to ride in that car; she could take a seat in and privileges and pleasures that are. the front car. According to her testimony furnished to either class. That colored and that of her witnesses the conductor told people and white people migth be so separaher she must ride in the front car. She told ted if the carriers have a car to proceed him she had always been allowed to ride in according to this rule. That if the had a the ladies' car, and thought she should do car giving white ladies' special privileges of so again, as she was rich and did not want seclusion and other comforts, substantially to ride in the front car, where there was the same must be furnished colored ladies. swearing and smoking and whisky drinking. He told them all travelers had to submit to The conductor insisted she must ride in the some discomforts and inconveniences and front car, but told her he would see there must not be too exacting, but that they are was no swearing or smoking. entitled to polite treatment, free from any indignity of any kind. According to the testimony of the conductor and his witnesses, he told her he was He told the jury that the brakeman having busy then, but he had always let her ride in referred the right of plaintiff to ride in that that car, and if she would take a seat in the car to the conductor, who was the proper front car, when he got through he would official to decide it, and plaintiff having gone come and let her back in the ladies' car. to the conductor, the question in this case She ordered her trunk off the baggage car and must be determined by what occurred berefused to take that train, and under instruc- tween her and the conductor; and if the jury tions from her husband kept that ticket, believed the conductor ratified the act of the bought another and went home on the next brakeman by telling her that she must ride train in the ladies' car. Both Mrs. L. and in the front car and would not be permitted the conductor testified she had often traveled with him and always rode in the ladies' car. The conductor testified that the car in the rear was reserved for ladies' and such passengers as were admitted to it. The front car was a general car, in which smoking was permitted, but on this particular occasion the front car was newer and brighter, in all respects than the rear one in appearance and comfort; that colored people generally rode in the front car, unless objection was made by them, in which case proper persons were allowed to ride in the ladies' car which the plaintiff was always permitted to do. to ride in the ladies' car, the company was undoubtedly liable for damages, unless the jury believed from the proof that the front car was, under the rule already announced, equal to the ladies' car. But if the jury believed that the conductor told her that at his convenience he would admit her to the ladies' car and there was no unreasonable discomfort or delayin in so doing, she could not recover.--Chi. Leg. News. -0 SOME people are too trusting for this world. At a recent trial the prisoner entered a plea of "Not guilty," when one of the jury put on his hat and started for the door. The Judge called him back, and informed him that he could not leave until the case was "Tried!" cried the juror. "Why he acknowledges that he is not guilty!" Judge. Hammond charged the jury that common carriers are requried by law not to make an unjust discriminaton, and must treat all passengers paying the same price tried. alike, but that equal accommodations do not mean identical accommodations; that races and nationalities might be, under some circumstances to be determined on the facts of of each case, reasonably separated, but that in all cases the carrier must furnish substantially the same accommodations to both, to be determined by having the same comforts reply. “GUILTY or not guilty?" sharply said an Assize Judge the other day to an inattentive female prisoner in the dock. "Just as your Honor please. It's not for the likes o' me. to dictate to your Honor's worship," was the THE CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL. The Chicago Law Journal. CHICAGO, JUNE, 1885. CONTENTS. Central Law Association.... Federal Courts. ..162-166 and 187-189 DIGESTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. 16J-170 172 NEW PUBLICATIONS. 169 THE RAILROADS AND THE COURTS is the title of a book wrirten by 'Hiram T. Gilbert Esq., County Judge of La Salle County, Illinois, and recently published. It is chiefly an analysis of the litigation of the last ten years in this state, in which some one 10 of the principal railroad companies was a party, and a comparison of the results with 172-1 other classes of litigation between individuals, or between the state and individuals. In the preface Judge Gilbert makes the 179 statement, that out of a total of sixty three judgments rendered against four of the leading railroads, in the Circuit Courts, in which the question of negligence was in 177 177-178 .178-179 .179-181 181-182 .182-184 THE CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL volved, ten were affirmed and fifty-three reis published on the first of each month versed by the Supreme Court. Of the ten and mailed to subscribers at the low price affirmed, only five were affirmed on the first, of $1.50 per annum, postage paid. With the December Number of the current volume of THE JOURNAL, A COMPLETE INDEX TO VOLUME VI. will be furnished to subscribers FREE. and the other five upon the second or third trial. On the other hand, out of a total of fifty-three judgments of conviction in criminal cases reviewed since 1881, thirty-two were affirmed and twenty-one reversed. These statement are confirmed by a citation of the cases. From these facts the conclusion is drawn We will continue to give from sixteen to eighteen pages of reading matter in each issue, which will consist chiefly of brief digests of recent decisions of the Court of that there is something radically wrong in a last resort of the several states, and of the system of Jurisprudence which, seems United States, carefully selected, with a to favor the stronger against the weaker view to their practical importance, RE- party, especially when the former is a PORTED