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sit heredibus, etiamsi liberos habebunt.

§ 208. Sed plerisque placuit, quantum ad hoc ius quod lege Papia coniunctis constituitur, nihil interesse utrum per vindicationem an per damnationem legatum sit.

§ 209. Sinendi modo ita legamus:

HERES MEUS DAMNAS ESTO SINERE LUCIUM TITIUM HOMINEM STICHUM SUMERE SIBIQUE HABERE.

§ 210. Quod genus legati plus quidem habet quam per vindicationem legatum, minus autem quam per damnationem. nam eo modo non solum suam rem testator utiliter legare potest, sed etiam heredis sui cum alioquin per vindicationem nisi suam rem legare non potest; per damnationem autem cuiuslibet extranei rem legare potest.

§ 211. Sed si quidem mortis testatoris tempore res ipsius testatoris sit vel heredis, plane utile legatum est, etiamsi testamenti faciundi tempore neutrius fuerit.

§ 212. Quodsi post mortem testatoris ea res heredis esse coeperit, quaeritur an utile sit legatum. et plerique putant inutile esse: quid ergo est? licet aliquis eam rem legaverit quae neque eius umquam fuerit, neque postea heredis eius umquam esse coeperit, ex senatusconsulto Neroniano proinde videtur ac si per damnationem relicta esset. § 213. Sicut autem per damnationem legata res non statim post aditam hereditatem legatarii efficitur, sed manet heredis eo usque, donec is heres tradendo vel mancipando vel in iure cedendo legatarii eam fecerit; ita et in sinendi modo legato iuris est et ideo huius quoque legati nomine in personam actio

is to be preferred to heirs with children.

§ 208. And it is generally agreed that as to the rights which the lex Papia gives to joint legatees, it makes no difference whether the bequest is by vindication or by condemnation.

§ 209. A bequest by permission is in the following form: Be my heir condemned to permit Lucius Titius to take and to have to himself my slave Stichus.'

210. A bequest in this form has more latitude than one in the form of vindication, but less than one in the form of condemnation, for hereby not only can the testator's property be effectively bequeathed, but also that of the heir, whereas by the form of vindication the testator can only bequeath his own property, and by the form of condemnation he can bequeath the property of any stranger.

§ 211. If at the time of the testator's death a thing belong to the testator or the heir, the bequest is valid, even though at the time of making the will it belonged to neither.

§ 212. If it first belong to the heir after the death of the testator it is a question whether the bequest is valid, and it is generally held to be invalid. However, even though a thing bequeathed never belonged either to the testator or to the heir, by the senatusconsult of Nero all bequests are put on the same footing as a bequest by condemnation.

§213. Just as a thing bequeathed by condemnation does not immediately on the acceptance of the succession belong to the legatee, but continues to belong to the heir until by delivery, or mancipation, or default in a fictitious vindication, he makes it the property of the legatee; so it happens in bequest

est QUIDQUID HEREDEM EX TESTAMENTO DARE FACERE OPORTET.

§ 214. Sunt tamen qui putant ex hoc legato non videri obligatum heredem, ut mancipet aut in iure cedat aut tradat, sed sufficere, ut legatarium rem sumere patiatur; quia nihil ultra ei testator imperavit, quam ut sinat, id est patiatur legatarium rem sibi habere.

§ 215. Maior illa dissensio in hoc legato intervenit, si eandem rem duobus pluribusve disiunctim legasti: quidam putant utrisque solidum deberi, sicut per damnationem: nonnulli occupantis esse meliorem condicionem aestimant, quia cum in eo genere legati damnetur heres patientiam praestare, ut legatarius rem habeat, sequitur, ut si priori patientiam praestiterit, et is rem sumpserit, securus sit adversus eum qui postea legatum petierit, quia neque habet rem, ut patiatur eam ab eo sumi, neque dolo malo fecit quominus eam rem haberet.

§ 216. Per praeceptionem hoc modo legamus: LUCIUS TITIUS HO

MINEM STICHUM PRAECIPITO.

§ 217. Sed nostri quidem praeceptores nulli alii eo modo legari posse putant, nisi ei qui aliqua ex parte heres scriptus esset: praecipere enim esse praecipuum sumere; quod tantum in eius personam procedit qui aliqua ex parte heres institutus est, quod is extra portionem hereditatis praecipuum legatum habiturus sit.

§ 218. Ideoque si extraneo legatum fuerit, inutile est legatum, adeo ut Sabinus existimaverit ne quidem ex senatusconsulto Neroniano posse convalescere: nam eo, inquit, sena

by permission, and accordingly this form of bequest is ground to support a personal action in the terms: 'Whatever the heir is bound by the will to convey or perform.'

