trust this supererogatory and seemingly innocent statement will not (like Treaty of Friendship which grew out of very similar proposal) develop into something with more far-reaching implications than Turks contemplated beforehand or indeed seem even yet to realize. (3) I fear that disclosure of dualism in British policy referred to in your 173, October 1,12 may delay if not make impossible course recommended in my 370, yesterday. But I continue to hope that on suitable occasion Department take suggested means to bring home to Turkish diplomatic and (particularly) military representation in Washington our interest and concern in chrome question and its relation to our lease-lend program. Repeated London. MACMURRAY 811.20 Defense (M)/3485: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, October 7, 1941-4 p.m. [Received October 8-8: 39 a. m.] 374. Last night British Ambassador advised me that during evening Foreign Minister had called him in and informed him as follows: Clodius had that morning told Numan Bey that Germany was prepared to respect Turkey's contractual obligation to sell entire chrome output to Britain up to January 1943 but demanded that Turkey sign secret exchange of letters, obligating herself to supply in exchange for war materials furnished by Germany under trade agreement, half of her production (and not less than 150,000 tons) 43 in 1943 and again in 44; if Turkey would not agree there would be a rupture of trade negotiations. He had insisted that this should not be communicated to British Ambassador but Numan had refused. Cabinet had immediately considered matter and decided to offer counterproposal as follows: Provided Germany will now furnish war materials already asked for in connection with proposed trade agreement, Turkey will undertake to furnish Germany 100,000 tons each in 1943 and 4, in payment for such further military supplies as Turkish Government may designate from time to time during that period. Min [iste]r argued to Hugessen that such undertaking would not effectively commit Turkey to furnish chrome inasmuch as it would be open to Turkish Government when time came to specify war materials that Germany 42 See footnote 96, p. 906. 43 In telegram No. 376, October 8, 10 p. m., the Ambassador in Turkey reported that the German delegation had accepted a counterproposal for a maximum of 90,000 tons each year without mention of half of the Turkish production (811.20 Defense (M)/3497). would not be in a position to furnish. He also argued that in any case, giving of chrome to Germany would not necessarily diminish amount available to Britain and ourselves, as production could be increased correspondingly if mining equipment and particularly overhead cable lines and trucks could be furnished. (It is of course absurd to suppose that Turkey, whose production has decreased this year and which in view of quasi-mobilization has had to introduce forced labor in some mines, could double output by '43.) 2. In view of extreme urgency of matter I feel warranted in exercising broad discretion conferred on me by your 164, September 21 and have concerted with H[ugessen] that he should see Min[iste]r this morning to protest against proposed arrangement and to say that he had consulted me and that I proposed to call and present certain views. He has now done so and tells me that he first asked Minr to withhold action until British Government could state its views but was told that that was impossible as negotiations had already dragged on too long. In reply to question he was told that Turks were making their counterproposal as a "take it or leave it" proposition. He asked whether Minr could at least confirm definitely his assurance that supplies available to Britain and United States would not be diminished and Saraçoğlu unhesitatingly promised this on condition that mining equipment and particularly overhead cable carriers and trucks could be furnished. He says Minr almost in so many words gave him to understand that Turks are prepared to accept German demands with idea of tiding over time until 43 when they feel situation will have developed to point at which Germany will either be in a position to take what she wants or else in such a position that Turkey can afford to find some basis for not carrying out agreement. When H mentioned my intended call Minr rather heatedly exclaimed "are Britain and United States combining to force us into war." 3. I am awaiting appointment with Minr when I shall hand him memorandum of following tenor: "While on one hand Government of United States has no direct contractual rights in matter purchase of chrome from Turkey it has on other hand no obligation in matter either of according to Turkish Government favored position with regard to purchase of American materials or of supplying war materials to that Government under so-called Lease-Lend Act. American Government has in fact allowed to Turkish Government a position of high priority in both these respects, has already made available to it important quantities of materials and is taking steps to supply them in great quantity. American Government has been enabled to supply war materials without cost to Turkish Government by virtue of provisions of LeaseLend Act authorizing it to give such assistance to any country whose defense President deems vital to defense of United States. President has construed that authorization as justifying aid to Turkey by reason of her definite identification with cause of democracies through her alliance with Great Britain and of her determination to resist aggression and to give no aid to aggressor nations. In fulfilment of its program of assistance to democracies American Government is making every effort to expand industrial energy of United States and concentrate it upon production of war materials. For this purpose it is essential that there should be available for American industry bulk of present chrome output of Turkey; and when American industry reaches its peak production of war materials in 1943 it may be expected to require all chrome Turkey can produce. American Government can not contemplate without anxiety prospect that its program of assistance to democracies, by which Turkish Government is now benefiting, should be jeopardized by action which for benefit of a country at war with democracies would cut off or reduce supply of chrome at a time when it would be more than ever essential. Secretary of State on September 22 advised Turkish