rect, it will be noted that the present discussions are very comprehensive. After the conference has terminated, Sugiyama is scheduled to make a one month's trip to "Manchukuo" and North China, reputedly for the purpose of coordinating the policies and activities of the Kwantung Army and the North China Garrison with the plans of the War Office; Isogai will return to Shanghai; as already reported, Major-General Doihara intends to take up a permanent residence in Peiping "for the purpose of promoting Sino-Japanese relations". Respectfully yours, 761.94/873: Telegram For the Ambassador: F. P. LOCKHART Counselor of Embassy The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, February 13, 1936-2 p. m. [Received 8:20 p. m.] 45. Your 19, February 6.85 It is extremely difficult to ascertain the real views of the Kremlin with regard to the possibility of an attack by Japan during the present year since the statements of responsible Soviet officials frequently differ and sometimes change from day to day. After a careful consideration of all the information which it has been able to obtain from published sources and from Soviet civilian and military officials and competent foreign observers in Moscow, the Embassy nevertheless ventures to set forth these views as follows: 1. The Kremlin does not believe that the Japanese Government is deliberately planning a war against the Soviet Union this spring, although it feels that Japan is energetically making preparations internally and externally for the eventuality of such a war. 2. It feels that although the Japanese Government has no desire for an immediate war with the Soviet Union, there is grave danger that some incident may occur which might strengthen the hands of an aggressive and active minority in Japan which is of the opinion that if the Soviet Union is to be eliminated as an important factor in the Far East that elimination must take place this year. This feeling is reflected in the extreme nervousness with which some of the border incidents are regarded. (See my telegram 39, January 31, 4 p. m.) 3. The Kremlin takes the position that the border incidents which have already occurred have been sufficiently grave to justify the Soviet Union in making war upon Japan. It is determined, however, not to be provoked into a war as long as these incidents do not constitute a serious invasion of Soviet territory or a dangerous threat to the security of the Soviet Far East or as long as they are not of such a nature as to force the Red Army to take defensive military action. 4. The Kremlin is particularly concerned regarding possible developments in Mongolia, since it feels that the Kwantung army might 85 Not printed. take action in Mongolia which, for military and political reasons, it would hesitate deliberately to take in Soviet territory. It is believed that the extent of assistance which the Soviet Union would give Mongolia in case of invasion would be determined by the internal situation at the time and the type of campaign conducted. 5. Kremlin is hopeful that the Japanese Government will continue to consider that China proper, not the Soviet Union or Mongolia, offers the best field at the present time for Japanese expansion on the Asiatic Continent. Recent announcements regarding the strength of the Red Army are promoted in part by a desire to warn the Kwantung army that the difficulties of penetrating into the Soviet Union or Mongolia would be much greater than those connected with further penetration into China proper and at the same time to convince that section of Japanese opinion which is in favor of driving the Soviet Union from the Far East that it is already too late to engage in such an undertaking without help from other great powers. 6. The Kremlin is convinced that developments in the Far East are dependent to a certain extent on those in Europe and vice versa and feels that Great Britain may be the deciding factor in the maintenance of peace, since, in its opinion, Germany will not embark on an eastern European adventure with an actively hostile Great Britain at its back and Japan will not deliberately go to war if it feels that it cannot count on support from the West, particularly if it cannot depend upon the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain. In view of the above, one of the main objects of Soviet diplomacy at the present time is to bring about a closer rapprochement with Great Britain which it apparently feels may be more valuable over a protracted period than the mutual assistance pact with France. Although the Soviet Government is confident that the pact will be ratified within the next few days, after the experience of the last 2 years, it has grave doubts with respect to French dependability. In general, the statements of officials of the Foreign Office are believed to be somewhat more optimistic than the actual feelings of the Kremlin would justify. Since his return from the West, Litvinov, in particular, is bubbling over with optimism. The Embassy has learned from several sources, believed to be reliable, that he states that his conversations in London were extremely satisfactory and that he feels that with the changed situation in Great Britain, the danger of the Soviet Union being drawn into an armed conflict has been averted for the present, at least. HENDERSON 893.01 Inner Mongolia/54: Telegram The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, February 14, 1936-noon. [Received February 14-11: 13 a. m.] 46. The following is a summary of a Tass telegram from Ulanbator dated February 13th published in today's Pravda: At 7 a. m. on February 12th, a Japanese-Manchurian mixed detachment of 500 men in 20 trucks and 1 passenger car armed with fixed and portable machine guns and 3 field guns, accompanied by 2 tanks and 2 airplanes, crossed the Mongolian frontier and attacked the Mongolian Frontier Guard at a point 7 kilometres from Bulundersun. The Mongolian Frontier Guard, although outnumbered by over 5 to 1, put up a stiff resistance before retreating. They left behind 1 field gun and 1 machine gun which were carried away by the Japanese-Manchurians. The Japanese-Manchurian detachment penetrated into Mongolian territory to a depth of 10 or 12 kilometres. Upon the arrival of reenforcements, Japanese-Manchurians were driven back to Manchukuo. Mongolian losses were 1 killed and 7 wounded and Japanese-Manchurian losses 10 killed and 20 wounded. The Mongolian Government has