893.00/13825: Telegram

The Consul at Hankow (Jarvis) to the Secretary of State

HANKOW, December 23, 1936-4 p. m. [Received December 23-8:35 a. m.]

Peiping's December 22, noon. Mission offices here, with whom the Consulate General is in close touch, have heard nothing since the coup from their stations in Sian or Kansu. The only communications the Consulate General has received are the two telegrams mentioned in my telegram of December 20, 2 p. m. As directed by Peiping's December 22, noon, I have despatched urgent telegrams to the heads of missions in Kansu and Chinghai advising Americans to evacuate and informing them of the Embassy's request to the Kansu Chairman to afford them facilities and protection. Sent to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

JARVIS

893.00/13826: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, December 23, 1936-8 p. m. [Received December 23-11: 14 a. m.]

378. Hankow's December 23, 4 p. m. and December 20, 2 p. m. Telegrams have been received today from Swenson and Fitch, American representative of Texas Company in Sian, stating that Americans are safe. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow by mail. To Peiping, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

893.00/13835: Telegram

The Consul at Hankow (Jarvis) to the Secretary of State

HANKOW, December 25, 1936-9 a. m. [Received December 25-6:50 a. m.]

My telegram of December 24, 9 a. m.94 I have received the following telegram from the China Inland Mission, Lanchow, Kansu:

"Your telegram received Sunday 20th. All Lanchow foreigners safe, immediate tension relieved. No accurate news of other centers but believe safe. Communications difficult. Kindly inform missions."

This telegram was filed at Lanchow at 7:10 p. m., December 20th and received Hankow 6: 15 a. m. today. My telegram to the mission was sent December 16.

91 "Not printed.

2. I am informing missions here and my interested colleagues. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

JARVIS

893.00/13834: Telegram

The Consul at Hankow (Jarvis) to the Secretary of State

HANKOW, December 26, 1936-5 p. m. [Received December 26-11:40 a. m.]

The news of Chiang Kai Shek's release, first report of which reached here yesterday evening," has been received with striking manifestations of popular joy and relief.

2. I have received a telegram from the Kansu Provincial Government which states that Kansu is peaceful and quiet, order is being preserved as usual, all Americans at Lanchow and other points are safe and the Provincial Government has issued orders for their protection. This telegram was sent from Lanchow at 1:20 p. m., December 24th and received at Hankow at 2: 15 p. m. yesterday.

3. Peterson, American missionary in Pingliang, eastern Kansu has telegraphed that all Kansu Scandinavian Alliance Missionaries are going to Lunghsien, Shensi, the first party leaving today. His telegram was sent yesterday afternoon at 5 and arrived here via Sian this morning.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

893.00/13840: Telegram

JARVIS

The Consul at Hankow (Jarvis) to the Secretary of State

HANKOW, December 28, 1936-9 a. m. [Received December 28-2: 15 a. m.]

My December 26, 5 p. m. Seventh Day Adventist Mission at Sining, Chinghai, has telegraphed me that the local government is loyal, the situation is quiet and evacuation is difficult owing to lack of facilities.

2. I telegraphed yesterday to missions in Chinghai and Kansu (except Pingliang) that the situation had eased and to advise Americans to use their own discretion in the light of local conditions. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

JARVIS

95

p. 448.

See telegram No. 380, December 25, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in China,

893.00/13852: Telegram

The Consul at Hankow (Jarvis) to the Secretary of State

HANKOW, December 31, 1936-6 p. m.

[Received December 31-10: 15 a. m.]

My telegram of December 28, 9 a. m. Missionaries report and military authorities here confirm that area west of Sian is disturbed. American missionaries there are evacuating to Nancheng, southwestern Shensi. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

JARVIS

OPPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN ARMY FORCES FROM NORTH CHINA; RETENTION OF AMERICAN EMBASSY IN PEIPING "

893.0146/479

96

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Dern)

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1936.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the letter of November 19, 1935, from the Acting Secretary of War (and to my letter of acknowledgment of November 20, 1935) 97 in which the Acting Secretary of War refers to a letter, under date April 9, 1931, addressed by the Secretary of War to the then Secretary of State, recommending the withdrawal of the American garrison from Tientsin, and states that, in view of current developments in North China, he renews that recommendation.

