the Department of State regarding the attitude of the Turkish Government.

I said that I was somewhat at a loss to account for this new instance of discord in the implementation of the policies of our two Governments with regard to Turkey. I said that the United States had consistently endeavored to support the British position vis-à-vis Turkey, and that in as much as I knew from my personal friendship for him of the unusual ability of Ambassador MacMurray and of the highly intelligent manner in which he conducted his official business, I felt sure that the American Ambassador in Ankara had carried out the instructions sent to him in accordance with the policy of this Government. I said that what had happened during past months had been that frequently after this Government has communicated its views to the Turkish Government in response to requests from the British Government, the latter had then modified its own position. I said that in the present instance I believed that Ambassador MacMurray was reporting objectively and by no means in an unduly defeatist spirit and that he had done his utmost, as had this Government, to support the British Government in order that the Turkish Government might be dissuaded from giving way to Germany more than was absolutely inevitable under present conditions.

Lord Halifax said that he felt very much the same way.

811.20 Defense (M)/3500: Telegram

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1941-5 p. m.

180. Your No. 374, October 7, 4 p. m., your 375, October 8, 4 p. m., and your 378, October 9, 7 p. m.48 The Department concurs in the representations which you made to the Turkish Foreign Minister, and takes note of Saraçoğlu's remarks in reply. It agrees that no further representations to the Turkish authorities appear necessary at this time with regard to the Turkish-German trade agreement or to the joint communiqué issued at the time of its signature.

While neither the Turkish action in agreeing to sell chrome to Germany in 1943 nor the joint communiqué are pleasing to this Government, it is considered preferable to endeavor to strengthen our economic ties with Turkey as much as possible in the near future, by such means as finding tonnage to lift Turkish chrome and tobacco, and effort will be made in this direction at once. If this can be accomplished, the principal German argument for trade with Turkey will be obviated. However, an immediate suggestion along this line to the 48 Ante, pp. 958, 960, and 908, respectively.

Turks would give a false impression of our reaction to the German agreement, and no mention of the matter will be made until tonnage can be guaranteed.

HULL

662.6731/151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 17, 1941-5 p. m. [Received October 18-10:20 a. m.]

386. Although Foreign Minister at first consented to give British Ambassador only in strictest secrecy copies of document constituting trade agreement with Germany, he has now assented to Hugessen's request that he be allowed to communicate them to me. I shall shortly telegraph résumé of most essential points.

2. This change in attitude with regard to our relationship to the questions involved, of course, invalidates the suggestion in fifth paragraph of my 383, October 15.49

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

662.6731/152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

388. My 377, October 9, 5 p. m.

ANKARA, October 17, 1941-7 p. m. [Received October 18-6:46 p. m.]

1. Turkish-German commercial arrangement (comprising commercial agreement with protocol and 13 confidential exchanges of notes, and payments agreement with confidential protocol and 2 exchanges of notes) which entered provisionally into force on October 9 and is to remain in force until March 31, 1943, provides for exchange of goods divided into 2 groups to the value of 96 million Turkish pounds. Turkish goods to f. o. b. value of 55 million Turkish pounds of which the most important items are: minerals and metals (copper, chrome "to be delivered after January 15, 1943" and antimony), 10 million, olive oil, 7, cotton, 7, mohair and other goats' hair, 6, skins, 5, and oleaginous seeds, 4.5, are to be exchanged for specific German goods to a similar value, c. i. f., of which the most important are: war material, 18 million, iron and steel, [apparent omission], machines, means of transport, 30, and copper manufactures of which copper content is not to exceed 1,000 tons, 2.5. Turkish goods

to a value of 41 millions, of which most important items are: tobacco, 20 million, figs, 6.5, hazel nuts, 5.4, raisings [raisins?], 3, fish, 2.5, are to be exchanged to the extent of 50 percent for German goods specified in first group with the exception of war material, copper manufactures and sugar beet seed and hardware, iron and other metal manufactures, and to the extent of 50 percent for German goods of any sort.

While the commercial agreement stipulates that export of Turkish goods will be authorized to the value of German goods in corresponding category arriving in customs in Turkey, a confidential exchange of notes provides for a margin in each group of 10 percent of value of goods to be exported. This apparently means that at the beginning the Germans could import from Turkey Turkish goods in group 1 to the value of 5,500,000 Turkish pounds prior to the arrival of any German goods in Istanbul. It is provided that when the margin is exceeded either Government may take measures necessary to restore the equilibrium. In a confidential note the Turkish Government agrees to issue export licenses to Germany for : 12,000 tons of copper, 7,000 tons of cotton, 45,000 tons of chrome and 8,000 tons of olive oil. In this connection it is worthy of note that the export of copper, chrome and antimony to Germany was not authorized under the previous TurkishGerman commercial agreement, and that the quantities of cotton and olive oil have been vastly increased.

