For it must not be supposed that the treaty of peace secured the national life. Indeed, it would be more correct to say, that the most critical period of the country's history embraced the time between the peace of 1783 and the adoption of the constitution in 1788.

It is now almost impossible to understand how the Articles of the Confederation, which constituted the revolutionary government, lasted through the struggles of that difficult time.* The central power was clumsy in its construction, uncertain in its action, and very feeble in its execution. It certainly did not either lead popular sentiment, or develop a consistent scheme of national policy. The indomitable spirit of the people

* For the history of the Confederation, the only authority with which I am acquainted is "The History of the Formation and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States," by Mr. George T. Curtis, of Boston. The first volume of this work only has been published, including the period of the Confederation. As the great party divisions of our political history have taken their rise in different constructions of the constitution, and as every one brings to the study of that instrument a mind more or less biased by early, and, of necessity, prejudiced convictions, it is of course impossible to pronounce an opinion on this work until it is completed. Inferring some of Mr. Curtis's opinions from his argument in the Dred Scott case, I can anticipate a wide difference on many important points. I can say, however, with truth and great pleasure, that so far the work is a credit to the graver literature of the country. It is conceived in a spirit of candid, philosophical inquiry, and executed in a manner honorable to the taste, learning, and honesty of its accomplished author.

conquered by endurance the chief obstacles to success, while the necessary unanimity of action and opinion was preserved by the individual influence of the great men who appeared together in the different colonies, and commanded, each in his sphere, the confidence of his immediate section. The subordination of the government to the individual ability of its instruments was most striking in the foreign relations of the country, and the diplomacy of the Revolution was the result rather of the wisdom of Franklin, Adams, and Jay, than of the prolonged and perplexed deliberation of the Continental Congress. Efficient and sufficient, however, as might be the articles of the confederation for the purpose of giving validity to the diplomatic transactions which resulted in the treaty of peace, the provisions of those articles rendered the government absolutely impotent for the continued administration of the foreign affairs of the new commonwealth. And the inquiry made by the Duke of Dorset, in reply to the advances of the American commissioners towards the negotiation of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, suggested insuperable difficulties.

"Having communicated," says his Grace, in a letter dated March 26, 1785, " to my court the readiness you expressed in your letter to me of the 9th December, to remove to London for the purpose of treating upon such points as may materially concern the interests, both political and commercial, of Great Britain and America, and having at the same time represented that

you declared yourselves to be fully authorized and empowered to negotiate; I have been, in answer thereto, instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested, whether you are merely commissioned by Congress, or whether you have received separate powers from the respective States. . . . . The apparent determination of the respective States to regulate their own separate interests, renders it absolutely necessary, towards forming a permanent system of commerce, that my court should be informed how far the commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain which it may not be in the power of any one of the States to render totally useless and inefficient."*

Now the Articles of Confederation, after providing in Art. 2, that "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled," provided in Art. 9, that "the United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, . . . . of sending and receiving ambassadors, entering into treaties and alliances; provided, that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing

*Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. II., p. 297.

such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever." And it also provided, in the same article, that the consent of nine States should be necessary to the exercise of even this limited power. Such a provision, in the presence of thirteen States, differing widely in the character of their production and the interests of their commerce, was an absolute negative upon any permanent or concerted action.

In addition to this, there was no efficiently constructed Department of State. Congress itself was gradually subsiding into a political inanity; the States were absorbed in their local affairs; their most distinguished men were employed at home; a quorum of members was tardily and with great difficulty convened at the seat of government; the federal and state finances were in a condition of almost hopeless embarrassment; the military force of the country nearly disbanded; and the executive government itself, at the very time it was offering to negotiate with the most powerful nation of the world, was driven from the capital by a military insurrection which lacked principle to be called a rebellion, and had scarcely strength enough to be termed a riot. The questions, too, which were of first importance to the United States, were precisely those commercial and territorial questions which needed prompt action, a vigorous government, and competent military force: such questions, for example, as the

boundaries between Spain and themselves; the restoration of the frontier posts by the English; the commerce with the West Indies, and the navigation of the Mississippi. And yet, unfortunately, these were just the questions most calculated to excite sectional feeling, to develop mischievously local differences, and consequently, under the limitation of the Confederation, the most unlikely to be settled. All therefore which could be expected at this period of our history was, that the government should give up nothing, and, if it pressed no claims, that at least it should abandon none. And this is just what the government did. It held every thing in statu quo between the treaty of independence and the adoption of the constitution; and therefore it is that from the transactions of these five years can best be learned the position of the United States upon the opening of General Washington's administration.

In 1781, the Continental Congress, which had in the first years of the war neglected the organization of any department of foreign affairs, was compelled, by the growing necessities of its diplomatic relations, to establish some orderly arrangement in this branch of administration.

They resolved, "That the extent and the rising importance of these United States entitle them to a place among the great potentates of Europe, while our political and commercial interests point out the propriety of cultivating with them a friendly correspondence and connection.