Ambassador in Washington of serious repercussions that could not but arise at once in event that Turkish Government should allot to Germany any portion of chrome output of Turkey." Repeated to London. MACMURRAY 811.20 Defense (M)/3500: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, October 8, 1941-4 p. m. [Received October 9-7:45 a. m.] 375. Shortly after sending my 374 yesterday I was received by Foreign Minister who in earnest but this time not unamiable mood confirmed general situation reported in that telegram and overwhelmed me with arguments that he was doing just what we wanted Turks to do about chrome; we desired not an infinity of it but enough to satisfy our needs even for a greatly expanded war industry; British and we together were not now taking he maintained as much as Turkey can produce with result that some mines had shut down; we could have that and more if we wanted for duration of British contract; thereafter if we had been interested enough in meanwhile to provide additional transportation facilities there was no reason why production should not be doubled or quadrupled so as to provide our maximum needs in addition to German quota. He brushed aside all question as to feasibility of this. He then went on to claim that Turkey had been confronted with critical situation in which she could not have refused German demand on any ground except open enmity and that a way out had been found by putting off fulfillment of those demands and making it dependent upon conditions which it might well prove impossible for them to meet. He even said that he felt he de served congratulations for averting this crisis in interests of United States and Britain as well as of Turkey. I then asked him to read informal memorandum quoted in my next preceding telegram." He studied it carefully then asked whether it embodied fresh instructions I had received; I said it was my own formulation of my Government's views as I understood them from a whole series of instructions. He said it raised a wholly novel point in insisting on behalf of United States that no chrome be given to Germany. I said that Secretary had twice emphasized that point in conversation with Turkish Ambassador September 22. He sent for and translated to me Münir Bey's report of that conversation which I was disappointed to find was rather casual and unprecise and failed to convey any clear idea of matters discussed or of any importance which our Government attaches to them. I read him relevant portions of your 172, September 30,45 and particularly pointed out that Secretary's comments on repercussions to be expected in event of giving chrome to Germans were not (as Minister suggested) limited to case of giving it during life of British contract. He then turned to passage re lease-lend assistance and rather dramatically implored me to make clear to my Government that Turkey quite definitely expects to be attacked by Germany before next summer; that meanwhile she has no choice but to arm herself (from whatever source available, even Germany) to fullest extent possible in hope of deterring or eventually meeting that attack on best terms possible; and that she relies on her friends of democracies to understand her position and contribute utmost they can to strengthen her as bastion of Middle East. I promised to convey this message whose purport I fully understood and had indeed reported home on various occasions but said that I counted upon his understanding that my Government too has its own interests and problems and viewpoints to consider. I attempted no more detailed argument of points he raised as he gave me to understand that Turkish position (set forth in first paragraph of my next previous) had been finally determined and would be at once communicated to German Trade Delegation (which was in fact waiting in his anteroom) and incorporated without delay in signed agreement, if accepted by Germans. 2. Whereas my British colleague and his advisers are not disposed to take it tragically, feeling that essential point has been gained and that events may be expected to take care of matter of ultimate deliveries of chrome to their enemies, I cannot but feel that common cause has suffered serious defeat in this field, although it may well prove that in upshot Turks will never actually give Germans any chrome. Fact remains that they are now promising 14 months hence to transfer to 44 Supra. 45 'Not printed; it repeated memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 22, p. 949. Germany, from their allies and friends who are arming them against Germany, the very substantial first call upon their output of vital war material. To speak only of matters within my ken, I feel that not only will German propaganda make most in Near and Middle East of such a breach in Turkey's solidarity with democracies but effect on Turkish morale of this Government's yielding to first use of pressure in implementation of recent Treaty of Friendship cannot but be one of defeatism and flabbiness of will in meeting any further presI still believe in good will and loyalty of Turks to cause of democracies even though it be result of their conviction that Allied victory is only assurance of their national survival; but this case has shaken my confidence in their capacity to keep their heads in a tight situation... Repeated to London. MACMURRAY 662.6731/147: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, October 9, 1941-5 p. m. [Received October 10-12:24 a. m.] 377. The German-Turkish commercial agreement was signed about noon today.46 740.0011 European War 1939/15970 MACMURRAY Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1941. The British Ambassador 47 called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador read to me some messages from his Foreign Office concerning the situation in Turkey and the negotiations between the Turkish and German Governments involving the right of Germany to acquire chrome in Turkey. The British Foreign Office again was very anxious that the Turkish agreement with Germany should be played down and that too much pressure should not be brought to bear upon Turkey by either Great Britain or the United States as a result of the agreement Turkey had entered into with Germany. The British Foreign Office again feared that Ambassador MacMurray was adopting too defeatist an attitude and reporting too gloomily to 46 For text, see Reichsgesetzblatt, vol. 11, No. 2, November 15, 1941, p. 375. 47 Viscount Halifax. |