Also among the known aims of the radical army element and of a great part of the Army as well was the establishment of a kind of state socialism, with the imposition of higher taxes on capitalists, the reduction of taxes on the poorer people, and general administrative measures for the welfare of the masses, particularly in the rural communities. These objectives were touched on in the Army pamphlet of October 1, 1934, which contained such phrases as: "So long as economic profits, and especially unearned incomes, are enjoyed by one section of the nation alone the majority of the people will be left in utmost misery and distress. . . ."** A program of state reform resembling that desired by the Army is now under consideration by the Hirota Cabinet as evidenced in general terms in the Hirota Cabinet's policy statement of March 17.†† After the assassinations of February 26, according to information received by the Embassy, the insurgents demanded of the provisional Government the appointment of either Baron Hiranuma or Admiral Kanji Kato as Premier. While Baron Hiranuma was not made Premier, he was appointed to the post of President of the Privy Council on March 13 and formally installed in office on that day. It will be recalled that Hiranuma has long been known as a chauvinist, an anti-liberal, and a favorite of the radical group in the Army; that the appointment of Baron Ikki as President of the Privy Council on May 3, 1934, was made in violation of the precedent that the Vice President of the Council be promoted to the Presidency upon the resignation of the former incumbent; and that the supporters of Baron Hiranuma were greatly annoyed because, although Vice President of the Council, he had not been appointed to the Presidency.§§ The younger officers who engineered the insurrection wanted larger defense appropriations and a stronger policy against Soviet Russia. Judging from current reports and the present Cabinet's statement of policy, an increase in defense appropriations seems assured. As stated above, on March 9 Mr. Hirota mentioned the necessity of positive and independent readjustment of international relations. Four days later, in a conversation with me, Mr. Hirota stated that the "positive diplomacy" frequently mentioned in the press applied exclusively to Soviet Russia and China and simply meant the expediting of his former policy as Minister for Foreign Affairs.|||| **Embassy's despatch No. 1031, November 1, 1934. despatch not printed.] †† Embassy's despatch No. 1733, March 19, 1936. despatch not printed.] [Footnote in the original; [Footnote in the original; [Footnote in the original.] [Footnote in the original; des #Embassy's telegram No. 41, February 27, 1936. §§ Embassy's despatch No. 776, May 5, 1934. patch not printed.] |||| Embassy's telegram No. 74, March 13, 1936. [Footnote in the original.] II. AIMS OF THE INSURGENTS WHICH FAILED Prince Saionji, the Genro, escaped assassination and in fact subsequently recommended to the Emperor the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Premier. However, in choosing a candidate for Premier, the Genro avoided consulting the other elder statesmen near the Throne, a custom which had been established by him immediately after the May 15 Incident and which was distasteful to the radical element in the Army. On February 27 the leaders of the rebellion were reported to have demanded a military dictatorship for Japan. This demand was immediately rejected by the Government.¶¶ However, the establishment of a military dictatorship was not among the objectives of the insurgents as disclosed by their mimeographed statement of February 26 and by the official statement of the War Office on that day. The probable reason for the issuance of this demand was to enable the insurgents to make a better bargain with the Government in accordance with the well-known Japanese habit of demanding more than can be obtained for the purpose of striking a future compromise. Seven Army members of the Supreme War Council resigned on March 3, assuming responsibility for the incident. Among those who resigned were Generals Masaki and Araki, who had been an inspiration to the plotters and whose ideas undoubtedly influenced the latter. However, General Hayashi, a member of the military clique which the insurgents wanted to get rid of, also resigned from the Supreme War Council. In return for certain concessions mentioned elsewhere in this despatch, General Terauchi is reported to have agreed with Mr. Hirota to establish stricter control in the Army. The disciplinary measures thus far taken by the Army have already been mentioned. In addition, more than one hundred civilians are said to have been arrested by the Tokyo gendarmerie and the Metropolitan Police for alleged complicity in the February 26 Incident. If the Army and the Home Office continue to take vigorous steps against the "direct actionists" and if the Government supplements these steps by carrying out the reforms desired by the Army, the danger of another uprising in the near future will probably be greatly lessened. III. CONCLUSION From an examination of the foregoing considerations it would appear that the aims of the insurgents which failed are outweighed by those that succeeded. In general, the insurgents wanted a liquidation of the status quo. The Okada Cabinet, which had been upheld at the polls on February 20, gave no indication of any intention to alter its policy or to adopt a reform program similar to the one announced by the Hirota Cabinet on March 17. While the changes ¶¶ Embassy's telegram No. 41, February 27, 1936. [Footnote in the original.] desired by the insurgents have not all come about, measures toward effecting them gradually are under definite consideration. It is probably true that the reforms desired would have had to be adopted in the course of time owing to widespread popular sympathy for the Army's ideas. Nevertheless, it can be safely said that the insurrection of February 26 hastened that break-up of the status quo. Respectfully yours, 894.00/635 JOSEPH C. GREW The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1746 TOKYO, March 20, 1936. [Received April 6.] SIR: Supplementing the Embassy's despatch No. 1707 of March 5, 1936, concerning the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa for the murder of Major-General Nagata, I have the honor to submit a report on developments that have come to light since the writing of that despatch, with particular reference to the relation between the trial and the Incident of February 26. Recently the Embassy's Military Attaché was informed