98

This Department, in the light of changes in the situation in North China, has given constant thought and study to this question and offers below for the consideration of the War Department its present views. In this connection, attention is called to this Department's letter of February 17, 1933," addressed to General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, enclosing a copy of a memorandum entitled "Foreign Armed Forces in the Peiping-Tientsin Area of China”, in which were set forth the facts in regard to the circumstances under which American armed forces were originally sent to North China and the purpose for which they are at present maintained there.

The foreign armed forces maintained at Peiping and Tientsin and at various points along the railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan

For previous correspondence regarding these questions, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, pp. 700 ff. and pp. 508 ff.

97

Ibid., pp. 701 and 702.

98 Not printed; for the reply thereto, see ibid., 1931, vol. I, p. 1015.

" Not printed.

under the provisions of the Boxer Protocol1 were (as reported by the Military Attaché at Peiping under date September 27, 1935) on September 1, 1935, as follows:

(The American forces comprise two battalions of the Fifteenth Infantry stationed at Tientsin-a detachment of which was on September 1 at the summer encampment near Chinwangtao-and a Marine Corps detachment at Peiping.)

Under existing conditions, it would seem that the original mission of this force (that of providing, in cooperation with similar forces of other countries, special protection for the lives and property of foreign nationals, including the legations at Peiping and, in case of emergency that may call for evacuation, making available an armed escort to the sea) has been substantially modified by the fact that the presence of this force along with similar forces of other countries is regarded as having a psychological influence of a reassuring and stabilizing character. We feel that it should be kept in mind at all times, in thinking of this force, that its mission has not been and is not combat or coercion but has been and is guard duty and potential escort.

The presence of American and Japanese armed forces in juxtaposition presents, of course, during periods of tension between Japan and the United States possibility that incidents may arise between members of these armed forces. At present this danger is, in the opinion of the Department and its representatives in China, not great, and there appears to be little reason to expect that the situation in this respect will greatly change.

On the basis of renewed consideration of all facts and factors known to it, military, political and diplomatic, this Department is of the opinion that the withdrawal at this time of the American detachment at Tientsin would not be to the best interests of the United States.

In the first place, the precipitate withdrawal of this force would contribute toward a further breaking down of what remains of the system of cooperative or collective action which has been an objective of American policy in regard to the relations of the principal treaty powers with each other in China and in their dealings with the Chinese Government. This system, which is typically exemplified in the

'Signed at Peking, September 7, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

several agreements relating to China entered into during the Washington Conference, has been, in our opinion, of advantage to the United States and might well be to the best interests of the other "foreign" powers as well as of China. Moreover, the American Government has certain responsibilities to the other signatory powers of the Boxer Protocol and certain responsibilities as a consequence of our long association with these powers in maintaining armed forces at Tientsin. If a decision were reached to withdraw from these responsibilities it would be desirable, prior to such termination, to consult with or give notice to the interested powers.

In the second place, the precipitate withdrawal of American troops from Tientsin at a moment when China is confronted with a new and serious impairment of its administrative integrity, and when Chinese rule in North China although already attenuated is still indeterminate, might be expected to be misinterpreted by both the Chinese and the Japanese. Coming closely after developments which occurred in China subsequent to the establishment of our silver purchasing policy and after recent bankruptcies of American firms (including one bank) in Shanghai, the withdrawal of this detachment might be expected to encourage an unfavorable reaction against American nationals in China and their interests. Japanese propaganda could be expected to encourage these reactions. The taking of this step by us might even encourage the Japanese to enlarge the scope and increase the tempo of their militaristic advance in China.

In summary, it appears to the Department that the danger of the United States becoming embroiled with Japan because or in consequence of the continued presence of a detachment of American troops at Tientsin is not greater today than it has been in the past, while the precipitate withdrawal of this contingent would in all probability be misunderstood and be used to the disadvantage of the United States and of the principle of cooperative action in China of which the American Government has been a leading advocate.

This Department is desirous that all American troops be withdrawn from China whenever the advantages of their being there become outweighed by the disadvantages and when their withdrawal can be effected without embarrassment to American interests. For the time being we feel that very useful purposes are served by their being and their remaining there.

It is suggested that the Commandant of the American detachment at Tientsin might in view of recent developments care to consult with the American Ambassador at Peiping in regard to the advisability of discontinuing the use of the summer encampment near Chinwangtao.