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793.94/8410: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, December 4, 1936-3 p. m. [Received December 4-1:17 p. m.]

588. Embassy's 583, December 3, 3 p. m. Following telegram has been received from Tsingtau:

"December 4, 10 a. m. Situation remains quiet. Chinese who were arrested have been released. Chinese authorities regard Japanese action as designed to force out present Mayor and his administration." Nanking informed.

LOCKHART

702.6593 Manchuria/12

The Consul at Harbin (LaMont) to the Ambassador in China

No. 286

(Johnson)"

HARBIN, December 4, 1936.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 284 of this office of December 1, 1936,78 entitled "Report of Italian Recognition of 'Manchukuo'" as well as previous despatches on this subject and Italian consular representation in Manchuria.

There is enclosed an extract" from the Dairen Manchuria Daily News reporting that the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo requested permission through the "Manchukuo" Ambassador to establish a Consulate General in Mukden and that the request was granted.

According to Mr. A. Maffei, the local Italian Consul, this report is true. Such negotiations as took place in this matter were carried on in Tokyo and Mr. Maffei had no part in them. This action probably constitutes de facto recognition of "Manchukuo" inasmuch as the permission of the "Manchukuo" government was formally requested to establish the new Consulate General. Mr. Maffei does not believe that his government plans to fully recognize "Manchukuo" and establish a legation at Hsinking at present. Respectfully yours,

GEORGE D. LAMONT

77 Copy_transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Harbin in his despatch No. 443, December 4; received January 5, 1937.

78 Not printed.

" Not reprinted.

893.01 Inner Mongolia/92: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary

of State

592. Following from Mukden:

PEIPING, December 8, 1936-1 p. m. [Received December 8-7: 40 a. m. 80]

"December 7, 6 p. m. Concordia Society today made following [statement?] through its [president?] Premier Chang [of Manchoukuo].

'In order to give concrete expression to its wholehearted spiritual support of the Inner Mongolia volunteer army which has taken up arms to destroy bandic Communism, this society, which has declared itself against Communism, had decided to campaign far and wide among Japanese and Manchurians for donations to aid the said army'.

"An acquaintance reported seeing at Mukden station last week special train of 19 cars of wounded Japanese, enroute presumably to the local base hospital, adding that 100 severely wounded are being treated in the South Manchuria Railway Hospital and that Japanese wounded arrive daily in great numbers evidently from Suiyuan front."

Report on "Manchukuo Concordia Society" was made in Mukden's despatch No. 304, of July 28, copies of which were sent directly to the Department.81

Nanking informed.

LOCKHART

793.94/8421: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, December 8, 1936-6 p. m. [Received December 8-9:40 a. m.]

254. 1. Some observers in Tokyo believe that the landing of Japanese marines in Tsingtau has a political rather than a defensive background. They base their opinion on the following facts and theories: (a) a landing force of 800 men appears to be excessive under the circumstances; (b) the Sino-Japanese diplomatic negotiations having been suspended, the landing of marines in Tsingtau may be the first step in a policy of bringing stronger military pressure to bear on China, possibly with a view to forcing the reopening of the negotiations; and (c) Tsingtau being a vital strategic point for any Japanese military action against China, the Japanese may have used the strike as an excuse to take over control of the city. The Naval and Military Attachés of the Embassy are inclined to concur in these views.

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2. Without ruling out the possibilities implied in paragraph 1 (c), the Embassy considers it also possible that the landing of the unusually large force at Tsingtau may have been intended as a demonstration to the Chinese of the reported determination of the Japanese to take "self-defensive" measures for the protection of Japanese nationals and interests should all diplomatic negotiations to this end definitely cease. 3. The Military Attaché of the Embassy in a conversation with the assistant Liaison Officer of the War Office today was told that the tension in Tsingtau had relaxed, the Chinese forces having been withdrawn from contact with the Japanese forces; that the Mayor of Tsingtau had been instructed by Chiang Kai Shek not to aggravate the situation; that the Mayor was showing "sincerity" in complying with the Japanese demands; and that the Japanese demands on the Mayor were substantially as published in the press. (The demands as reported by Domei were: (a) the dissolution of the Tsingtau branches of the Kuomintang; (b) punishment of municipal officials who have been backing the strikers; (c) apology by the Mayor, and (d) expulsion of "irregular" Koreans from the city.)

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

793.94/8427: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, December 9, 1936-9 p. m. [Received December 9-1: 15 p. m.]