2. In a confidential exchange of notes the two Governments agree to conclude before March 31, 1943, an agreement concerning the delivery of Turkish chrome to Germany to be effected up to December 31, 1944 on the following conditions

(1) that amount of war materials specified in schedule 1-A "must be entirely liquidated by the delivery to Turkey of the materials in the conditions specified by the agreement";

(2) "the chrome to be exported from Turkey will form the counter value of further war materials to be agreed upon by the two Governments":

(3) "the Turkish Government will then authorize the exportation of an annual quantity of chrome amounting to 90,000 tons, for the periods from January 15 to December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944, that is a total of 180,000 tons from the 15th of January 1943 to the end of 1944."

The war materials to be delivered by Germany to Turkey are : spare parts for German planes, heavy machine guns, Krupp guns 7.5/60, with sights and ammunition, Bochum guns 7.5/20 with ammunition, pontoons and engineering material spare parts for trucks and motorcycles and 40 relined Bochum guns.

3. Payments agreement which is similar to 1938 agreement covers in addition to payments arising out of commercial exchanges financial

transfers of all sorts between the two countries, provision is made in a supplementary note for the utilization of excess blocked funds in Germany of persons residing in Turkey for the purchase by German banks for Turkish account of obligations of the Anatolian Railway, Port of Naydar Pasha and Turkish debt 1933 in circulation in Germany or in territories occupied by Germany.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/3596: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary

of State

LONDON, October 24, 1941-4 p. m. [Received 4:35 p. m.]

5070. 1. Ministry Economic Warfare are now preparing instructions for Ambassador at Ankara with respect to conclusion of chrome purchase contract covering year 1942. Chief object which Ministry has in mind is to evacuate every ton of chrome they can from Turkey just as soon as possible, particularly not to leave any stocks in Turkish ownership at beginning of 1943, to avoid such unsold stocks possibly being delivered to Germans.

2. As regards price, British Ambassador at Ankara has suggested 140 shillings per ton as possible ceiling for 48 percent ore. He also reported that Germans had offered 150 shillings. Ministry therefore point out that while an effort should be made to obtain as low a price as possible it is likely to be very difficult to drive any hard bargain with the Turks who are under no illusions as to importance being attached to their chrome supplies. Ministry Economic Warfare in particular feel strongly that a price should be paid for ore at Mersin, Payas and Iskanderun which would be sufficient to induce mine owners or Turkish Government to take all steps in their power to get the ore to these ports particularly Mersin. They point out that it is in fact much more advantageous to pay 170 shillings for ore at Mersin than 130 shillings for ore which may never leave the mining area or only reach the ports after long delays.

3. Ministry Economic Warfare has telegraphed British Ambassador at Ankara in general terms setting forth these considerations and suggesting to him that he explore the following three inducements for the Turks to bring the ore to one of the three selected ports:

(a) Either a basic price at one of three selected ports with penalty for deliveries elsewhere or alternatively a basic interior price with a premium for delivery at one of three selected ports.

(b) Only part payment for ore when delivered at ports other than the three selected, the balance to be payable when delivery is made at Mersin, etc.

(c) Combination of the two foregoing points.

4. Ministry Economic Warfare state they have centralized all their activities in this matter with their Embassy at Ankara and express the hope that pertinent American Government authorities will coordinate their activities so that American Ambassador there will be in a position to work closely with his British colleague.

5. Ministry Economic Warfare also state they would appreciate any suggestions or comments Department or defense agencies concerned might care to advance at earliest moment.

WINANT

811.20 Defense (M)/3596: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1941-9 p. m. 194. The Department has received the following telegram from London:

[Here follows telegram No. 5070, printed supra.]

The Department agrees completely with London's decision, as expressed in paragraph 4 of London's 5070, to center their activities having to do with chrome in their Embassy at Ankara, and intends similarly to center its activities in your Embassy.

The Department also believes the general line of suggestion as to price and buying policy set forth in London's 5070 to be sound and promising, especially in regard to the suggestion of buying f. o. b. Mersin, Payas, and Iskenderon. Before formulating final definite instructions to you, however, it seems useful to wait until the British Embassy in Washington has received a reply from the British Government in response to two cables that it has sent after discussion with us. These apparently crossed London's 5070. One contained suggestions on policy; the second was a cable from Washington on October 27, requesting data on chrome production, stocks, and movements during 1941. We surmise that it is probable these cables have been repeated to the British Embassy at Ankara.

Meanwhile, it would be useful for you fully to consult with your British colleague.

All interested agencies of this Government have been concentrating attention on the greatly desired objective of securing as much chrome from Turkey as possible between now and the end of 1942. It is realized that this is a question involving the maintenance of the highest possible rate of production at points and places from which the chrome can be shipped; second, the best utilization of available railway transport; third, the making of arrangements for ship transport.