§ 214. Although some hold that a bequest in this form does not bind the heir to mancipate or cede by fictitious action, or deliver, but is satisfied by the legatee being permitted to take the thing, as the testator only enjoined the heir to let him have it.

§ 215. A more serious question arises in another point respecting this form of bequest: if the same thing is bequeathed severally to two or more, some hold that each is entitled to the whole, as in bequest by condemnation; others hold that the first occupant is alone entitled, because as this form of bequest only condemns the heir to suffer the legatee to have the thing, as soon as the first occupant has been suffered to take it, the heir is safe against any subsequent claimant, as he neither has possession of the thing, so as to let it again be taken, nor has fraudulently parted with possession.

§ 216. A bequest by preception is in the following form: 'Let Lucius Titius take my slave Stichus by preception [before partition].'

§ 217. My school hold that such a bequest can only be made to one of several coheirs, because preception, or previous taking, can only be attributed to a person who, taking as heir, over and above his portion as heir, and before partition of the inheritance between the coheirs, takes something as legatee.

§ 218. Therefore, if a stranger have a legacy in this form it is void, and Sabinus held that the flaw is not remedied by the senatusconsult of Nero, for that senatusconsult

tusconsulto ea tantum confirmantur quae verborum vitio iure civili non valent, non quae propter ipsam personam legatarii non deberentur. sed Iuliano ex Sexto placuit etiam hoc casu ex senatusconsulto confirmari legatum: nam ex verbis etiam hoc casu accidere, ut iure civili inutile sit legatum, inde manifestum esse, quod eidem aliis verbis recte legatur, velut [per vindicationem et per damnationem], sinendi modo: tunc autem vitio personae legatum non valere, cum ei legatum sit cui nullo modo legari possit, velut peregrino cum quo testamenti factio non sit; quo plane casu senatusconsulto locus

non est.

§ 219. Item nostri praeceptores quod ita legatum est nulla ratione putant posse consequi eum cui ita fuerit legatum, praeterquam iudicio familiae erciscundae quod inter heredes de hereditate erciscunda, id est dividunda, accipi solet: officio enim iudicis id contineri, ut et quod per praeceptionem legatum est adiudicetur.

$220. Unde intellegimus nihil aliud secundum nostrorum praeceptorum opinionem per praeceptionem legari posse, nisi quod testatoris sit: nulla enim alia res quam hereditaria deducitur in hoc iudicium. itaque si non suam rem eo modo testator legaverit, iure quidem civili inutile erit legatum; sed ex senatusconsulto confirmabitur. aliquo tamen casu etiam alienam rem per praeceptionem legari posse fatentur: veluti si quis eam rem legaverit quam creditori fiduciae causa mancipio dederit; nam officio iudicis coheredes cogi posse existimant soluta pecunia solvere eam rem, ut possit praecipere is cui ita legatum sit.

§ 221. Sed diversae scholae auc

only cures verbal flaws which make a bequest informal at civil law, not personal disabilities of the legatee. Julian, however, and Sextus held that this bequest also is made valid by the senatusconsult, as only being avoided at civil law by a verbal informality, as appears from the fact that the very same person might take by a bequest in another form, for instance, the form of permission, whereas personal disability of a legatee implies inability to take under any form, as that of an alien, who cannot be a party to a will, and is not relieved by the senatusconsult.

§ 219. Again, my school hold that in this form of bequest, the only action by which a legatee can recover is the action for partition of an inheritance, the judge's commission including a power of adjudicating a thing bequeathed by preception.

§ 220. From this it follows that, according to my school, nothing can be bequeathed by preception but what belongs to the testator, for nothing but the inheritance forms the subject of this action. If, then, a thing that does not belong to the testator is bequeathed in this form, the bequest is void at civil law, but made valid by the senatusconsult. In one case they admit that another person's property may be bequeathed by preception, for instance, if a man bequeath a thing which he has conveyed by fiduciary mancipation to a mortgagee, as it is within the powers of the judge to order the coheirs to redeem the property by payment of the mortgage debt, and thus enable the legatee to exercise his right of preception.

§ 221. The other school hold that

tores putant etiam extraneo per praeceptionem legari posse proinde ac si ita scribatur: TITIUS HOMINEM STICHUM CAPITO, supervacuo adiecta PRAE syllaba; ideoque per vindicationem eam rem legatam videri. quae sententia dicitur divi Hadriani constitutione confirmata esse.

