he intended to follow. Mr. Gauss gained the impression that his action was prompted by a desire to show solidarity with the Japanese. In speaking of these incidents, Mr. Gauss says: "And, running along from day to day, observing the play-up of news in the British press in China, their editorials, et cetera, one gets an impression of a change of attitude; not so much one of conciliation or of support of the Japanese, but of avoidance of criticism of Japanese policy. "As I said, I may be mistaken; but this is my impression-the 'feel' of the situation-here . . . Sir Alexander Cadogan in his conversation with Mr. Atherton on July 2 said that he "was not in favor of attempting to cooperate with Japan for a profitable exploitation of China; neither was he in favor of an attempt to short-circuit Japan in China unless Japanese policy tread on British interests." That such an attitude would prove pleasing to Japan there seems little doubt, especially if credence is to be given to the statement of Mr. Yoshida to Mr. Norman Davis that the Japanese Army leaders now think they should cultivate the friendship and cooperation of Great Britain and the United States and particularly not alienate the British any further by their Chinese policy. When the interests of two countries clash as directly as do those of Japan and Great Britain there must either be a complete break or there must be an agreement to cooperate in a division of the spoils. The overtures of Japan at this time would appear to indicate that Japan wants a breathing interval and that she feels that she has achieved a position sufficiently strong vis-à-vis England to force a compromise very favorable to her needs for a larger market for the products of her factories. The question is, is Great Britain ready to make the concession which Japan will demand. As indicated above, there is evidence of a British desire to be conciliatory but there is as yet little evidence that she feels the situation is so serious as to make a truce an immediate necessity. Respectfully yours, 793.94/8139: Telegram NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, September 14, 1936-noon. [Received September 14-6:30 a. m.] 445. The following telegram has been received from the Consul General at Shanghai. "September 11, 4 p. m. Japanese news agency Domei reports that at conference convened by Japanese Ambassador yesterday afternoon at which the Commander of the Third Fleet and Japanese Military and Naval Attachés were present a decision was reached to the effect that 'should the Nanking Government lack the authority to facilitate the investigation by Japanese officials of the Pakhoi mob murder of Mr. Nakano the Japanese authorities on the spot should take whatever measures that are considered appropriate to perform their task'. Confirmation of the above has been obtained from reliable source. Unconfirmed reports from fairly reliable sources indicate that should Nanking fail to take immediate and effective steps to suppress anti-Japanese activities the Japanese Government will take action and will deal with local authorities rather than with Central Government. Repeated to Nanking, by mail. By mail to Tokyo." JOHNSON 793.94/8140: Telegram The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State CANTON, September 14, 1936-4 p. m. [Received September 14-12:03 p. m.] Reports in local press and confirmed by Japanese Consulate that Japanese gunboat Saga arrived at Pakhoi afternoon of 12th but local commander 19th Route Army refused investigating party permission to land. Chinese investigating party landed from Chinese gunboat Foo Kon. Dr. Ling Shih Feng in charge of the Chinese investigators asked the Saga to leave but ship remains at Pakhoi. All quiet there at last reports. Press reports today that martial law has been lifted at Wuchow and Kwangsi Government has ordered cessation of all forms of military activities. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking. LINNELL 793.94/8142: Telegram The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, September 15, 1936-5 p. m. [Received September 15-9: 10 a. m.] 186. 1. Vernacular press reports that Pakhoi case is assuming a more serious aspect consequent upon the opposition of the 19th Route Army to the landing there of Japanese investigators, that Nanking is now being pressed to take measures to enable investigation to proceed in security, and that if Nanking fails to act the Japanese Government is prepared to take independent action "in self defense". 2. Notwithstanding strong tone adopted by press, which may have been purposely inspired with a view to producing an effect in China, there are reasons to believe that Japan would be reluctant to precipitate hostilities at Pakhoi for in doing this, according to opinion in navy circles, Japan would be fighting Chiang Kai Shek's battles for him. Naval Attaché has been informed that only a small gunboat, a destroyer, and a light cruiser have been despatched to Pakhoi, Military Attaché has been told by the War Office liaison officer that no particular preparations have been made for despatching an expeditionary force but that the Taiwan army is watching the situation. 