that the establishment of German armed forces in Bulgaria would be a grave matter which Turkey could not regard with indifference. 4. Despite the satisfaction manifested in official circles and its reflection in the inspired press, the indications are that Turkish opinion generally is inclined to regard the declaration as, at any rate, a means of temporizing in an acute situation and is not disposed to be critical of the Government for postponing an evil which is perhaps inevitable. Local British opinion deplores the fact that an agreement not bad in itself has in the end taken a form that lends itself so readily to misrepresentation. The local Axis representatives are jubilant. Repeated to Sofia. MACMURRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/8581: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, February 24, 1941-4 p. m. [Received 9: 43 p. m.] 40. The following is a translation of an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs published in this morning's semi-official Ulus in reference to the divergent interpretations placed upon the recent Turkish-Bulgarian declaration. "Nothing has changed in Turkish policy; Turkey remains faithful to her alliances; she is determined to live on good terms with all the Powers, particularly with her neighbors. Turkey could not remain in any way indifferent to foreign activities which might take place within her zone of security; Turkey would oppose by arms any aggression which might be directed against her territorial integrity or her independence. "The Turco-Bulgarian accord is an understanding between the two States whose desire is to safeguard their own peace and stretch out their hands cordially to each other declaring that they have nowhere any aggressive purposes whatsoever. Any desire that might be manifested under the same circumstances for the realization of a like aim would also be welcomed by Turkey with the same eagerness." Repeated to Sofia. 767.74/116 MACMURRAY Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1941. The Turkish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador said that he was calling by instruction of his Government to make clear in an official way to this Government the position of Turkey in view of the misinterpretation which had been given in the American press to the recent pact concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria. The Ambassador delivered to me the public statement made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs as conveyed to the Department by Ambassador MacMurray.19 He further stated that, as I knew, the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey for a nonaggression pact had been going on for some three or four months and that the sole objective on the part of the Turkish Government in concluding the pact was to secure the assurance that in the event Turkey was obliged to defend herself against German aggression, the fifteen Bulgarian divisions would not be used against Turkey. The Ambassador seemed to feel that the pact recently concluded provided satisfactory assurances in this sense. I asked the Ambassador for his interpretation of certain portions of the Turkish Foreign Minister's public statement, notably that portion which declared that Turkey could not view with indifference activities of other powers within Turkey's "zone of interest". I asked whether I was to understand that this meant that in the event Germany undertook aggressive action against Greece, Turkey would render assistance to Greece both because of this statement and because of Turkey's existing engagements to Greece, which the same statement said remained unimpaired. The Ambassador replied that it should be regarded as clear that both Bulgaria and Greece were within the Turkish "zone of interest". He said, however, that what action Turkey would take in the event that Germany occupied Bulgaria or entered the war against Greece would depend necessarily upon practical considerations. He said that Turkey above all did not wish to make the same mistake as that made by France and undertake to fight on strategic lines which had not been prepared in advance. The Ambassador said that for defensive operations, Turkey believed that their existing lines of defense, as well as the natural Turkish terrain, were admirably fitted for successful operations but that the movement of Turkish forces outside of these lines of defense was another matter. Whether the Ambassador was completely informed or not, I gained very definitely the impression that his own personal belief was that the material assistance which Turkey might give Greece in the event that Germany moved against Greece would be of very little significance. S[UMNER] W[ELLES] 19 For statement sent by Ambassador MacMurray, see telegram No. 40, supra. 740.0011 European War 1939/8614: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, February 25, 1941-10 a. m. [Received 11:25 p. m.] 41. Following for Secretary, Under Secretary. 1. Through what I believe to be an entirely trustworthy intermediate source I am informed that a junior official of the German Foreign Office recently called in the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin 19a and made to him a statement along these lines: Hitler had summoned the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to Berchtesgaden for the purpose of apprising them of Germany's intentions with regard to the Balkans and the necessity of access to the Aegean Sea and warning them that Yugoslavia must count upon the fact that since the fall of France Germany is the sole great power on the European Continent and that it would be an illusion to suppose that Soviet Russia could be played off against her. The Turkish Government for its part should likewise realize and be guided by the state of facts thus indicated. Despite the persistently unfriendly attitude of the Turkish press the German Government is prepared to be tolerant with respect to Turkey's pro-British sympathies and even of such things as taking British generals on tour of inspection so long as no British forces are admitted; but Germany is prepared to take immediate action against Turkey if she permits so much as one British plane to base upon her territory. 