signed to purge the Army of the more radical elements, but rumors which have reached the Embassy indicate that the younger officers of both the Army and the Navy are still as radically opposed to the present political system in Japan as they were before the purge took place. With this division within itself, and the popular feeling opposed to the imposition of the military will upon the nation, the Army does not feel in a position to take any drastic steps in China or Russia at the moment.

The people of Japan, for their part, seem to have lost interest in military adventures. For many months past the Army has been holding up the difficulties in Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese relations as indications of the crisis which was to come in 1935 and 1936. The crisis has not materialized and, until recently, it appeared that the difficulties in the relations between Japan and China and Japan and the Soviet Union would be settled by diplomatic means. It was to be expected, under such circumstances, that the people of the country would gradually lose interest in the war-scares of the military. The people cannot be kept at a high tension indefinitely. Too many cries of "Wolf!" cause them to disbelieve in the existence of the wolf. Another factor contributing to the indifference of the people toward SinoJapanese problems arises from the censorship on news of the negotiations. The exact nature of the Japanese demands on China, their scope and the extent to which the Japanese Government is prepared to go in enforcing those demands, have been kept from the people of Japan. Public opinion is therefore unformed in regard to the question, and the press is unable to reflect the sentiments of the public. The public is better informed in regard to Russo-Japanese relations, but here again there seems to be no very definite indication of public opinion. Moreover, the attention of the people has been distracted from external affairs by pressing domestic problems. The taxation increase and taxation reform schemes, the increase in the military budget demands, the plans for administrative reform and the quarrel between the Army and the political parties over the reform of the Diet have occupied the attention of the Japanese people to the exclusion of SinoJapanese and Russo-Japanese affairs. There is also a feeling of unrest among the people of Japan. The heavy increase of taxation planned for the coming fiscal year is not being favorably received by the nation, and the slowly-developing struggle between parliamentarism and Fascism in Japan is causing a feeling of insecurity among the financial and industrial elements.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that the military have dropped war-like talk for the time being. On the other hand, it is quite probable that the military have deliberately tried to calm the nation and to prevent outbreaks of anti-Chinese or anti-Russian feeling which might get out of hand and force the nation into war. For

the above-mentioned domestic reasons, and for external reasons which will be discussed later, it appears that the Japanese Army is not prepared to engage in a major war on the Asiatic continent, and consequently it is not only possible but probable that the military have desired that the Japanese nation lose interest in the minor incidents on the continent which formerly were exaggerated in order to fan the war-like ardor of the people.

2. External Conditions.

Perhaps chief among the external circumstances causing Japan to exhibit less pugnacity in its relations with its neighbors on the Asiatic continent is the strength and determination against further aggression shown by both China and Soviet Russia during recent months. The Soviet Union has indicated unmistakably that while it does not desire war with Japan, it will fight to the extent of its ability to preserve every inch of its territory or territory which it believes should be under its control. This determination, as the Japanese Army knows, is backed by military force probably superior to any which Japan could put into the field of conflict within a reasonable period. At the same time the rapidly growing unification of China and that country's determination not to concede further loss of sovereignty have given the Japanese cause for thought. A war with China would undoubtedly result in early victories for Japan, whereby the Japanese Army and Navy could hold the Chinese coastal provinces, but it is not believed, even in Japan, that the war would be so soon resolved. It is considered more probable that the war would last in a guerilla form for years and would impose such a severe financial strain on Japan that the economic structure might collapse. In order to proceed further with its expansion schemes on the continent, therefore, it appears that it will be necessary for Japan to use force, and the country is not apparently prepared for this step.

It is also quite probable that the Japanese Army had expected another world war to break out in Europe as a result of the Spanish civil war and the growing tendency to divide into leftist and fascist blocs. Anticipating that such a war would give Japan a free hand in Asia, the fighting forces indulged in expansionist sentiments until recent months, but as the European war did not materialize, the fighting forces considered it best to drop their expansion schemes for the moment. The Japanese nation also realizes that it is more or less isolated in a world of conflicting ideas and policies. A need for a friend is being felt, and the possibility also exists that the military decided to relax its pressure on China and to discontinue its threats against the Soviet Union until such time as the pending agreement with Germany should be concluded.

A survey of the domestic causes of the apparent lessening of the

belligerent spirit among the people of Japan reveals the fact that they are largely temporary in character, or of such a nature as to be readily overcome by an inspired outburst of patriotic fervor. From this viewpoint the loss of pugnacity cannot be considered as permanent; it is rather a temporary phenomenon subject to change at any time. The external causes of the lessening of belligerency, however, are more fixed in character and are more liable to act as a permanent restraint on Japanese pugnacity in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

E. R. DICKOVER

793.94/8384: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, November 26, 1936-10 a. m. [Received November 26-9:30 a. m.]

