that they are being permitted to refuel and take off again. We are told that General Dentz requested that they land in the future at Palmyra and not at Damascus "where they would be seen by too many people." The orders permitting them to utilize Syrian air fields our informant said were issued from Vichy presumably by General Huntziger. 65 He also said that a certain amount of war material is being shipped from French supplies in Syria to Iraq under instructions from Vichy though he did not know the nature of the material nor quantities involved. The foregoing seems to check with Engert's telegram 139, May 12, 4 p. m., which has just arrived. Repeated to Beirut. LEAHY 740.0011 European War 1939/10886: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, May 13, 1941-8 p. m. [Received 9 p. m.] 1906. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Following is text of a letter which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed me personally this afternoon, with the request that it might be given the earliest consideration possible. "I should be grateful if you could at once convey to your Government the following information which we have received in the last 2 days about the position in Syria. On the 10th May our Consul at Aleppo reported that 3 German Heinkel planes, each carrying 6 passengers, arrived there from Beirut on the evening of the 9th May escorted by one small French plane. Two of the Heinkels left on the morning of the 10th May and we have what seems to be reliable information showing that they reached Mosul the same day. According to our Consul at Aleppo, one of the passengers was a German General, who received members of the Germar colony and friends at his hotel. When our Consul General at Beirut took the matter up with the head of the Political Bureau of the French High Commission on the morning of the 12th May the latter at first professed ignorance but in the end telephoned to the High Commissioner, who is at Damascus. General Dentz confirmed that the planes had landed at Aleppo, though not at Beirut. He said that this had been done without previous notice and that the planes claimed to have lost their way. He said that his orders were to allow German planes to land only if they were in trouble, and in that case effect immediate repairs and order the plane out of the country by the shortest route. He maintained that, in pursuance of these instructions, he had isolated the planes and crews while overhauls were effected and then asked them to leave. 65 Gen. Charles Huntziger, French Minister for National Defense. As a sidelight on this explanation I should add that General Dentz himself informed our Consul at Damascus on the same day that two of the planes that had landed at Aleppo were Iraqi and the third plane French. Our Consul General at Beirut has further reported that about 10 aircraft flew over his house early on the morning of the 12th May at intervals of a few minutes, heading eastwards. One of the planes, which came low, seemed undoubtedly to have had Italian markings, but it was not possible to identify the others. The head of the Political Bureau told Mr. Havard that he thought all the machines must have been French as there were a hundred French aircraft in Syria which were periodically exercised. Commenting on this statement, Mr. Havard says that aerial activity on such a scale is most unusual. Our Consul at Damascus also has reported unusual aerial activity on the night of the 11th to 12th May. He has heard various reports that 13 German planes bearing French colours have alighted at Damascus in the last 2 days and the British Vice Consul saw 2 troop carriers and 6 bombers on the aerodrome on the morning of the 12th. When he questioned General Dentz, the High Commissioner would not deny that Axis planes had landed at Damascus, and one of the senior French officials there practically admitted it. General Dentz went on to say to our Consul that his instructions did not at present provide for a German occupation of Syria, but if those orders came he would obey them. So much for enemy planes. Both our Consul at Aleppo and our Consul General at Damascus have received reliable reports to the effect that a substantial quantity of war material has been despatched from Aleppo for Iraq. According to the former, two trains left Aleppo on the morning of the 12th each carrying 400 tons of munitions from the French dumps. The head of the Political Bureau admitted the despatch of war material to our Consul General at Beirut, but asserted that it was being sent to strengthen the French frontier defences in case rebel parties tried to force their way into Syria. Our Consulate at Aleppo, too, had heard that the trains were leaving nominally for a frontier post in Syria but, according to a reliable report, the French N. C. O.'s who superintended the despatch of this material were convinced that it was intended for Iraq. The foregoing reports are disquieting. They show that the Germans, with the connivance of the French authorities in Syria, are already making use of Syria for their preparations to send airborne assistance to Rashid Ali in Iraq. So far, such assistance does not seem to have been sent on a large scale. If, however, this use by the Germans of Syrian territory for military purposes continues, it is evident that the results will be very serious indeed. I can not help wondering, therefore, whether there is anything that the United States Government can do to stiffen French resistance to these German activities in Syria. No doubt the State Department are receiving full information [of] all these developments from Mr. Engert, your Consul General at Beirut, and are already considering what can be done. I would, however, suggest that immediate action at Vichy, and perhaps also by Mr. Engert, might be very useful. If only Vichy can be induced to send instructions to their authorities in Syria that no facilities of any kind are to be given to German military operations, and that no use is to be made of Syrian aerodromes for sending German or Italian help to Rashid Ali, that would be the most satisfactory solution. Failing that, perhaps an attempt might be made to stiffen General Dentz, whatever Vichy says, but in view of his admission to our Consul at Damascus this does not seem very hopeful." WINANT 740.0011 European War 1939/10966: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, May 14, 1941-11 a. m. [Received May 18-1: 30 p. m.] 144. In view of Vichy's 543, May 13 to the Department, my 143, May 14 66 and the report that Vichy had capitulated to Berlin, I called on the High Commissioner late tonight upon his return from Damascus in order to make a last appeal to him to weigh most carefully all factors and considerations before he committed himself beyond recall. I began by saying that