$222. Secundum hanc igitur opinionem, si ea res ex iure Quiritium defuncti fuerit, potest a legatario vindicari, sive is unus ex heredibus sit sive extraneus: et si in bonis tantum testatoris fuerit, extraneo quidem ex senatusconsulto utile erit legatum, heredi vero familiae herciscundae iudicis officio praestabitur. quod si nullo iure fuerit testatoris, tam heredi quam extraneo ex senatusconsulto utile erit.

§ 223. Sive tamen heredibus, secundum nostrorum opinionem, sive etiam extraneis, secundum illorum opinionem, duobus pluribusve eadem res coniunctim aut disiunctim legata fuerit, singuli partes habere debent.

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a stranger may take a bequest in the form of preception just as if it were in the form: Let Titius take my slave Stichus,' the addition [by preception, or, before partition] being mere surplusage, and the bequest being in effect in the form of vindication; and this opinion is said to be confirmed by a constitution of the late emperor Hadrian.

§ 222. According to this view, if the thing was the Quiritarian property of the defunct, it can be recovered in a real action by the legatee, whether an heir or a stranger, and if it was only the bonitarian property of the testator, a stranger will recover the bequest under the senatusconsult, an heir by the authority of the judge in an action for partition of inheritance. If it was in no sense the property of the testator, either an heir or a stranger may recover it under the senatusconsult.

§ 223. Whether heirs, according to my school, or strangers, according to the other, if two or more legatees have the same thing bequeathed to them, each legatee is only entitled to a ratable portion.

§ 197. Senatusconsulto Neroniano cautum est ut quod minus pactis (aptis?) verbis legatum est perinde sit acsi optimo jure legatum esset optimum autem jus legati per damnationem est, Ulpian, 24, 11. The senatusconsult of Nero provided that every inaptly worded bequest should be deemed to be expressed in the most favourable form: the most favourable form being by condemnation.'

By this senatusconsult, A.D. 64, the four forms of legacy are not entirely abolished, but the importance of their distinctions is very much diminished. A legacy, by whatever form bequeathed, is henceforth always recoverable, provided it could have been ef fectively bequeathed in any form.

Subsequently a constitution of Constantine, Constantinus, and Constans, A.D. 339, which, as we have already seen, abolished the

necessity of sacramental terms in instituting an heir, dispensed with them also in the remaining testamentary dispositions: Et in postremis ergo judiciis ordinandis amota erit sollennium verborum necessitas, Cod. 6, 23, 15. In legatis vel fidei commissis necessaria non sit verborum observantia, ita ut nihil prorsus intersit, quis talem voluntatem verborum casus exceperit aut quis loquendi usus effuderit, Cod. 6, 37, 21. Legacies and trusts need no verbal formulas, and it is utterly immaterial, given the intention, in what grammatical form it is clothed, or in what idiom it is enounced :' apparently a part of the same constitution.

Three years afterwards, a constitution of Constantius and Constans abolished all legal formulas in the following terms: Juris formulae, aucupatione syllabarum insidiantes, cunctorum actibus penitus amputentur, Cod. 2, 58, 1. Legal formulas, with snares in every syllable to make them treacherous, in every occasion are to be utterly abolished.'

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Finally, Justinian enacted ut omnibus legatis una sit natura, Inst. 2, 20, 2, that all bequests should be one of nature; and allowed them to be recovered by personal or real action, at the option of the legatee; or, perhaps we should say, according to the exigences of the case: for some subjects are essentially incapable of recovery by real action; e. g. if a determinate quantity of anything estimated by number, measure, or weight, were bequeathed by a testator who had none in his possession at the time of his death, the heir would be bound to procure and convey it or its value to the legatee, but there would be no specific thing in existence which the legatee could recover by real action.

§ 215. A passage in the Digest, 33, 2, 14, makes this depend on the intention of the testator.

§ 218. Juliano ex Sexto. If this is equivalent to Juliano libris ex Sexto, it would mean 'Julian in his abbreviation of Sextus Pomponius.' Von Savigny proposes Juliano et Sexto; Boecking, Juliano libro sexto Digestorum.

AD LEGEM FALCIDIAM.

§ 224. Sed olim quidem licebat totum patrimonium legatis atque libertatibus erogare, nec quicquam heredi relinquere praeterquam inane nomen heredis; idque lex XII tabularum permittere videbatur, qua ca

§ 224. By the ancient law a testator's whole estate, between legacies and enfranchisements, could be bequeathed away, and nothing left to the heir but an empty title; and this privilege seemed granted by

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