ESPECIALLY FOR THE poweriul and wealthy corporation. Whilst JOURNAL, or in American Law Periodicals, the evils complained of are apparent to all giving a syllabus of each case, together who have observed the results of such litigawith the name, page and date of the Jour- tion, and call loudly for reform, yet there nal or RECORD where a full report of the are facts, upon which the author has touched case may be found. The purpose is to advise very lightly, which tend in some degree to our patrons of questions decided in the lessen the apparent wrongs. These facts latest cases of importance, and HOW and are, that in trials by Jury, where the defenWHERE complete reports of the same dant is a railroad company or any large may be obtained. corporation, the general prejudice against Subscriptions may commence with any such corporations is likely to taint the The first chapter consists of an analysis of which it is held, that a land owner has no the cases confirming the general results right to put up such barriers as will cause stated. The second chapter treats of the surface water to flood his neighbor's land.rule of comparative negligence established Also the case of Hart v. Western Union by the Supreme Court. The third discuses Telegraph Co., Supreme Court of California, the question as to the burden of proof and in which it is held, that the telegraph comthe rules of practice concerning the same. pany is liable for any loss which follows The fourth treats of when negligence should naturally, and in the usual course of things, be considered a question of fact or a ques- from its failure to transmit a message tion of law. In the fifth chapter the subject promptly and correctly, although the message of damages is elaborately discussed, with a is in cipher, and further that the usual printed citation and analysis of numerous cases. stipulation on the company's blanks exempSixth of trial by Jury. Seventh of instruc- ting it from liability, are void for want of ting the Jury. Eighth, of the appellate consideration. Such company is exempt Courts. What should be their sphere in from liability for errors arising from causes our system of Jurisprudence. beyond its control, only.-Also the case of In the ninth chapter the author discusses, Clement v. W. U. Tel. Co., Supreme Court with a freedom and vigor which is refreshing, of Massachusetts, in which it is held that the the subject of bribery by railway passes. stipulation on a telegraph blank that the Whilst he attributes the wrongs complained | company will not be liable for mistakes or of to radical defects, in our system of Juris-delays in sending a message, unless said prudence, and not to any wrong motive on message be repeated, beyound the amount the part of the members of the Supreme received for sending the same, is valid and Court, he condemns in unmeasured terms, binding, and the sender cannot recover the practice of railroad companies in issuing beyond the amount so paid although the passes to men in any official position whatever. In the tenth chapter, he suggests some remedies for the wrongs refered to which are worthy of consideration. Upon the whole, the work is a vigorous and searching criticism of our system of jurisprudence, and of some of the evil practices which find encouragement from many in high official position, and, if we do not misjudge as to its fruits, it will awaken a wide spread interest in the subjects discussed and perhaps vigorous criticism. For Sale by all Law Booksellers. error or delay was occasioned by the negligence of the Company's servants.-Also the case of Mealey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Company. U. S. Circuit Court of Rhode Island, where it is held that where the pleading does not show that an instrument, of which proffert is made, is under seal, oyer is not demandable, but it is the practice of the court to make an order for its production. Where a state statute regulates the practice in making such application, that practice will be followed in the Federal courts. FEDERAL COURTS. RAILROAD TICKET-HOLDER BOUND TO COMPLY WITH ITS CONDITIONS. Plaintiff purchased a round trip ticket, limited, and on the face thereof was the express condition that said ticket was good for transportation. AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER for May contains the case of Joseph v. Lyons, English Court of Appeals, in which it is held that a registered bill of sale of personal property which includes stock in trade to be after- as indicated, provided, the purchaser idenwards acquired is, as to such stock, only a contract to assign and the vendee takes only an equitable title.—Also the case of Boyd v. Conklin, Supreme Court of Michigan in tified himself to the "Authorized Agent" of the railroad at his destination, and that said ticket, should be "officially signed, and dated in ink, and duly stamped by said agent." The purchaser presented himself no waiver of any condition or term in the at the railroad office at the proper time, for policy, unless by express authority in writing. the purpose of identifying himself and having Plaintiff placed their insurance in hands of his ticket signed and stamped as required, brokers in New York City. The New but the agent was absent and not returning York brokers obtained the policy in question before the departure of the train, which through another broker in Jersey City. The plaintiff wished to take, he boarded the policy had been delivered to the New York train. Upon presentation of his ticket the brokers, and they had paid the premium to conductor refused to accept the same and the broker in Jersey City, and before the demanded cash fare. The plaintiff refused money was remitted to the company the to pay and the conductor removed him from property was destroyed by fire. The prethe train. Thereupon this action is brought mium was afterwards sent to the company for damages for being wrongfully ejected but was refused. Held that B. & Co. of from the train. Held that such removal Jersey City were not the agents of the gave the holder of said ticket no right of company to receive payment of this premium action. Mosher v. St. L. I. M. & T. R. R. and that therefore the plaintiff could not reCo.