894.00/584: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, February 29, 1936-6 p. m. [Received February 29-7: 19 a. m.] 50. Excellent order has been maintained in Tokyo throughout the recent incident and no injury or molestation to American citizens has been reported to the Embassy except the inconveniences necessarily caused by the precautionary measures of the authorities. GREW 894.00/588: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, February 29, 1936-7 p. m. [Received February 29-9:30 a. m.] 51. I am informed by Baron Hayashi, former Grand Master of Ceremonies, who has just returned from the Palace, that Prime Minister Okada is alive and uninjured. It appears that his brother-in-law who somewhat resembles him was killed by mistake and that the Premier escaped and has been under cover since the night of February 25th. It is said that he suddenly announced himself to the Emperor whereupon Acting Prime Minister Goto resigned the Premiership which was resumed by Okada. The Emperor is officially reported to have expressed great pleasure at Okada's reappearance. The implications of this dramatic turn of events are too obvious to need comment. Our first reaction to the circumstances of the past 4 days is that they may well cause a revulsion of feeling against the military throughout the country and that the final results may be salutary. We learn that from 15 to 20 officers not higher than the rank of captain were involved in the insurgency. Their fate is unknown but it is generally thought from the tone of the announcement that they may have been allowed to commit suicide. Repeated to Peiping. GREW 894.00/591: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, March 1, 1936-6 p. m. [Received March 1-9:35 a. m.] 52. 1. Although martial law has not yet been lifted, virtually normal conditions prevail in Tokyo once more. The barricades have all been removed, the police have replaced soldiers in patrolling the city, and few troops are to be seen except in the neighborhood of the martial law headquarters. A considerable proportion of the troops called into the city during the emergency have apparently departed. 2. According to an official announcement, only one of the insurgent officers, Captain Nonaka, committed hara-kiri and the others are in prison under arrest. They and five additional officers of low rank have been dismissed in disgrace from the army. Their dismissal without trial is believed to indicate a more drastic policy than has hitherto been followed in dealing with incidents of this type. 3. No announcement has yet been made concerning the formation of the new Cabinet and the appointment of a new Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. GREW 894.00/593: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, March 2, 1936-noon. [Received March 2-3:34 a. m.] 53. 1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs speaking confidentially told me this morning that in the conferences now taking place looking to the formation of a new Cabinet the primary and fundamental consideration under discussion is that a government shall be chosen which will not only maintain but constructively improve Japan's relations with foreign countries. Obviously we must await concrete evidence to support these indications. He said that he himself knew nothing more definite at the present moment and he thought it might take 2 or 3 days to form the Cabinet but that he would keep me apprised of any definite developments in order that I need not rely on the press for information. 2. I have today written a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting him to convey to the competent authorities my sincere appreciation of the thoroughness of the measures taken by various departments to ensure the safety of ourselves and the personnel and property of the Embassy during the recent uprising. The situation was admirably handled. 894.00/594a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) GREW WASHINGTON, March 3, 1936-5 p. m. 28. Department assumes that Embassy is preparing and will in due course forward by mail to the Department for purposes of present study and future reference a comprehensive account, as authentic as possible and citing where possible official or authoritative statements, of last week's coup. In your preparation of this, Department suggests that, in view of highly conflicting press reports regarding circumstances of attack on Okada and his reappearance, of action taken against insurgents, and of fate of insurgent leaders, special attention be given to those subjects. HULL 894.00/596: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, March 4, 1936-noon. [Received March 4-6: 34 a. m.] 56. Embassy's 53, March 2, noon. Prince Saionji arrived in Tokyo on March 2 and is reported to have called various national leaders into consultation preparatory to formulating his recommendations to the Throne in regard to the composition of the next Cabinet. Many of the important Japanese newspapers editorially demand the formation of a really strong national Cabinet capable of stabilizing the situation. Conditions are still too nebulous, however, to permit any prediction as to the personnel of the next Cabinet. In the meantime, the Okada Cabinet which resigned en bloc on February 26 assuming responsibility for the insurrection is carrying on its duties as a provisional government. Repeated to Peiping. GREW 894.00/595: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, March 4, 1936-1 p. m. [Received March 4-1 a. m.] 57. Department's 28, March 3, 5 p. m. The Embassy is now compiling a despatch containing all available official announcements, official radio broadcasts, leaflets, et cetera, which will be transmitted in the pouch due Washington March 21.30 It is improbable, however, that all the official details desired by the Department will be available for some time to come owing to continued censorship and the fact that even the officials of the Foreign Office are not yet certain of all the details. The whole subject will be fully covered in due course. GREW 30 Despatch No. 1721, March 6, not printed. 