THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS1 CHAPTER I: JANUARY 1-APRIL 15, 1936 Japanese dissatisfaction with situation in China and pressure to bring about favorable readjustment; President Chiang Kai-shek's determination to avoid surrender to Japan; possibility of German-Japanese military understanding; recurrence of incidents along Soviet-Outer Mongol borders of "Manchoukuo"; assurance of Soviet aid to Outer Mongolia in event of Japanese attack; Arita-Chang exploratory conversations at Nanking, March 16-19; Chinese protest against Soviet-Outer Mongol mutual assistance pact of March 12 500.A15A5/597: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) to the Secretary of State LONDON, January 6, 1936-9 p. m. [Received January 6-5:30 p. m.] 34. In the course of a conversation yesterday with Craigie,2 a full report of which is contained in a memorandum being mailed," he told me in strict confidence that he had learned that the Japanese and Chinese are now actively engaged in negotiating a pact of nonaggression which Chiang Kai Shek had proposed himself, that the Japanese Foreign Office is reported to favor it and to be pressing the matter but that the military group in Japan is opposed because it would put an end to their operations in China. Craigie added that if such an agreement were reached as would seem probable in the near future, it would automatically settle the Manchurian question if the situation were thus to be accepted by the Chinese. Craigie said that speaking personally his idea is that if we are to get a naval agreement with Japan, it will be necessary to have some political basis and if such a pact of nonaggression were consummated, the Japanese, British, and ourselves might then enter into a pact of nonaggression in the Pacific which could give to the Japanese justification for entering a naval agreement to maintain the present status 1 Continued from Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, pp. 1-507; see also Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. 1, pp. 241-246 and 290-299. 2 Robert Leslie Craigie, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Dated January 6, not printed. President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier). For correspondence regarding naval discussions, see vol. I, pp. 22 ff. 1 quo. I told Craigie I doubted if it were practicable now to try to reach any political agreement as it would raise questions that are now insoluble. Furthermore, that his suggestion raised some very serious questions that would require careful consideration before determining whether or not they would have political association, that it was doubtful if the pact of nonaggression would give China anything more than the Nine Power Pact had given in the way of protection, and that it might also seem ridiculous for us to enter into such a treaty with Japan which would in effect approve the past violation of the Nine Power Pact. Craigie stated that the British position is that the Nine Power Pact is still in force in effect and that he thought his suggestion should be carefully considered. He also said that if anything further came of his ideas the Foreign Secretary,' himself, would take occasion to talk with me on the subject. We realize the objections to excluding other interested powers from any nonaggression pact and of course will not give any encouragement to this idea. I seriously doubt if Eden, himself, would entertain such a limited pact which might have such far reaching consequences. DAVIS 793.94/7623: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State NANKING, January 7, 1936-1 p. m. [Received 3:25 p. m.] 4. My 160, December 31, 11 a. m.8 1. Chen Chieh, administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me yesterday that it was expected that the Japanese Government would agree in principle to the proposal for a conference to effect a comprehensive adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations although no official agreement had yet been obtained. Hsu Mo, the political Vice Minister, told me the Chinese plans contemplated some kind of commission with special plenipotentiaries at their head. In regard to the scope of discussion the latter criticized as unreasonable the reported Japanese demand that China advance concrete proposals based on Hirota's "three principles" since Japan not China originated these principles. He added that China had not agreed to avoid any specified subjects such as extraterritoriality. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. 1, p. 276. 'Anthony Eden. Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. I, p. 502. 'Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs; for his policy, see telegram No. 72, November 11, 1935, 2 p. m., from the Embassy in China, Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. II, p. 404. 2. From another Foreign Office source it is confirmed that there has been no change in the status of this matter since its inception. According to a Domei despatch from Tokyo dated January 5 the Japanese Foreign Office will insist upon (1) the prior submission by the Chinese of a concrete list of proposals and (2) prior acceptance by China of Hirota's three point program; and before agreeing to formal discussion will obtain approval of the Japanese Ministries of War, Navy and Finance. This despatch states that the situation in China does not warrant optimism because of the undercurrent of anti-Japanese activity and regretfully expresses belief that the Nanking Government intends to bring up the question of the abrogation of the "unequal treaties." 3. By mail to Peiping. PECK 500.A15A5/597: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 10 WASHINGTON, January 7, 1936-7 p. m. 4. 