present uncertainties of the war situation and in view of the possible necessity resulting therefrom of moving them to another place again and again. Please communicate your 455 and this reply to the Consuls at Beirut and Jerusalem and elsewhere, if necessary. In advising Consul at Jerusalem, refer to his 86, May 10, noon to Department. HULL 367N.1115/219: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul at Jerusalem (Steger) WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941-9 p. m. Your 86, May 10, noon. Department has replied to telegram no. 455, May 10, 4 p. m. from Minister, Cairo, on subject of evacuation of Americans and has requested Minister to inform you. HULL 867N.55/239: Telegram The Consul at Jerusalem (Steger) to the Secretary of State JERUSALEM, May 22, 1941-noon. [Received May 23-11: 55 a. m.] 117. A notice issued May 19th under the Palestine immigration ordinance states that Government has decided not to prescribe a quota of immigration certificates for the 3 months April 1, to June 30, 1941. The controlling reasons are the same as those given in my telegram No. 188 of December 30, noon,19 which reported that no immigration quota would be prescribed for the semester which ended March 31st last. The notice states that the position will be reviewed in respect of the succeeding quarter June 1st to September 30th in the light of future circumstances. Against the 75,000 certificates available under the White Paper policy of May 1939,20 19,601 authorities were granted during the period April 1, 1939, through March 31, 1941. Actual arrivals during that period were 32,868 of which 14,678 were legal immigrants and 18,190 illegals. Of the latter figure 16,100 have been deducted from quotas and 2,090 are to be deducted. The balance of account on April 1, 1941, is therefore 75,000 less 32,868 or 42,132. Replacement immigration certificates in a strictly limited number will continue to be granted during the period April to June in special cases. STEGER 740.0011 European War 1939/11258: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, May 23, 1941-4 p. m. [Received May 25-2: 35 p. m.] 572. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In discussing the general situation in this area with various representative persons both Egyptian and foreign I have repeatedly heard reference made to the failure of British policy in the Arab world and its deleterious effect on the position of the British not only in the Arab countries but also in the Islamic world in general which has greatly facilitated the extension of Nazi influence in this area. Recent developments in Iraq and Syria including the arrival of German military forces and accompanied by disquieting indications in Turkey and Iran have served to throw the seriousness of this situation into high relief and even 19 Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, p. 856. 20 British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy. raise the question of whether the British will be able to maintain their armies in the Middle East. The serious effect of such an eventuality on the course and duration of the war needs no emphasis. Although reasons contributing to this situation are many and varied, I find in discussing the angle of the subject that the major factor which inevitably emerges is the problem presented by Zionism in Palestine. There lies the basic disorder whatever may be the immediate and [apparent omission] symptom and should it be that the Axis is temporarily successful in this area no very apparent fact will probably have contributed more to their success than the dissension sown in the Arab world by the Zionists. In the face of this state of affairs, I have not infrequently heard surprise expressed that the responsible heads of world Jewry have not apparently been brought to realize the great contribution which they could render not only to the cause of democracy but also to their co-religionists by admitting that despite the noble sentiments which may have characterized the idea of the Jewish national home at its inception the project in its present form has not only failed in the past but is incapable of realization in the future unless imposed by force on an unwilling native population. In making mention of the foregoing I need not add that I have not sufficient information or special experience which would warrant definite suggestions on my part as remedies for the adverse reaction to the Zionist issue in the Arab world. It may be that some declaration could be made which would tend to mitigate the state of animosity prevailing among Moslems as a result of certain factors of this issue in Palestine which are regarded as offensive by the Arabs. It may also be possible that some fundamental realignment of the idea of a Jewish national home may be effected with a practical reorganization of the project on a basis different from that prevailing at present and in this connection reference has been made to the part which the Vatican might play in such a plan. These suggestions are naturally vague and in no way deemed as exhausting the possibilities. The problem is so grave, however, and the potential consequences so far reaching that I