To these thanks should be added my own pleasure at having established with you personal relations full of cordiality and esteem of which I shall keep the most pleasant memory. I hope that this happy collaboration in the interest of the public welfare will become still closer in the future. Please accept [etc.] 740.0011 European War 1939/13488: Telegram A. NACCACHE The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, July 25, 1941-8 p. m. [Received July 28-1:02 p. m.] 309. General de Gaulle arrived in Beirut at noon today accompanied by General Catroux. General Wilson also spent the day in Beirut. De Gaulle received this afternoon the same officials mentioned in paragraph 1 of my 302, July 16, 7 p. m. He expressed to me his appreciation of the sympathy and support the Free French cause was receiving from the United States. Yesterday the Vichy garrison at Soueida, capital of the Jebel Druze, was supplanted by a British cavalry brigade. This was the last French force to disappear from the Syrian scene under the terms of the armistice because it was feared that the Druzes might overpower the French if they became defenseless before the British were ready to take over. I understand that the Jebel Druze will be under British not Free French administration. ENGERT 740.0011 European War 1939/13602: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, July 27, 1941-10 a. m. [Received August 1-11:25 a. m.] 313. My 309, July 25, 8 p. m. General de Gaulle asked me to call on him yesterday afternoon as we had not had an opportunity to talk much at the reception and he was leaving for Damascus today. He began by saying that the Free French were here to uphold and continue the rights of France in the Levant. This was generally understood and approved not only by the British but also by the Syrians and Lebanese. He had received the necessary assurances from the British Government and quite recently these assurances were renewed and confirmed. However, he had observed that while men like Churchill and Eden seem to understand the situation thoroughly, there was evidence of less comprehension on the part of some of the British military authorities in the Middle East. He regretted this because it rendered the principal task a little more difficult. Few people seemed to realize he had to watch public opinion in France most carefully in order to counteract German propaganda that the Free French movement was merely a tool of the British. (I gathered from the tone and manner in which he said this that he wished to convey the thought that occasionally he had to appear less disposed toward the British than he personally felt because everything he said and did had its reaction among the French people.) I thanked the General for taking me into his confidence in connection with a matter which was extremely delicate but which all of us had so much at heart. I said I hoped he realized that in the Levant he found himself in an atmosphere of characteristically oriental intrigue and that he would not take too seriously the multifarious accusations, denunciations, innuendos, et cetera, which had doubtless already come to his ears. There were a great many people in Syria and the Lebanon who would like nothing better than to see serious friction develop between the Free French and the British quite apart from a relatively numerous group who were either in Axis pay or had proGerman sympathies and would therefore take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord and suspicion. It seemed to me, I said, there was one-and perhaps only one— solid tongue which could provide a common starting point for everybody right now, whether French or British, Christian or Moslem or any other nationality or race, and that was the immediate necessity of defense. For the present nothing mattered except the purely physical and strategic position of keeping the Axis out of Syria. And in so far as the situation in Syria was linked up with Britain's general war effort and could be made to contribute to the overthrow of Hitlerism and any other reason to think of direct interests and concern to the American Government and people. I therefore ventured to hope that neither his relations with the British nor the admittedly complex and trying relationships of both occupying forces with the natives would be permitted to impede the military effort of the Allies. I did not mean that political problems should not be discussed even now especially as everybody was agreed that Syria and the Lebanon were entitled to independence. But it was futile to allow political schemers to stir up internal dissensions while the present potentially dangerous situation continued, for not only would it be playing into Hitler's hands but it would jeopardize the very existence and integrity of the territories for whose independence the same politicians profess so much solicitude. General de Gaulle said he was in entire accord with me but it remained to be seen whether it would prove practicable to postpone indefinitely the implementation of certain political promises which had been made to the natives. I replied the essential thing was that they should temporarily be relegated to the background and that irrevocable commitments should as much as possible be avoided before the successful conclusion of the war. Repeated to London and Cairo. ENGERT 740.0011 European War 1939/13608: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, July 30, 1941-11 a. m. [Received August 2-2 p. m.] 319. General de Gaulle made a speech in Damascus yesterday in which he said the time had come to put an end to the mandate and to negotiate with the Syrians regarding the conditions for their "full and complete sovereignty and independence and to establish the terms of an alliance which both sides most sincerely desire." He added that in this war the liberties and even existence of all peoples were at stake. France would prevent Syria from being enslaved in cooperation with her brave British allies "who have come here exclusively for strategic reasons. In this connection, I am pleased to refer to the declarations and undertakings of the Government