255. Embassy's 252, December 5, 6 p. m., paragraph 2.82

1. Sentiment favoring the resignation of the Hirota Cabinet is accumulating. Increasingly outspoken opposition to the international position into which Japan has been led by the agreement with Germany is being expressed throughout the country. The general policy in China does not seem to be a dominant factor in the dissatisfaction with the Cabinet but the disapproval of the failure of the Foreign Office to obtain satisfactory results appears to predispose the military and the leaders of the political parties toward the overthrow of the Hirota Cabinet.

2. This afternoon the Minister for Foreign Affairs is appearing before the Privy Council to defend the Cabinet's foreign policies. The press predicts difficulties for the Government.

3. Apart from political maneuvering in the Cabinet situation the serious interest of leaders is partially concerned with the advisability of the overthrow of the Cabinet at this juncture for the effect of such a step on world opinion. In other words the question at issue is

82 Not printed.

whether the enforced resignation of the Cabinet would assist in quieting foreign apprehensions that the Japanese Government intends to develop the recently concluded agreement with Germany in the direction of a sweeping new orientation of Japanese foreign policy.

4. The Embassy inclines to the opinion that while the GermanJapanese agreement may be used as a means of attack on the Cabinet, the actual underlying cause of any such attack will be the loss of face involved in the failure of the Japanese negotiations with China. Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

893.00/13751: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, December 10, 1936-5 p. m. [Received December 10-2:30 p. m.88]

601. Embassy's 586, December 4, 1. p. m. Today's Chinese press reports the capture by Suiyuan forces of Tamiao (Sharramuren), an important point of strategic importance northeast of Pailingmiao. A foreigner upon whom great reliance can be placed has returned from Suiyuan and states that Tamiao was the first objective of the Suiyuan forces in their countermovement against Chahar, and that the present plans of the regulars envisage the capture of Shangtu and Chapatante. He states that three Nanking divisions are on the line from Pingtichuan to Tatung, but says no Government planes are at the front. The regular forces have suffered somewhat from bombing attacks in which, according to chairman Fu Tso Yi, 20 and 60 pound bombs were commonly used. This informant stated that some of Wang Ying's subordinates have apparently been bought over to the Government side, and that in view of the adverse weather conditions and other factors, it is difficult to conceive of any important Manchukuo supported countermove before spring.

A Chinese official in conversation stated yesterday that there is in fact an oral agreement, such as is mentioned in Nanking's 342, December 4, 1 p. m.84 He gave it as his opinion that it was concluded about June 1935 while Ho Ying Chin was still in Peiping and that it provided for the effective extension of the demilitarized zone to include the six districts of Southeast Chahar.

He stated in addition that Sung Che Yuan, under orders from Chiang Kai Shek, has moved two divisions to be ready to enter Chahar

83 Telegram in two sections.

84 Not printed.

in a flanking movement should reenforcements be sent from Jehol to meet a Chinese thrust into Chahar, which he also forecasts.

By mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

793.94/8481

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 277

NANKING, December 10, 1936. [Received January 4, 1937.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a self-explanatory memorandum of conversation which I held on December 3, 1936, with Mr. Suma, Japanese Consul General and First Secretary of Embassy in Nanking.

The Department's attention will doubtless be drawn to Mr. Suma's statement to the effect that until recently the Chinese and Japanese negotiators had found themselves ninety per cent in material agreement in regard to the questions under discussion. I may observe in this connection that possibly Mr. Suma was able to envisage agreement on ninety per cent of the total number of points under discussion, counting all minor points, but there has at no time appeared any evidence indicating even a remote understanding as regards the several vital matters at issue. This statement by Mr. Suma may have been dictated by a desire to make it appear that the breakdown in negotiations resulted from a sudden reversal of position on the part of China. It will be recalled that the recent incident which took place when the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to accept an Aide-Mémoire from the Japanese Ambassador, was explained, according to the Chinese version, by the assertion that the Aide-Mémoire represented the Chinese Foreign Minister as having gone further than he could or would admit, in meeting the Japanese point of view.

Mr. Suma struck what to me was a surprising note in his statement that he had long entertained the thought that Japan and the United States should do something to bring about political stability in the Pacific. It will be observed that he coupled this remark with the statement that he had recently, during his visit to Japan, had occasion to discover that the same thought was in the minds of "a number of very important people in Japan."

Mr. Suma's observations suggest the possibility that there may be a growing tendency in Japanese official circles to seek American cooperation and understanding, as the means toward a breathing space, until such time as she is more sure of herself than at present. NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON

Respectfully yours,

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