-(Brewer J.)—March 20.—Fed. Rep. cover.-Peoria Sugar Refinery v. Susg. M. April 28, 1885. F. Ins. Co.-(Butler J.)- Ins. Law Journal May, 1885. NATIONAL BANKS-PLEDGE TO SECURE DEPOSITOR-INSOLVENCY.—Where a deposi RIGHT OF THE STATE TO REGULATE IN PRIOR ΤΟ LEGISLATIVE ACT The legisla tor in a National bank is apprehensive that SURANCE COMPANIES SPECIAL CHARTER the bank is about to fail and after consulation, GRANTED with the officers of the bank, receives of the IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT. bank certain securities to be held as a ture of Illinois in 1869 passed an act requipledge or as collateral for his deposit, it is ring the auditor of State to compel life inheld that if the officers made the pledge to surance companies to keep on hand a certain keep the securities thus pledged out of the reserve, and if they fell below the requireassets of the bank, well knowing at the timements to compel them to suspend new that the bank was about to fail, such pledge business. would be void: but if they made it to prevent failure and used the funds to pay other depositors the deposit it would be good and valid. Roberts v. Hill — (Wheeler J.) — ' sed. March 27, 1885.-Fed. Rep. 28 April, 1885. The plaintiff company was organized in 1867 under a special charter, without any such limitation as the statute of 1869 impoContinuing thus to do business under their charter the company denies that the auditor has any right, under the statute, to INSURANCE—WAIVER OF CONDITIONS IN insist upon their keeping a standard reserve THE POLICY—PREMIUM PAID TO A BROKER— as required by the statute. The Auditor, A policy of insurance issued to plaintiff on plaintiff below, after due examination into its property provided, in express terms, that the affairs of the company, commenced this the company should not be liable, "until the action to enjoin them from doing further cash premium be actually paid to the com- business until they complied with the condipany or an agent of the company," and tion of the statute. This action was prosthat any broker who had procured the ecuted to judgement and a perpetual inpolicy should be "deemed the agent of the junction was issued restraining the company. assured and not of the company," and that From this judgement the company appeals. no person should be considered the agent Held that the state had a reserved right to of the company, unless heheld a commission pass such subsequent laws as might be from the company, and that there should be needed to prevent the privileges granted in the charter from being abused, and that the SUPREME COURT OF ERROR. CONNECTICUT. held by the widow, as and for her life estate, or dower interest in the lands of her late husband; that the rents for the premises did not fall due until the expiration of the lease; that on Nov. 1, 1881, and after such leasing and before the rent fell due the widow departed this life, and that plaintiffs claimed to recover the rents of and from the defendant, as heirs at law of the deceased husband, and not otherwise: Held, that the plea was bad, in failing to allege that the defendant quit the premises on the termination of the lease by the death of the lessor. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease from 2. DANGEROUS CONDITION OF SIDEWALKCITY LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED THEREBY. -One of the principal thoroughfares in the City of Waterbury, became covered with ice and was permitted to remain in that condition for three or four weeks, the sidewalks life tenant good during life of lessor.--The being covered with solid ice, very smooth. heirs of a deceased owner of land can not The plaintiff not being aware of the danger- recover for the use and occupation of the ous condition of the sidewalk, started to walk same while the tenant occupies the premises upon it when he fell and received a severe under a lease from the owner of the life fracture of the leg. This action was brought estate therein; but if the tenant continues to to recover damages for the injury, and a occupy the premises after the death of his verdict and judgment was had for plaintiff lessor, he will be liable to the heirs up to the in the sum of $1300. From this judgment time he surrenders possession to them. defendant appeals. Held there was no 3. SAME-Tenant under one having a error, Judgment affirmed. Cloughessy v. City of Waterbury. (Loomis J.)-Alb. Law Journal, April 11, 1885.-51 Conn. SUPREME COURT OF ILLIONIS. HEAD-NOTES TO OPINIONS FILED AT SPRINGFIEL, AND PREPARED BY HON. NORMAN L. FREEMAN, OFFICIAL REPORTER, TO APPEAR IN HIS REPORTS. life estate absolved from paying rent on death of lessor before end of the term.At common law, where a tenant for life gives a lease for a term of years on a yearly rent, and dies in the course of the year, before the day for the payment of the rent, the rent can not be apportioned and the tenant may quit the premise on such death, without liability to pay any rent to any one since the last day appointed for payment. This rule of the common law remains un 32-29-Henry H. Hoagland et al. v. changed in this State. John W. Crum. (Opinion by Scorr, J., reversing and remanding.) Filed at Springfield, March 30, '85. I. 4. But if the tenant continues occupy the premises after the determination of his lease by the death of his lessor and the owner of the reversion aquiesces in such holding, there is no rule of law to prevent the owner from recovering of the tenant the resonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, from the time of the determination of the lease by the death of the lessor. PLEADING--Plea in action for use and occupation. To an action to recover for the use and occupation of land, the defendant pleaded that the sole cause of action was the rent of the land which had been leased by the defendant from the widow of the deceased owner, for one year, from 5. Release of errors.-The administraMarch 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882, and not from the plaintiffs (the heirs of the deceased owner) or either of them; that such land was trix of a dowress can not release any rights the heirs of the deceased husband may have against an occupying tenant, holding over |