I had come to see him unofficially as an old and sincere friend of France; that I had seen France in several of her most heroic hours during the last war and that my wife like so many other American women had been decorated for war work by the French Government. I knew him to be a man combining the qualities typical of the French soldier of courage, patriotism and enlightenment who doubtless realized that it was his and our business to think about the future civilization and the greatness of France. As on many previous occasions I would therefore speak my mind with the utmost frankness and he need make no reply to anything I said unless he particularly wished to do so. I then explained to him the attitude of the United States Government and people toward aggressor nations in much the same manner as I had explained it to Iranian Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the last 3 years and as the Department was informed in my numerous telegrams on the subject from Tehran. I added that the American people had really not been morally neutral since the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and many of them had abandoned neutrality in Manchuria 10 years ago. We then began to distinguish definitely between nations devoted to decent international relationships and those committed to a policy of force and malice. Today there was an ever-widening field of American anxiety and the President and Secretary of State had repeatedly declared that we could not view with equanimity a predatory world dominated by 66 Latter printed infra. fear. The American people were therefore showing an increasing interest in the wider aspects of the Middle Eastern problem and were quite openly inclined to support anybody willing to help liberate civilization from aggression. New manifestations of idealism were animating our nation and we were appealing to all likeminded peoples and individuals to take a firm stand on moral grounds against brutality and treachery. Now that the Axis was about to cast its death-like pall over the Levant States I wished the High Commissioner to pause and ponder the enormous responsibilities that rested upon his shoulders not only in respect of the true interests of France but the entire civilized world and the native races entrusted to his care. I hoped he viewed the situation with a proper sense of perspective and proportion: for the past 4 months I had been witnessing in Syria the characteristically transparent tricks of Nazi technique which always precede a Nazi assault upon a new victim. He himself had spoken to me about them and we now knew that they were the preliminaries of the far more serious events of the last few days which I feared were precipitating the French and Syrians into a position from which there would soon be no escape. But as Syria was not yet invaded the whole world felt that the right of the Axis Powers to interfere should be repudiated, for by obtaining important strategic concessions they could thrust a spearhead into the Middle East which might affect the whole military and naval situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. I reminded the High Commissioner that the American people were unflinchingly committed to the uttermost support of the British Empire and that when as in this case the whole course of the war was at stake we could hardly be expected to remain indifferent. We believed there was a true employer [sic] between the French and British Empires and the United States and it would be tragic if a portion of the French possessions were needlessly turned over to the enemy to the detriment of the common cause. The French could count implicitly on the sympathy and benevolence of the United States so long as they did not actively assist the Axis. Today the responsibility of barring the way happened to be his and I felt sure that not even Nazi pressure could permanently submerge the old French spirit. General Dentz replied that he agreed with much I had said and thanked me for being so frank. He would be equally outspoken and tell me that the world would not be in such a mess if the United States had joined the League of Nations. As regards American support for Britain, he realized its magnitude and sincerity but doubted whether it could be decisive. Rightly or wrongly German armies had created the im pression of invincibility. He believed if the United States had declared war on Germany a year ago the moral effect would have been immense and might at least have saved Southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Today he doubted whether it would make much difference especially in view of Japan's and Russia's enigmatic attitudes. He personally also felt uncertain whether Great Britain had sufficient forces in the Middle East to cope with determined Axis thrusts, particularly as he feared Turkey would cave in. Referring to his own position he said politicians had been the ruination of France and he was glad Pétain was a soldier everybody trusted; and if, as seemed to be the case, the Marshal found it necessary to yield, he (Dentz) for one was not prepared to question the decision and he would continue to obey his instructions. Vichy was probably influenced by the belief that Germany's military grip on the Continent of Europe could no longer be broken and by the fact that collaboration with Germany was the only way to get the prisoners back. Whatever the reason he was sure Pétain knew a great deal more about the needs of France than he did and it was about time the French became disciplined enough to follow one leader instead of arguing every point ad infinitum. Incidentally he pointed out that the Americans were making the same mistake the British made when they speak of the French Empire. There never really was a French Empire, only France and her colonies. Without France the colonies amounted to nothing and were helpless compared to the British Dominions. The High Commissioner thought I took too gloomy a view of the local situation. It was true that some 15 German planes had come, and, thank God, gone again, but he did not think many more would arrive if the hostilities in Iraq came to an end soon. He had no intentions of turning the Levant States over to the Axis but he admitted very readily that the present concessions might lead to others. As to the war material shipped to Iraq, he had no choice for under the terms of the armistice such material was no longer, strictly speaking, French. Finally he referred to the possibility hinted at by me that the situation might bring about military action by Great Britain and possibly armed conflict with the French forces. He said "Unless utterly unforeseen events should occur I do not believe you need fear such a contingency which I should consider as regrettable as you do." Repeated to Vichy. ENGERT |