in London by which Great Britain expresses herself completely free from all political aims in Syria and the Lebanon and determined to respect in its entirety the position of France." Even these unequivocal diplomatic instruments might not stop enemy propaganda or inconsiderate words "but I am counting on the complete union of England and France which existed in the past and simultaneous actions of their armies in the Levant states to contribute toward the reassurance of Syria and the Lebanon in the certainty that they will preserve from the Tigris to the Mediterranean and from Trans-Jordan to Turkey their national liberty and integrity." The General concluded by expressing his firm conviction that the powerful British armies and determination, the mobilized resources of America and the losses inflicted on Germany by Russia were all bound to lead to victory. ENGERT 740.0011 European War 1939/13750: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, August 5, 1941-11 p. m. [Received August 7-11: 15 a. m.] 323. My 313, July 27. General de Gaulle sent for me again this afternoon and said he had done so because he knew I was a sincere friend of England and France and he authorized me to make use of our conversation as I saw fit. He said his relations with the British had reached such a critical stage that he was beginning to doubt whether he could go on like this much longer. Despite all promises made to him by the British Government as recently as July 25, by Lyttelton 34 in Cairo, British military seemed determined to thwart and defy him wherever they could. In the first place the armistice terms in themselves were a betrayal of the Free French cause and had been dictated by the British against his own wishes. As far as he was concerned they were, therefore, practically null and void. In the second place, the solemn assurances given him by the British Government and his recent agreements with Lyttelton were being deliberately disregarded by the British military on the spot. And thirdly, British political officers were traveling all over the Jebel Druz, Hauran and Jezideh which gave the natives the impression that the British were the real masters of the country. General de Gaulle then showed me a letter Lyttelton had sent him July 25 to which were attached two agreements regarding British and French collaboration in Syria and Lebanon. After reading them I remarked that they seemed to me quite fair and logical and if both parties acted in good faith I could not see why there should be trouble. The General replied that he accepted London's good faith but the good faith of the British military in Syria was more questionable. I said I could not possibly enter into a discussion of this nature and expressed the hope he would tell his British friends quite frankly whenever he thought they were at fault and I knew they would appreciate it. He then startled me by saying he had found it quite useless to talk to them and from now on he would insist on Free French rights “even if this should lead to a rupture of relations with the British." At first I thought it best to ignore this statement but when a few minutes later he repeated it with emphasis, I said "I deeply deplore your statement, for if you should make it to an indiscreet person you would be playing into the hands of Hitler which I know is furthest from your thoughts. I personally refuse to believe that the situation is such as to justify a threat of this kind. I am certain that with good will and common sense and a little tact on both sides there is no problem between French and British in Syria which cannot be satisfactorily settled. We in America are naturally interested in the preservation of harmony and effective cooperation between all the Allies, because only so will the Axis be defeated." Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State, representing the British War Cabinet in the Middle East. We talked for an hour and a quarter but I fear he instinctively distrusts the British and is by nature quite incapable of understanding British character and purpose. I have informed Generals Wilson and Spears 35 of this conversation but Department may wish to repeat above to London.36 ENGERT 740.0011 European War 1939/14008: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, August 15, 1941-11 p. m. [a. m.] [Received 10:07 p. m.] 37 332. Local newspapers published yesterday exchange of letters dated August 7th between General de Gaulle and Oliver Lyttelton signed during Lyttelton's recent visit to Beirut. The British Government reiterates its disinterestedness in Syria and the Lebanon except to win the war and to recognize their independence. It admits that France should enjoy in these countries a preeminent position. compared to any other European power. General de Gaulle expresses satisfaction that Great Britain recognizes in advance the preeminent and privileged position of France as soon as the Levant States are independent, and in return he gives assurances that Free France is resolved to continue the war at Great Britain's side until complete victory has been won. ENGERT 740.0011 European War 1939/14012: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, August 15, 1941-noon. [Received 10: 05 p. m.] 333. Exchange of letters mentioned in my telegram 332, August 15, 11 a. m., was the outcome of recent conversations between Lyttelton and de Gaulle in Beirut in order to convince the latter of the good faith of the British Government and if possible to prevent further reckless observations such as he made to me on August 5 and reported in my 323.38 It may amuse the Department to learn that General Wilson claims he found de Gaulle much more reasonable and tractable after I had my chat with him but I doubt whether the present extraordinary 35 Maj. Gen. Edward L. Spears, head of the British Mission to Syria. 37 36 Apparently this information was not repeated to London by the Department. British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): Statements of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June-9th September, 1941, pp. 3-4. 28 'Dated August 5, 11 p. m., p. 780. |