1. Under date January 6 Davis telegraphed from London as follows: [Here follows the substance of telegram No. 34, printed on page 1.] 2. Department has had no information from any other source indicating that there are in progress negotiations such as Craigie described. 3. Please cable Department your comments and any information pertinent. HULL 793.94/7631: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, January 9, 1936-4 p. m. [Received January 9-9:30 a. m."] 9. 1. Several incidents have occurred recently which are alleged to have caused dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese military with General Sung 12 and his men. They are as follows: (a) According to Japanese press report, some 40 Chinese soldiers in uniform of Sung's army looted on January 2, two Japanese owned shops at Taku, de 10 The same telegram was sent on the same date to the Embassy in Japan as No. 2. 11 Telegram in two sections. 13 General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. stroyed Japanese flags, and interfered with Japanese consular police. (b) As the result of delay by Chinese guards in opening a Peiping city gate at 10 p. m. January 5, to a motor car containing six or seven Japanese military, some ineffective shooting occurred and one or two Chinese guards were allegedly beaten. The entire blame is placed by the Japanese on the Chinese, although reports indicate that the Japanese were by no means blameless. (c) General Sung refused some days ago the request of the commandant of the local Japanese guard to call to discuss certain important matters, Sung sending word that the matters were within the province of the mayor. (d) Three Koreans attempted to enter the local military headquarters compound to shoot birds. Refusal resulted in a Chinese guard and the three Koreans being beaten. 2. At least the first incidents have been taken up officially. The local assistant to the Japanese Military Attaché informed the foreign press yesterday that demands would be made with regard to the second upon receipt of instructions from Tokyo and that the incident was regarded as an insult to the Japanese Army and as the result of the fundamentally anti-Japanese attitude of Sung's army. 3. These incidents, the Japanese attitude in regard thereto, and alleged Japanese dissatisfaction with Sung's delay in doing what the Japanese want have aroused apprehension that the Japanese will in the near future force Sung and his army out of North China (putting into nominal power Chinese more susceptible to Japanese direction) unless he complies with Japanese desires. By mail to Tokyo. JOHNSON 793.94/7630: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, January 9, 1936-5 p. m. [Received January 9-9: 40 a. m.] 10. Embassy's 9, January 9, 4 p. m. Consulate General at Tientsin has been informed by Japanese Consul that with regard to antiJapanese acts of soldiers of General Sung committed at Taku on January 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, six demands have been made: (1) apology by Sung, (2) strict supervision of troops and staff of the Public Safety Bureau at Taku, or possibly, (3) immediate dismissal of local Chinese authorities responsible for the acts, (4) indemnity for damages suffered by the Japanese residents, (5) immediate cessation of anti-Japanese acts by troops and police, and (6) assurances for the future. The Japanese Consul does not expect the incident to develop into serious proportions but does regard it as indicative of the antiJapanese attitude of Sung's army. He stated that, contrary to press reports, there has been no increase of Japanese troops at Tangku. JOHNSON 500.A15A5/602: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, January 9, 1936-6 p. m. [Received January 9-10:43 a. m.] 11. Department's 4, January 7,7 p. m. 1. I have heard no hint of any proposal for a non-aggression pact. I have no reason to believe that situation has changed from that set forth in my telegram No. 72 of November 11, 2 p. m., sent from Nanking, 13 setting forth the character of the three-point policy reported at the time to have been accepted by the Japanese Cabinet, communicated to the Japanese diplomatic, military and naval representatives in China and to the Chinese Ambassador to Japan when the latter was about to return to China. I was given to understand while in Nanking in November that the Chinese Government indicated its willingness to discuss these matters with the Japanese Government provided that the Japanese Government would (a), treat China as a sovereign nation, and (b), lay before Chinese Government a concrete proposal elaborating the three points. 2. In his telegram No. 160 of December 31, 11 a.m.14 Peck reports that a proposal for the fundamental readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations through proper diplomatic channels had been made by the Chinese Government to the Japanese Government. I am instructing Nanking by telegram to make discreet inquiry as to the exact nature of the proposals said to have been put forward by the Chinese Government. If in fact they include a suggestion for a nonaggression pact between China and Japan, I would suspect that a suggestion may have been put forward to counter a claim made by the Japanese that the Chinese have entered into some kind of an agreement with Soviet Russia against Japan. But I am extremely doubtful that the Sino-Japanese controversy can be reduced to such a simple formula as that suggested by Craigie. There is no evidence locally that the Japanese intended to abandon their plans to achieve a portion of domination on the Asiatic Continent, and particularly in China. I doubt whether Japan will use actual military force to accomplish this pur |