in area claimed by Yin Ju Keng. One informant with official sources states today that the magistrate opened the gates to a force which was variously reported as belonging to either Liu Kwei Tang or Yin Ju Keng and that some of Sung's soldiers are outside the town. If the force within the town is being used as an instrument for extension of Yin's or Manchukuo's power, undisputed occupation of Changping would be a step toward gaining control of the railway and would make possible the separation of Sung's troops in Hopei from his one division in Chahar which would probably prevent Sung's taking early action to restrain Li Shou Hsin's forces from taking Kalgan, a probability which is now being rumored. 4. The press reports bandits of Liu Kwei Tang numbering 500 out of a total force of 1,500, have entered the northern tip of Honan. In line with the statements in the Embassy's 33, January 23, 5 p. m., with regard to the possible use of Sun Tien Ying and Shih Yu San to assist in the establishment of an autonomous North China, some observers are of the opinion that Liu may be used to effect the inclusion of Honan north of the Yellow River in such a regime. By mail to Tokyo. JOHNSON 762.94/69 Report by the Military Attaché in Germany (Smith) 5 Report No. 14,500 55 BERLIN, January 30, 1936. On Jan. 24th in the course of a conversation with the official representative of the German War Ministry, Major von Pappenheim, I casually handed him a copy of the London Morning Post of January 20th containing a Tokio dispatch reporting the consummation of a German-Japanese military alliance. This dispatch reads as follows: "From our own Correspondent Berlin, Jan. 19. In well-informed German political circles it is stated that a military agreement between Germany and Japan was signed in Tokyo on January 4, by which, in the event of either power being attacked, the other is pledged to come to its assistance. The aggressor in mind is, it need hardly be said, Russia. The agreement was signed on behalf of the German Government by the German Ambassador in Tokyo and the Military Attaché. Further details are not obtainable." I stated that I had not as yet read any official German denial of this story, and had thought that probably the German War Ministry would care to take a position in the matter, inasmuch as much loose conversation was going the rounds of Berlin embassies that such a treaty had either been completed or was in preparation. 55 Copy transmitted to the Department on February 19 by the War Department. The representative of the War Ministry, far from taking my question casually, told me that I had raised a very serious matter in which he had no competence, and that he must seek the approval of higher authority before an official answer could be given me. He said inofficially, however, that the entire story was nonsense, and that there was no firm basis at present for a military agreement, which in its very nature could only be aimed at Russia. Nevertheless, he stated also very definitely, that Japan desired such an alliance, and that the question had been raised by their Berlin representatives lately in a pressing manner (sogar drückend). On January 29, I was asked over the telephone to come to the Ministry of War again. The attaché chief, Major von Pappenheim, was on this occasion not alone, the German G-2, Colonel von Stülpnagel being present. Major von Pappenheim was the speaker throughout the conversation. He stated that he and the Ministry of War greeted my question, as they desired no shadow of suspicion to disturb their good relations between Germany and the United States. As the question had raised a political as well as a military question, a delay in their reply had been inevitable, as the matter had had to be referred to the Führer himself. He desired now to state officially: 1. That the matter was essentially a political matter with which the Foreign Office could only deal. 2. Inasmuch, however, as the London Morning Post dispatch hinted at a "military alliance", the Ministry of War felt free to make known to an interested foreign attaché the Government's position in the matter. 3. This position was: (a) The statement of the London Morning Post was untrue. (b) The German Government attaches no importance to the matter. (c) The German Government felt that no Berlin denial was necessary, inasmuch as such a denial had been issued in Tokio by a spokesman for the Japanese foreign office. Your attention is called to the rather unusual wording of the denial, which was apparently drawn up only after careful thought by high German officials. The reply can easily be interpreted not as a complete denial of a German-Japanese alliance, but rather only of the London Morning Post version of such an alliance. The United States Ambassador has been consulted with regard to these conversations, and has been furnished a copy of this report. TRUMAN SMITH Major, G. S. 761.9315 Manchuria/35: Telegram The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, January 31, 1936-4 p. m. [Received January 31-2:55 p. m.] 39. The usual emissary of the Kremlin who in past conversations has been in the habit of minimizing the importance of Soviet-Japanese dissensions in the Far East stated to me yesterday substantially as follows: The feeling which had hitherto prevailed in the Soviet Union that Japan would be too deeply occupied with completing its conquest of North China to attempt any aggressive action against the Soviet Union in the near future was being replaced with an uneasy feeling that on [sic] the outbreak of a Japanese-Soviet conflict in the spring or summer of the present year was quite within the realms of possibility. The desertion into Soviet territory on January 29th (as reported in the Pravda of January 30th) of a whole company of Manchurian soldiers, together with a Manchurian lieutenant and several non-commissioned officers, was the very type of an incident which the Soviet Government feared might serve the Japanese as a pretext for opening of hostilities. It seemed that the company after having killed its