894.00/604 Memorandum by the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1936. The Japanese Ambassador 31 called and handed me the following note in writing from Foreign Minister Hirota: "I am most grateful to you for your kind message of condolence transmitted to me by the American Ambassador in Tokyo, and, on behalf of the Japanese Government, I wish to convey to you and through you to the United States Government our most sincere thanks for this manifestation of sympathy." The Ambassador and I exchanged a few general statements about the restoration of international trade, in the course of which I emphasized the broad program which this Government was pursuing, and, without referring to Japan, I endeavored to point out the necessity for the restoration at the earliest possible date of the normal processes of international finance and commerce. The Ambassador suggested that our two nations had similar views on this general subject. He then added that there were some small minor troubles in our trade situation which had been the subject of more or less discussion and misunderstandings.32 I replied that this Government was carrying all the political load possible in its efforts to go forward with our program of liberalizing commercial and general trade policies; that the small overflows of imports with respect to given commodities were very combustible politically; and that it was necessary that we should compose the troubles which they presented by amicable agreements, if and when at all possible; otherwise, we were obliged to take other necessary steps. The Ambassador seemed agreeably disposed towards special agreements, such as we had been making. I replied further that it was either this or a possible cessation of our trade restoration movement and the still further increase of tariff that would soon follow, with the result that Japan would be much worse off than if she entered into these special agreements, restricting voluntarily certain quantities of exports from Japan to the United States. The Ambassador volunteered the suggestion that the recent explosion in Japan, planned at the instigation of certain young army officers with the result that a number of Japan's statesmen were assassinated, was not a controversy between the ultra-radical and conservative elements in the military group, but that it was the reaction of the soldiers to seriously discriminatory economic treatment of farmers and small business men in Japan by what we would call big 81 Hirosi Salto. 32 See pp. 806 ff. business in this country. The Ambassador said that these officers, without the knowledge of their superiors, sought to resent the action of the Government in playing into the hands of what we would call the big predatory interests at the expense of the farmers and small business men whose suffering was growing steadily worse. The Ambassador went on to say that seven generals had resigned because they were in charge of the military forces of which the rebellion companies were a part; he said that the generals knew nothing about the plans for this uprising and the systematic assassination, but that, of course, the generals were chargeable with the responsibility for the results, and hence their resignation. The Ambassador stated he felt now that conditions were comparatively calm and normal the Government unquestionably would work out a list of cabinet members who would make up a satisfactory government, and by that the Ambassador said he meant a government more considerate of the rights and interests of the farmers and the small business men and less under the domination of big business in Japan, which he said had rapidly accumulated wealth by trading, while the other classes mentioned suffered correspondingly. C[ORDELL] H[ULL] 894.00/625 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1706 TOKYO, March 5, 1936. [Received March 23.] SIR: The results of the Diet election held on February 20 appear to have been one of the immediate causes of the uprising that broke out six days later with the murder of Admiral Viscount Saito, Finance Minister Takahashi, General Watanabe, and Colonel Matsuo, the Premier's brother-in-law.* However, the fundamental causes beneath the outbreak date back several years and are bound up with a feeling of discontent in the Army over political and social conditions in Japan. In their campaigning before the election the two principal political parties were at variance in several important points. Although both appeared to stand for a "positive foreign policy", for the improvement of agricultural interests, and for the relief of local finance, the Seiyukai advocated political reform for the abolishment of bureaucracy and insisted upon the resignation of the Okada Cabinet, which the Minseito continued to support. The Seiyukai was reported to be desirous of the abolition of the "senior statesmen bloc", while there was no evi *Embassy's telegram No. 37 of February 26, 1936. [Footnote in the original.] |