despatched a telegraphic note to Manchukuo protesting against the incident and demanding immediate investigation. HENDERSON 893.01 Outer Mongolia/62: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, February 14, 1936-7 p. m. [Received February 14-1:38 p. m.] 63. The following telegram has been received from the Consul General at Harbin: "4. February 14, 5 p. m. The Japanese Mission here confirmed newspaper reports stating that in an engagement on February 12, near Olanhodok on the Outer Mongolian border nine Japanese were killed. The Japanese charge bombardment by two Soviet planes in Manchukuo territory. Indications are that more Japanese troops are moving westward but details are not available". LOCKHART 662.9331 Manchuria/21 Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) se NANKING, February 14, 1936. I had a long talk to-day with Dr. Kiep, head of the German Economic Mission, in the course of which he stated that his Mission had come out to the Far East for the purpose of reaching conclusions as 86 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 340, March 28; received April 20. to what opportunities there were for increasing Germany's trade in the Far East. He stated that the visit of the Mission to Manchuria had no political significance whatever; that this was quite well understood by Mr. Hirota; but that later, when they arrived in Manchuria, Mr. Ohashi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the "Manchukuo" Government, had used their visit for political purposes, for it was from Ohashi and his group that emanated the publicity which hindered the possibility of a German-Japanese military alliance. He stated that he had complained to Hirota of Ohashi's methods. Dr. Kiep drew a comparison between the situation which developed between Germany and France when the German Army thought of France as a weak neighbor and therefore a threat to Germany, and the situation which now exists between Japan and China. He spoke of German business in Manchuria, stating that formerly the South Manchuria Railway made some thirty-three per cent of its foreign purchases from the United States, thirty-three per cent from Japan, and spent the remaining thirty-three per cent in Europe and Germany. He said that now this had all changed, as the South Manchuria Railway purchased more than eighty per cent of its requirements from Japan; that recent developments in Manchuria were crowding German as well as other Western business representation in Manchuria; that German representation to-day was only forty per cent of its former strength and that it was still growing weaker. The reason was Japanese political control in Manchuria, aided by the great number of Japanese retailers all over the country. He mentioned also the great number of Japanese advisers employed in the various departments of the Government of "Manchukuo", who were in a position to make it possible for bids to go to Japanese suppliers of goods. Dr. Kiep stated that Germany was in dire need of Manchurian soy beans which they imported and used as a fertilizer for the farmers' fields of Germany. He ascribed the recent butter shortage in Germany to their inability to purchase the soy bean of Manchuria. Germany was prepared to buy where it could sell. Manchuria was buying more and more from Japan and therefore selling less and less to Germany. He stated that his chief interest in Manchuria was to work out some sort of an arrangement whereby Germany could take soy beans in exchange for German goods. He said that difficulties were in the way, however, as the Yokohama Specie Bank wanted to have a monopoly of the business and to receive guarantees from the German Government covering all credits. He said that he did not know what attitude the Reich Bank would take in regard to this matter. Dr. Kiep explained in some detail Germany's need and the difficulties which she was now having. He mentioned the fact of the boycott which was current throughout the world and especially effective in the United States. It was his hope that the peoples of the world would forget the Jew in Germany and cease to agitate the matter, as such agitation by outsiders only tended to make the situation worse in Germany itself. He ascribed the recent recrudescence of anti-Jewish activities in Germany to politics, stating that the Party was losing a good deal of prestige because of the rapidly-increasing control over politics exercised by the newly-created German Army. The Party's problem was to keep itself before the eyes of the people. Reverting again to China, Dr. Kiep stated that Germany's trade with China was too important to Germany for Germany to enter into any kind of an arrangement of a cooperative character with Japan. Germany was not interested in mixing up in the situation here in the Far East and thus sacrificing her hard-won share of world commerce. NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON 793.94/7766 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1936. Reference, memorandum to the Secretary of February 12 hereunder attached.87 The Chinese Ambassador called me on the 'phone this morning and said that he had been checking his telegrams and had found a mistake in reading: in connection with his request for an interview with the Secretary, he found that it was not necessary that he see the Secretary, but his instruction was to "keep in touch with the Department of State"; he thought that it would be preferable that he talk the matter over at this stage with me rather than with the Secretary. The appointment for the Ambassador to see the Secretary at twelve o'clock this day was therefore canceled, and the Ambassador called on me. The Ambassador repeated substantially what he had said to me as recorded in the memorandum of February 12 under reference. He then added that his Government had reason to believe that the Japanese Government had approached or would approach the American, the British, and the Russian Governments with the objective of keeping those Governments apart and causing them to stand aside while Japan proceeded with Japan's China policy. The Chinese Government wished to know whether the American Government had been thus approached. I said in reply that the Japanese Government had made no approach to us. The Ambassador wished to know what would be our attitude if we were so approached. I replied that I thought the Ambassador could formulate for himself an adequate reply to 87 Ante, p. 52. |