Japanese officers fled into the Soviet Union with a considerable amount of military equipment. It was disarmed and sent into the interior for internment. The Soviet Government was concerned lest a number of such incidents might result in insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that the deserters be extradited and charges that the disturbances were the result of the activities of the Comintern. The anxiety of the Soviet governmental circles was sharpened by the fact that they were inclined to believe reports recently published to the effect that Germany and Japan had entered into an alliance directed against "the activities of the Comintern". They feared that if Japan should launch an attack under the pretext that it was crusading against the Comintern this alliance might serve as a basis for a simultaneous German attack from the West. They also felt that it was possible that influential groups in other countries which otherwise would have no sympathy for Japanese or German aggression might be inclined because of their dread of the spread of Communism [to support such attacks.] The Soviet Government believed that of all the great powers Great Britain was in the best position to exercise restraint upon Germany. Undoubtedly Litvinov 56 while in London would discuss the matter with the British Government. HENDERSON 56 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 893.01 Outer Mongolia/77 The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 57 No. 196 [Extracts] HARBIN, January 31, 1936. SIR: I have the honor to submit further observations on the opinion, set forth in the Consulate General's despatch No. 192, dated January 27, 1936, (No. 300 to the Department) 58 that the higher authorities of the Kwantung Army do not at the present time desire serious complications with Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia, although an incident in the hands of an officer on the "front" may cause them to take action. To turn to Manchuria and Soviet Russia, all Japanese civilians, both officials and merchants, to whom the subject has been broached, were agreed that the Kwantung Army does not desire war with Russia at the present time. General Minami and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Nishio, are said to be of this persuasion. On the other hand, it is common gossip that many of the younger officers in Manchuria, among whom may possibly be included the Vice-chief of Staff, Major-General Itagaki, openly advocate waging war on Soviet Russia at the earliest opportunity. It is believed that many of these malcontents have been sent to Manchuria expressly to get rid of their troublesome activities in Japan, and that as a consequence the ratio of nationalistic zealots among officers of the Kwantung Army is even higher than in the army at home. The theory has been advocated that one reason for the lack of concentration of large bodies of Japanese troops at any one point near the border-as is reported to be the case-is to minimize the possibility of an officer involving the Kwantung Army in large scale operations. An enlightening incident, illustrating the ideas of this type of officer, and at the same time showing that some officers have different opinions from their superiors and are willing to make public that fact, took place recently. Mr. Impey, Far East correspondent for the Daily Mail (London), had an interview with Major Shun Akikusa, second in command of the Harbin Special Service Mission. The Major, upon being asked whether Japan and Soviet Russia would soon be at war, replied most emphatically that the two countries would be at war within a few months. His chief, Major General Rinzo Ando, said the following day, when asked the same question 57 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his despatch No. 306, January 31; received March 10. 58 Not printed. by the same man, that war was not envisaged by the Kwantung Army; he added, however, that there were many fanatics on both sides. According to rumor in Japanese circles in Harbin, General Ando, who is far from well, has been criticized for not being able to control his subordinates, although he himself has been described as being a conservative. Not only has Major Akikusa publicly expressed opinions on matters of policy opposite to those of the Kwantung Army, but his superiors appear to be powerless either to discipline him, or to have him transferred elsewhere. The danger of serious developments on the Outer Mongolian frontier has probably increased since the reported military agreement reached at Moscow recently between Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia, as there has been evidence of an increase in Mongolian resistance to the presumably aggressive tactics of "Manchukuo" border outposts. It has also come to light that they are supplied with automobiles, have at least one airplane, and have developed a rapid system of telegraphic communication from the border to Urga and Moscow. Thus, although it is believed that the present policy of the Kwantung Army is to avoid hostilities, it remains to be seen whether sufficient discipline can be maintained to keep the younger officers in check. Respectfully yours, WALTER A. ADAMS 711.94/1057: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, February 1, 1936—11 a. m. [Received February 1-2:56 a. m.] 21. 1. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Japanese edition, this morning published an article to the effect that as a result of conversations between the Japanese Ambassador in Washington 59 and the Secretary of State, and between Hirota and myself, the following principles had been established: (a) There are no American-Japanese problems insoluble by diplomatic means. (b) Both countries should refrain from irritating speech and actions. The article then alleges that steps are now being taken for the conclusion of an American-Japanese political agreement based on the principle of division of the Pacific into American and Japanese spheres of action and including the spirit of the Hull-Hirota mes 59 Hirosi Saito. |