CHAPTER II: APRIL 16-JUNE 30, 1936 Continuation of Japanese economic penetration in North China; German-"Manchoukuo" trade agreement of April 30; informal British and American representations to Japan over smuggling operations in North China; Japanese-"Manchoukuo" treaty of June 10 on abolition of extraterritorial rights; demand by Southwest China for armed resistance to Japan; stiffening of North China against Japanese military pressure 793.94/7847: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, April 16, 1936-3 p. m. [Received April 16-10:40 a. m.] 191. Embassy's 168, April 3, noon. 1. Major General Matsumuro established his office at Peiping on April 10. The Japanese Embassy now states that this office is under the North China Garrison and not under the Tokyo General Staff. Matsumuro and Sung Che Yuan are in Tientsin. 2. Sung apparently continues his policy of procrastinating to the greatest degree possible in meeting Japanese desires. Sung's purpose is evidently to maintain his present status quo as long as possible. 3. Preparations for inauguration of reconstruction and communications committees under the Hopei-Chahar Political Council are being made slowly but the dates of inauguration have not yet been fixed. It is understood that the Japanese military hope that these committees will accelerate Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. It is doubtful, however, whether much can be expected of the committees for the reasons that the committees will probably procrastinate and that neither Chinese nor Japanese capital seems to be available at present for effective support of significant project. 4. The Economic Committee of the Council decided on March 21 to urge the Ministry of Railways at Nanking to issue a permit for the construction of a private narrow gauge railway from Kalgan to Dolonor and referred to economic advisers for study a proposal for readjustment of the Lungyen iron mine in Chahar. The action of General Sung's regime in respect to these projects in which the Japanese are interested illustrates that regime's methods of attempting simultaneously to please the Japanese and to delay. 5. Notwithstanding the situation described above, there is evidence of a steady Japanese economic and social penetration into Hopei and Chahar, such as (1) the continued smuggling of Japanese produce into China through Yin Ju Keng's area, (2) expanding trade by Japanese and Koreans in Hopei in opium and other narcotics, which is being extended to towns in Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces, according to foreigners resident there, (3) establishment of Japanese owned bus lines in northern Hopei, (4) activities for improvement of cotton pro duction, (5) establishment of various Japanese investigation organs and (6) intended improvement of the Peiping-Mukden Railway installation at Shanhaikwan at a reputed cost of $600,000 (Chinese currency). 6. The attitude of the Chinese military leaders in North China indicates that the Japanese will be unable to effect the establishment of a regime of the degree of autonomy and geographical scope which they presumably still desire unless they are ready to threaten the Chinese leaders with the use of armed force or to run the risk of using armed force. 7. According to a competent press correspondent who has just visited Kalgan and Kueihwa, the foreign residents of those provinces do not expect a forward movement into Suiyuan by Japanese controlled Mongols of Chahar for some time. By mail to Tokyo. 793.94/7846: Telegram JOHNSON The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State NANKING, April 16, 1936-5 p. m. [Received April 16-7:55 a. m.] 92. 1. An officer of the Embassy has just been informed by a Chinese official of Cabinet rank that the Hopei-Chahar Council has agreed to the formation of a Sino-Japanese "anti-Communist" commission including Sung Che Yuan as head and Matsumuro as member and that under the terms of the agreement Japanese troops may proceed as far as Shihchiachuang and Shunteh, Hopei, as Hopei is considered to be threatened by Communist forces. This statement has not been verified by other sources. 2. Repeated to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. PECK 893.00/13464: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State NANKING, April 17, 1936-noon. [Received 1:50 p. m.] 94. Peiping's 183, April 14, 2 p. m. 46 1. Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury April 16 published in news columns an "explanation of the hitherto completely mysterious" release of Bosshardt " as due to change in Communist policy 46 Not printed. 47 Telegram No. 183, April 14, 2 p.m., from the Ambassador in China reported that this missionery was "understood to be of Swiss nationality" (893.00/13457). described in a quoted article said to have been written by one Wang Ming, "leading member of the Internationale in Moscow" and to have appeared (date not given) in the London International Press Correspondence, "official organ of the Communist Internationale". According to this quoted article the new policy involves (1), concentration of Communist effort against "Japanese imperialism"; (2), establishment of more normal relations with other "imperialist" powers which "should not exclude the possibility under certain conditions of fighting together with them" against Japan; (3), relinquishment of "partisan traditions in relation to foreign diplomatic, trading, cultural and religious institutions and persons, i. e., a stop should be put to their arrest and holding to ransom." 48 2. Such policy would seem to be complete reversal of that hitherto followed including opportunist attacks upon foreigners as illustrated by the reported statement of the Stams' murderers in December, 1934, that the victims were being killed because being missionaries they were imperialists and had assisted Chiang Kai Shek in antiCommunist acts. That the reported new policy caused Bosshardt's release would not appear to be entirely borne out by Yunnanfu's April 15, 4 p. m., to the Embassy that Bosshardt when freed was told by Communist leader that Father Kellner would be released upon payment of ransom. 