1. That between the treaty of 1783 and his arrival in 1785, Lord Sheffield's views had become almost universal. The Marquis of Lansdowne, in whom alone Mr. Adams saw any hope, was out of power, and not likely to return; while neither among the people, nor the various political parties, was there manifest the slightest desire to liberalize their national policy.

2. The commerce of the United States had literally fulfilled the prophecy of its enemies, and had run towards England with a current too strong to be turned by home legislation, and regardless of British restriction. And thus England was already in full enjoyment of almost all which she could have obtained by the most conciliatory policy.

3. The right of each State to govern and regulate its own commerce, and the rivalry of their various interests, rendered it impossible to resort to any uniform and consistent system of retaliation, by which alone England could be brought to negotiation. The result of Mr. Adams's labors might be summed up in a few desultory and inconsequential conversations with the British minister; for the question of the posts was as hopeless as a more liberal arrangement of their commercial regulations. In the first place, England had the power, and in the next, she pretended a right. The British minister declared that the United States had broken the treaty, by putting obstacles in the way of the recovery of English debts; and they found, in the independent legislation of so many States, some laws which afforded

a plausible ground for argument. They therefore distinctly signified their intention to hold on to the posts, until the legislation of which they complained was repealed. There was, of course, but one alternative, if the issue was directly made, to resist or to submit. The first was impossible; for Mr. Jay's language, applied to the state of affairs between Spain and the United States, was still more painfully true in reference to Great Britain. "Unblessed with an efficient government, destitute of funds, and without public credit either at home or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in patience for better days, or plunge into an unpopular and dangerous war, with very little prospect of terminating it by a peace either advantageous or glorious." To submit was equally impossible; and Mr. Adams was therefore instructed by Congress to protract the discussions, and thus avoid a categorical answer, which would have forced upon the United States a profitless issue. Having demonstrated the uselessness of his mission, Mr. Adams was recalled at his own request. The British government had never reciprocated the courtesy of the United States in sending an ambassador, but had contented itself with appointing Mr. Temple consul-general at New York, an appointment which Congress sanctioned in a spirit of very ill-judged liberality. The negotiations between the two countries were therefore ended, and as the Federal Constitution was about to go into operation, Congress suffered the foreign affairs of the country to wait in patience for those better days.

Mr. Adams concluded his mission early in 1788, and with it he closed his diplomatic life. As a diplomatist, he was second to none. He possessed neither the facility of Franklin, nor the singular impartiality of Jay; but he was wider and bolder in his views than either. His appreciation of political events took in a broader scope, and was sustained by a profounder and ampler study of political history. His temper was not conciliating, for his intellect was too active and impetuous to wait upon other men's doubts. From the outset of the Revolution, he realized, more vividly than perhaps any other public man, the full force and value of that great event. If he erred, it was because he insisted too strenuously upon the immediate recognition by others of that consequence which he foresaw must attach to the political position of the United States. In his despatches will be found more than one anticipation of political consequences which his country is only now developing in the fulness of its strength and prosperity; and the American historian would be unfit for his task who could censure, with unsympathizing criticism, the impatience of an enthusiasm so patriotic in its zeal, and so far-seeing in its hopes. The treaty with Holland, which was his own peculiar work, and of critical importance at the time of its signature, could have been negotiated only by one who knew how to inspire others with his own confidence in his country's future. His thorough knowledge of the rights and interests of the colonies gave his services incalculable importance in the peace

But

negotiations with Great Britain; and his mission to England was all that under the circumstances it could. be, a strong and dignified protest against the wilfulness of a short-sighted and selfish policy. Since the day on which, in St. James's Palace, he was presented to the King, a long line of worthy successors, in that same palace, surrounded by the same royal pomp and circumstance, have from time to time renewed and maintained the bonds of national intercourse, and each new minister has represented a vaster, richer, greater nation. with all our increase, we have added to the national possession no nobler spirit, no truer patriot, no higher gentleman, than he who purchased his honors neither by popular lip service nor party jugglery, but who, literally, by journeyings often, in perils in the city, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren, in weariness and painfulness, earned the proud privilege of being named, by a grateful senate, the first Minister of the United States to the court of England.

This necessarily brief review of the diplomatic transactions of the years intervening between the treaty of peace of 1783 and the institution of the constitutional government in 1789, shows the difficulties which the new government had to encounter at the outset of its administration of the foreign affairs of the country. The object of the following pages will be to trace the policy of that government in dealing with the troubles it inherited, and to follow the progress of its negotiations to their successful conclusion.

CHAPTER II.

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH ENGLAND.

ON the 30th of April, 1789, George Washington was solemnly inaugurated as first President of the United States of America. After taking the oath of office, he addressed the two houses of Congress in the senate chamber. And with an "aspect grave almost to sadness, his modesty actually shaking, his voice deep, a little tremulous, and so low as to call for close attention," he declared, in language which finds its fullest and fittest application in the history of his own administration, that "there is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there exists, in the economy and course of nature, an indispensable union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity."

In the construction of the cabinet, which immediately followed the inauguration, the secretaryship for Foreign Affairs was conferred upon Thomas Jefferson, of Vir

*Life and Works of Fisher Ames, Vol. I. p. 34.