333. 1. Hsu Mo told the British Ambassador yesterday morning that the Japanese Kwantung army had warned Fu Tso Yi that an agreement between Doihara and Sung Che Yuan prevented sending of Chinese troops into Chahar. Hsu Mo said there is an opinion growing in the Chinese Government that the Government should issue a statement denying validity to any agreement with the Japanese not concluded by direct emissaries of the National Government as in the case of the Shanghai and Tangku truces. My British informant said Hsu Mo inquired whether the British Ambassador thought the Japanese Government would support the Kwantung army in its intrigues in Chahar and explained that Chiang Kai Shek might go to Suiyuan in person, the implication being that he might then pursue the irregular forces into Chahar thus challenging the Kwantung army.

2. Informant said that the lack of frankness of the Chinese Government regarding the obligations it has incurred was illustrated by a recent remark of Sung Che Yuan to the British Ambassador that he was obliged to sign the aviation agreement because the Tangku truce provided for it and that there were other concessions attached to the same document so "shameful" that he dared not reveal them.

3. Reuter despatch dated Tokyo November 25 quotes Nichi Nichi assertion that Great Britain and China are negotiating offensive and defensive alliance. The press carries denial of this report by the Chinese Government which describes it as fantastic. There have been indications here that the British Ambassador has consulted various Chinese authorities concerning their difficulties with Japan and has even tendered advice. I have several times reminded Hsu Mo that the Department is interested in the progress of events but

when he has shown himself reticent I have refrained from pressing him for information because of my impression that the Department would prefer that I carefully avoid any implication of a joint American-Chinese interest in China's struggle against Japanese encroach

ment.

Repeated to Peiping.

PECK

761.94/938

The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State No. 2160

TOKYO, November 26, 1936. [Received December 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that Soviet-Japanese relations, which during the past few weeks had been showing marked improvement due to the progress made toward the settlement of the outstanding issues between the two countries, have now received a severe set-back following the news of the German-Japanese accord. The details of this accord which are discussed in another despatch* are not important for the purpose of this discussion; the fact, however, that Japan has seen fit to join with Germany in a common front against the Soviet ideology, if not the Soviet Government itself, has apparently satisfied the USSR that the Japanese Government has thus sacrificed any claim it might have had to good-will and cooperation in the settlement of the questions which have been and are up for discussion between Moscow and Tokyo. Consequently negotiations on pending issues have been summarily suspended by Moscow and the prospects for their resumption have become remote.

It will be recalled that during the past few months Premier Hirota has been taking up one by one the outstanding issues between Japan and Soviet Russia in accordance with the policy which he has pursued ever since he became Foreign Minister and which he has continued through Mr. Arita while Prime Minister. After the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway was accomplished in March, 1935, the remaining questions have been the following: 1. The extension of the Japanese oil concessions in North Saghalien; 2. The new Fisheries Treaty to supplement the treaty which expired in May of this year; 3. The establishment of two commissions, one for the demarcation of the "Manchukuo"-Siberian border and the other for the settlement of border disputes between Japan-"Manchukuo" and the USSR. While there may be said to remain several other problems, such as the crea

69 See vol. 1, pp. 390 ff.

*Embassy's despatch No. 2159, November 26, 1936. [Footnote in the original; for despatch see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 153.]

tion of a demilitarized zone along the Manchurian-Siberian border and a non-aggression pact as well as the fundamental question of supremacy over Mongol peoples and pasturest only the first three mentioned have been the subject of actual negotiations up to the present. Of these the agreement extending the North Saghalien oil concessions was successfully concluded at Moscow on October 10, last; whether the Soviets will now create any difficulty in the way of enforcing these concessions remains to be seen.

The draft of the new Fisheries Treaty had been actually completed and on November 18 was formally approved by the Privy Council at a Plenary Session at the Palace in the presence of the Emperor and later accepted by the Cabinet. Instructions to sign it had been cabled to the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow but on the date set for signature, November 20, the Soviet Foreign Office informed the Japanese Chargé that "in view of the threatening developments in relations" the Soviet Government would be unable to sign the new Fisheries Convention until the atmosphere had changed.

On November 16, 17, and 18 the Soviet Ambassador conferred at length with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita, concerning the establishment of the border demarcation commission and the commission for the settlement of border disputes, and while little progress was apparent in the direction of settling the points at issue at least a real effort was being made to this end. Indications now lead to the belief that these negotiations will be broken off entirely, at least for an indefinite period.

In addition to these, and possibly as an indirect result of Soviet pressure and indignation over recent developments, it is reported that the preliminary border negotiations between the Governments of Outer Mongolia and "Manchukuo", which recently opened at Manchuli, have been temporarily postponed "because of the illness of the chief Mongolian delegate, Mr. Samboa."

The reaction of the Soviet Government to the German-Japanese pact cannot have come as a surprise to the Japanese Government; there is, however, some question as to whether the premature discussion in the press of this pact was not disappointing to Mr. Hirota who undoubtedly hoped that at least the Fisheries Treaty would be signed before the news of the German agreement became known. Indications lead to the belief that the draft of the Fisheries Treaty was hurried through the Privy Council and the Cabinet in the hope that it could be signed on November 20, that is, six days before the publication of the German agreement.

Reverting to the negotiations regarding the border commissions it may be stated for purposes of record that Mr. Yurenev is reported to

†Embassy's despatch No. 1236, April 5, 1935. [Footnote in the original; for despatch see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, p. 106.]