venture to bring very critical impressions to the Department's attention in the belief that the essential fact should be appreciated that the maintenance of present concepts in respect of Zionism constitutes a major obstacle to the successful prosecution of the war in this area and that those who have knowledge of this situation and power to act should exert every effort toward finding a solution. In the matter of initiating any such efforts the American Government is generally regarded as in the most favorable position to act. KIRK 740.0011 European War 1939/11258 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1941. MR. SECRETARY: We understand that a copy of the attached telegram of May 23 from our Minister at Cairo," which we regard as very important, has been sent to the White House. It is our feeling that conversations on the subject between officers of the Department and non-Zionists would have no result, because the latter have no influence with the Zionists. It is not likely that the Zionists can be influenced by anyone except the President himself. If you feel like discussing the matter with the President, we shall of course be glad to prepare any additional material which you may desire. WALLACE MURRAY 867N.01/17551 The British Minister (Butler) to the Under Secretary of State Ref. 555/31/41 (Welles) WASHINGTON, May [June] 4, 1941. DEAR MR. UNDER-SECRETARY: You may recollect that on May 8th you passed to the Ambassador a message from Rabbi Stephen S. Wise containing a request that the Jews in Palestine be permitted to form regiments and a Home Guard. We have now received from London a statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude in this connexion. They realise of course that the Jewish desire for the means of selfprotection in Palestine is natural, and have been considering how best to meet it. 2. We have now been authorized to inform you in confidence that they have approved the following proposals submitted by the High Commissioner: 21a_ (1) Expansion of the Jewish settlement police to its former strength during the disturbances, with the possibility of future expansion if this is successful. (2) More intensive training of the special rural constabulary. (3) Expansion on a more restricted scale of the urban special constabulary. (4) Continued equal opportunity for enlistment into the Palestine Infantry battalions for both Jews and Arabs, and completion of the accepted recruiting programme on the Jewish side irrespective of the rate of enlistment of Arabs. 21 Supra. 21a Sir Harold A. MacMichael. 3. In addition, the possibility is not excluded, provided equipment and assistance are available, of expanding the above on the following lines: (1) Conversion of Jewish settlements into strong points. (2) Training Jewish settlement police (a) to deal with parachute troops and minor air borne landings (b) to engage in tank hunting (c) to adopt guerilla tactics against enemy detachments and lines of communication (d) to protect without assistance from British troops or police the Jewish settlements against rebellious Arab bands. 4. The above have been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier of the Jewish Agency, who has expressed much satisfaction. It is not however intended to make any public announcement, since apart from giving valuable information to the enemy this might have the worst possible effect upon Arab opinion in the Middle East. It will be appreciated that with the present situation in Iraq and Syria any precipitate arming of the Jews might lead to deterioration in the internal security in Palestine, which could only be restored by the diversion of the British troops from more vital operations. 5. Even if arms were available for general distribution, such action would not in the judgment of His Majesty's Government contribute to local security and would have little military value against trained troops. They feel that the military authorities must be left full discretion to use the equipment available to them to the best advantage. 6. We are arranging to inform Rabbi Wise orally and in confidence that the question of the Jews forming regiments and a Home Guard has been under active consideration by His Majesty's Government who have approved certain proposals for action submitted by the High Commissioner, and that the gist of these steps has been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier in London and Mr. Shertok 21b in Jerusalem, both of whom have expressed their satisfaction. The details of the proposals are not being disclosed to Rabbi Wise. Yours very sincerely, NEVILE BUTLER 740.0011 European War 1939/12842: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, June 28, 1941-noon. [Received July 7-3: 55 a. m.] 840. My 574, May 23, 8 p. m.; 630, May 31, 6 p. m., and 747, June 17, 5 p. m.22 Since Eden's 22a May 29 statement on Arab unity 23 21b Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Palestine. 22 None printed. 22a Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 23 British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941): Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden... delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941. |