by an official of the War Office that former Captains Koji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe, former Lieutenant Zei Nishida and Kazuteru Kita (once a "ronin" in China), all of whom were prominently mentioned in the Aizawa trial as close associates of the defendant, had been the real ringleaders in the revolt although the nominal and active leaders had been Captains Ando and Nonaka. This information was substantiated by an announcement of the Martial Law Headquarters on March 11. According to newspaper reports, Kazuteru Kita was a Socialist during the early part of his career and later became converted to outand-out nationalism. About 1920 he published a book in Shanghai entitled Japan's Reconstruction which was prohibited from distribution in Japan on account of its pernicious intermingling of leftist and rightist ideas and its insistence upon direct action. It is said that the book, Japan's Reconstruction, had a great influence on the men accused of perpetrating the May 15 assassination. Zei Nishida resigned as a lieutenant in the Army in 1924 on account of illness and subsequently joined the chauvinist movement, becoming a member of several ultra-nationalist societies. In 1926 he was arrested in connection with a plot against the life of Count Makino and others and was sentenced to five months' penal servitude in 1930. For the past five years he has been working closely with Kazuteru Kita. Furthermore, according to the Asahi of March 5, ex-Captain Muranaka and Zensuke Shibukawa, a graduate of the Military Acad emy and one of the civilians arrested for participation in the February 26 Incident, attended seven sessions of the Aizawa trial, carefully taking notes, and on February 17 ceased to appear at the hearings. The disclosures made during the trial may thus have influenced the conspirators in the choice of the date on which to act and of the persons to be assassinated. It was reported by the Asahi of March 12 that Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa would have to be completely retried because his trial had already been suspended fifteen days, the legal limit under the Court Martial Law. Domei (News Agency) stated that no date for a new trial had been set and that it would be postponed indefinitely. In this connection it is of interest to note, according to newspaper accounts and to the Military Attaché's informant mentioned above, that the trial of the officers and civilians involved in the February 26 Incident will be distinctly different from the trial of the men involved in the assassination of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932, and from the Aizawa trial in that it will be held strictly in camera, the accused will be denied the benefit of counsel, the decisions given will be final with no appeal allowed, and there will be less airing of political views and more attention paid to establishing the guilt of and the punishment for the defendants. A five-day conference of Army and Division Commanders is scheduled to begin at Tokyo on April 7. Although such conferences of Army and Division Commanders are routine matters and take place from time to time under ordinary circumstances, the newspapers report that the purpose of the coming conference is to strengthen Army discipline and to unify the control of the Army. It remains to be seen whether any extraordinary measures will be taken at the scheduled conference. Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW 894.032/152: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, May 6, 1936-6 p. m. [Received May 6-8:20 a. m.] 95. 1. In his speech before the House of Peers this morning Premier Hirota said that in removing the causes of national unrest he would avoid extremes and would adhere to constitutional government under the Emperor. He avoided concrete expressions of policy but said that the Government would clarify the national policy; would perfect national defense while watching developments in China and Soviet Russia, would meet new expenditures by strengthening national finances and improving the taxation system; would take drastic steps if need be to overcome the barriers being erected against Japanese trade; and would if desirable abolish some governmental organs or merge them with others in order to effect administrative reforms. 2. The Foreign Office states that the speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was transmitted practically in toto to the Japanese Embassy in Washington where it will be available to the Department. 3. Contrary to expectations the Minister for War did not give a detailed account of the causes of the recent incident but stated that the causes would be made public at the proper time. He stated that the discipline of the army as a whole was not affected by the affair and that the trouble was caused by radicals working behind the scenes. GREW 894.20/165 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1821 TOKYO, May 12, 1936. [Received June 1.] SIR: With reference to the Embassy's despatches No. 1450 of August 23, 1935, No. 1707 of March 5, 1936, and No. 1746 of March 20, 1936, concerning the murder on August 12, 1935, of Major General Nagata by Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa and the trial of the assassin from January 28 to February 26, 1936, I have the honor to report that the War Office announced on May 9 that Aizawa had been sentenced to death on May 7 by the Court Martial of the First (Tokyo) Division. It will be remembered that Lieutenant Aizawa's first trial, which had a direct bearing on the recent insurrection, was indefinitely postponed on February 26; that subsequently his trial was suspended fifteen days, which necessitated a complete re-trial under the provisions of the Court Martial Law;* and that the military authorities have during recent weeks reportedly been seriously considering the elimination of all "direct actionists" from the Army. On April 7 Dr. Somei Uzawa, who in the first trial had exerted his utmost efforts to bring out the patriotic motives of the accused, resigned as a counsel for Aizawa, possibly because of his responsibility for the manner in which the trial had been handled and hence for the February 26 Incident. Aizawa's second trial was opened on April 22 and there were five hearings in camera. The date of the resumption of the trial was not publicly known until the War Ministry's announcement of the 47 Not printed. *Embassy's despatch No. 1746 of March 20, 1936. +Embassy's despatch No. 1784 of April 17, 1936. despatch not printed.] [Footnote in the original.] [Footnote in the original; |