3. A change in Communist policy as described in Wang's article would be a logical development in the light of present strained SovietJapanese relations because it would tend (1), simultaneously to strengthen the Communist cause in China and build up possible resources against Japan by playing upon and supporting the antiJapanese feeling in this country: and (2), to weaken Chinese official and popular sentiment against Communists by aligning the latter with other Chinese against the common enemy. Moreover, although the principles of the First International are opposed alike to the furthering of representative democratic institutions and of nationalistic ambitions, nevertheless Russian Communist advisers for their own ends espoused "bourgeois democratic" aims in this country until 1927 and if the reported present plan to direct Chinese Communist strength against Japan is a fact, the change in policy appears to be a reversion to past technique. The opportunity given by the situation in the Far East to use Chinese nationalistic feeling as a weapon against Japanese nationalism with a view to breaking down the latter, thereby permitting the growth of Communism in Japan would also seem to be a logical objective at this time. 4. To the Department and Peiping. By mail to Moscow, London, Tokyo and Shanghai. PECK 48 For correspondence concerning this case, see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. III, pp. 479 ff. 701.9493/103: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State NANKING, April 18, 1936-4 p. m. [Received 5: 17 p. m.] 99. 1. Press reports that Chinese Government's agrément to appointment of Kawagoe 49 would be announced today appear premature. According to responsible official of the Foreign Office, the Government will not act on the nomination before 3 or 4 more days. A Domei (Japanese news agency) despatch dated Nanking, April 15, purports to quote an unnamed high official of the Foreign Office as saying that "China is not in a position to object to Kawagoe's appointment." 2. It seems generally to be regretted in Chinese circles that Shigemitsu was not nominated Ambassador to China.50 According to one foreign press despatch, the Chinese believe that Kawagoe won the appointment by his sympathetic attitude, as Consul General at Tientsin, toward the acts of the Japanese military in North China and his appointment "is considered a further surrender (presumably of the Japanese Foreign Office) of [to?] the Japanese military authorities." 3. Repeated to Department and Peiping, by mail to Tokyo, Tientsin. PECK 793.94/7860: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, April 20, 1936-2 p. m. [Received April 20-12:30 p. m.] 201. 1. Nanking's telegram to the Department 92, April 16, 5 p. m., and paragraph 2 of the Embassy's 168, April 3, noon. Although joint suppression of Communism has probably been urged recently by Matsumuro, available information here indicates that Sung has not yet entered into an agreement. According to various sources, Sung has recently stated that he is not a traitor to China and that, unlike Ho Ying Chin, he has not entered into any written agreement with the Japanese. Chinese observers state that Sung is deeply averse to yielding to Japanese representations of major importance. 2. There are at present in Peiping two Kuominchun generals who formerly outranked Sung. One of them, Shih Ching Ting, has been here for some time as chief counselor of the Hopei-Chahar pacifica 49 Shigeru Kawagoe's appointment as Japanese Ambassador was confirmed May 1. 50 Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mamoru Shigemitsu was appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union. tion headquarters. The other, Teng Che-hsi, has only recently arrived from Nanking and has been appointed Chief of Court Martial of the Hopei-Chahar pacification headquarters. A third, Lu Chung Lin, was in Peiping recently as a representative from Feng Yu Hsiang. It seems probable that their advice to their former subordinate Sung has been that he should not yield to Japanese representations. What significance, if any, the movements of these men may have with regard to the Kuominchun as a unit is a matter of speculation. 3. The future of Sung's relations with the Japanese appears to depend upon (1) the courage of Sung in refusing to make important concessions to the Japanese, (2) the degree of pressure which the Japanese may be willing to exert, and (3) the extent of aid, if any, which the National Government may give to Sung. 4. The principal Chinese military of Hopei are expected to return from Tientsin to Peiping within a day or two. The principal Japanese military in the five northern provinces are expected to have a conference soon at Tientsin with Colonel Nagami, Chief of Staff of the North China Garrison, who has just returned from Tokyo where he represented Major [General] Tada at the annual meeting of Japanese commanders. It is anticipated that subsequent to [this?] Sino-Japanese conversations at Peiping will be resumed. 5. According to the Japanese press, there will be a conference at Shanghai of Japanese military officers after the imminent arrival there from Japan of the new Japanese Military Attaché. 6. Tientsin's telegram, November 27, 11 a.m.,51 the Consulate General at Tientsin reports in despatch 190, April 16,52 that there is renewed activity in the vicinity of the international race course. Evidence points to construction under supervision of Japanese military of large building or buildings near the land already leveled off for use as airfield. Apparently an aerodrome or barracks is being constructed. A Chinese official stated that the work involves an area of some 700 acres, much of which belongs to the Peiping-Mukden Railway. 7. Yin Ju Keng of the demilitarized zone has sent a "good will envoy" to Hsinking. Information is lacking with regard to developments in Yin's relations with the Japanese. 8. According to press reports, some 250 soldiers of the Japanese Embassy Guard left Peiping April 18 for Japan, replacements of approximately the same strength having arrived April 16. By mail to Tokyo. 61 Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, p. 447. 52 Not printed. JOHNSON |