2. There is some reason to believe on the other hand that the British have been urging the Turks to permit the establishment on Turkish territory of forces corresponding unit by unit with those which the Germans may establish in Bulgaria. The Turks have with apparent reason pointed out that their air and other bases have not yet been developed to the point they would suffice for effective military operations and that meanwhile the basing of even minimum forces on this territory would entail reactions which the British themselves would not be prepared to meet: they are altogether cooperative in preparing the necessary facilities but definitely unwilling to let anything be started before means of finishing it have been provided. 3. I have gathered the impression that the British diplomatic and military authorities here alike feel that their Government is trying to hustle the Turks faster than their temperamental and technological situations would justify and are inclined to advise the British Government that it would be wiser not to arouse in them a feeling of resistance but to rely rather upon their response to their impulses of self-interest and their sense of loyalty which in spite of their wariness and shrewdness in minor matters can be counted on to keep them faithful to the alliance and assure their eventual cooperation to the fullest extent of their potentialities. MACMURRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/8673: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, February 27, 1941-4 p. m. [Received February 28-8 a. m.] 46. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. 1. My British colleague 20 invited me yesterday to a talk with Sir Anthony Eden,21 General Dill 22 and himself which I would sum up as follows: 2. Eden spoke with appreciation of his contacts with Mr. Hopkins 23 and of the good that Colonel Donovan 24 had accomplished in this region. I said that I felt Donovan's bird's-eye view of the Balkans and Near East had been of great help to us in the field as giving a broader frame of reference for our ideas and interpretations of events and that he had also served a very useful purpose in bringing to the Turks, for instance, first-hand information of American intentions and capacities which they might have read about in the press but had never quite realized. He then said that Donovan's observations of the situation in this area had been of great help to the British. 3. He asked my opinion whether the loyalty of the Turks could be counted on. I replied (along the lines of the third paragraph of my No. 41, February 25) that I thought it could, . . .—that they might haggle and even cause many headaches about their performance of one thing or another that they had undertaken to do but that they would prove staunch and courageous in carrying out their fundamental obligations. I told him of the Premier's query whether American opinion was in doubt of Turkey's loyalty (see my 34, February 18, 5 [4] p. m.). He said he realized the Turks were abnormally sensitive on that point. 4. He asked how they had received the two communications of the President's views that I had recently had occasion to present to them (your Nos. 12 and 14 25). I acknowledged that neither of these com 20 Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. "British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 22 Gen. Sir John G. Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 23 Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt. 24 "Col. William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in Southeast Europe and the Near East, December 1940-March 1941. munications had elicited any marked reaction on the part of the Turks who are perhaps too isolated from American thought to be able to relate these communications to our policy and to realize their potential significance. He asked whether they had not reacted to the suggestion that we might make our material resources available to them. Upon my answering that they had not seemed especially impressed he asked whether they had not realized as England did that American industry would tip the balance in the war. . . . He remarked that it was not just a question of equipment but equally of technical ability in using it and Dill interposed that he understood the Germans had reckoned on 4 years to create and train an armored division. Both assumed that Turks were not yet even aware of their deficiencies in this regard. 5. Speaking incidentally of military prospects both Eden and Dill seemed to take for granted that Bulgaria would be a base of German operations against Greece and/or Turkey as soon as the condition of the ground should permit. When Hugessen said Turkish staff estimated that would be about mid-April Dill remarked that would give British several more weeks than they had reckoned on and Eden added that every day would count. 6. In expectation of further contacts I refrain from interpretation or comment for the time being. MACMURRAY 740.0011 European War 1939/8711: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, March 1, 1941-8 p. m. [Received March 2-5: 18 p. m.] 49. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Pending receipt of expected more comprehensive information I have reason to believe Eden and Dill convinced themselves it would in their own interest be disadvantageous to have Turkey participate in war under present circumstances and that they reached altogether frank and friendly understanding with Turks that they should not declare war even in event of German invasion of Greece but unless attacked should hold aloof for present although making preparations (along lines not yet fully worked out) for eventual participation. See third paragraph my 41.20 MACMURRAY 26 Dated February 25, 10 a. m., p. 825. |