3. According to the Asahi, Japanese Ambassador will insist in connection with the settlement of the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents upon China taking measures for the elimination of anti-Japanese activities which Japan regards as the underlying cause of these incidents, as otherwise settlement of the pending issues and the adjustment of the relations between the two countries will be impossible. Repeated to Peiping. DICKOVER 793.94/8146: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, September 15, 1936-5 p. m. [Received 5:57 p. m.] 448. Reference Embassy's telegram 440, September 11, 1 p. m.1 1. Wang Keh Min has definitely decided not to accept a post in North China. This decision is presumably the result of opposition by Sung Che Yuan and other Chinese elements supported by Japanese elements opposing Wang. 2. A high Japanese official states that approval was given in July to Wang by Japanese authorities on the understanding that he would be invested by the National Government with wide powers for negotiations but that the failure of the National Government to grant Wang such powers had caused the Japanese authorities to alter their attitude. It is also possible that Wang's going to Dairen to confer with Lieutenant General Itagaki of the Kwantung army may have offended the Japanese North China Garrison and given it further cause to turn against Wang. 3. Wang's decision would appear to weaken somewhat the possibility of future nominal participation by the National Government in Sino-Japanese "economic cooperation" in North China, thereby contributing to some degree to greater autonomy in the North. Also, Sung's gratitude for Japanese support in eliminating Wang at least for the time being may make Sung more amenable to Japanese suggestions in the future. 4. The press reports today that Chang Hu and Li Shih Hao are being considered for the post of Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to act as principal Chinese negotiator for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. Both these men formerly held Government positions in the Anfu regime when they allegedly made princely fortunes. Neither has a reputation for any special economic or financial ability but they are said to be obedient to orders. By mail to Tokyo. JOHNSON 793.94/8149: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State NANKING, September 16, 1936-11 a. m. [Received 7:34 p. m.2] 266. 1. The Japanese Ambassador came to Nanking September 13 accompanied by his Military and Naval Attachés and opened yesterday at 4 p. m. negotiations on the Chengtu incident in conference with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Both the Foreign Office and Japanese Embassy deny that the Pakhoi incident was discussed.) Prior to coming to Nanking, Kawagoe informed press correspondents that he would conduct the negotiations "on a lofty plane." According to a Foreign Office communiqué issued last night which was substantially duplicated by Japanese Embassy spokesmen in statements to press correspondents, the Japanese Ambassador inquired during the conversation concerning the Chinese Government's attitude toward the Chengtu incident and the Foreign Minister expressed "deep regret" and "gave a detailed account of the measures taken by the Chinese Government both before and after the incident and expressed the hope that a satisfactory settlement would soon be reached." The communiqué added "opinions were subsequently exchanged on general Sino-Japanese problems, the special bearing on the Chengtu incident" and that the conversation was concluded in 21⁄2 hours with no arrangements for subsequent conversations having been made. 2. Both Chinese and Japanese officials deny that the Japanese Ambassador presented any demands or made any threats and we believe this is true. 4 [37]. An officer of the Embassy has been confidentially informed by a responsible official of the Foreign Office: 5 [4]. That the Japanese Ambassador called the attention of the Foreign Minister to the extreme gravity of the Chengtu incident and 2 Telegram in five sections. the situation in general. The informant denied a report that the Japanese Government had set a limit to the time within which the Nineteenth Route Army must be withdrawn from Pakhoi but handed the officer a Reuter telegram just received from Tokyo stating that (1) the Japanese Cabinet deliberated yesterday on the movement of the Chinese squadron and the Navy Minister and Naval Chief of Staff handed the Emperor a report to the effect that shallow waters in the neighborhood of Pakhoi necessitated the use of Hoihow, Hainan Island, as rendezvous for the Japanese fleet and (2) "this foreshadows the possibility of Hainan becoming Japan's base of operations in the event of actual hostilities." 6 [57]. The obvious and extraordinary caution with which the Japanese are proceeding in their negotiations with the Chinese Government over the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents is causing much speculation. One explanation is that the Japanese are genuinely concerned lest impossible demands or overt action on their part cause a widespread outburst of anti-Japanese agitation and they wish, because of the domestic situation in Japan and the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-Japanese relations, to preclude developments which might involve Japan in a major conflict. 7 [6]. The refusal of the Chinese military at Pakhoi to permit Japanese investigators to land has created a situation from which such developments might flow and which is becoming more delicate by reason of a growing belief held by more than one highly placed and responsible official that the stationing of the Nineteenth Route Army at Pakhoi, its reinduction into the national forces and the subsequent incident were deliberately engineered by Li Tsung Jen and Pai Chung Hsi with a view to placing Chiang Kai Shek in an inextricable position vis-à-vis Japan and bringing about his political downfall. 8 [7]. Repeated to Department and Peiping. PECK 793.94/8148: Telegram The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State CANTON, September 16, 1936-4 p. m. [Received 4:48 p. m.] Regarding Pakhoi incident. Chinese gunboat Fookon returned to Canton yesterday bringing Dr. Ling and the other investigators sent to Pakhoi by the special delegate for Foreign Affairs. Investigators on landing at Pakhoi September 12 were met by threatening mob including Nineteenth Route Army soldiers and carrying anti-Japanese banners. Being unable to carry on any useful investigation they returned to Fookon and to Canton. Nineteenth Route Army Chief |