death sentence was made. In the following statement of the War Office, issued on May 9, it will be noted that the reason given for holding the hearings in camera was that public hearings would have been disturbing to public order: "The Aizawa case was for some time under examination by the court-martial of the 1st Division. With the outbreak of the February 26 incident, a change was made in the presiding judge, and the retrial was opened on April 22. There were five hearings. The presiding judge suspended public hearings because the proceedings, if published, would be disturbing to public order. On May 7, the judge announced the decision, and on May 8, Lieutenant General Aizawa appealed." In accordance with the provisions of the Army Criminal Code, the higher Court Martial for Aizawa must be held within thirty days of his appeal, which was made on May 8. The War Office authorities issued an interesting statement concerning the sentence of the Court Martial, a translation of the text of which is enclosed, as published by the Japan Times of May 11. While it is impossible to predict whether the higher Court Martial will uphold this decision and Aizawa will actually meet his death as a result of the murder, the death sentence laid down in this case may be considered as highly significant in view of the lenient sentences passed on the perpetrators of similar political assassinations in the past and also in view of the fact that the first trial of Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa, which was held before the occurrence of the February 26 Incident, seemed to have little or no connection with his confessed guilt and seemed to be much more concerned with sympathy for his political motives. There may be an indication in the Court Martial's decision of May 7 that the War Minister is, as he himself has asserted in recent Diet sessions, seriously intent upon establishing rigid discipline in the Army and punishing those guilty of direct action methods. Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW 894.00/651 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1833 TOKYO, May 14, 1936. [Received June 1.] SIR: With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 1784, dated April 17, 1936,48 concerning the results flowing from the incident of February 26, 1936, I now have the honor to report the following developments in the situation. POSITION OF THE ARMY The Japanese Army, and particularly that portion of the Army which has been concerning itself with political questions and advocating ultra-nationalistic principles, does not appear to be in favor in Japan at the moment. Since the convening of the special session of the Diet on May 1, numerous critical interpellations have been directed at the Minister for War, the most striking one being that of Mr. Takao Saito, a Minseito member of the Lower House, delivered on May 7 (Embassy's despatch No. 1826, dated May 13, 1936 50). In the course of his interpellation, Mr. Saito criticized the tendency of young Army officers to meddle in political affairs and described their ideas as "naive", "laughable" and "simple and pure but puerile". He condemned the Army authorities for not having taken steps at an earlier date to eliminate erroneous ideas in the Army and declared that the May 15 and February 26 incidents could have been prevented if the higher authorities in the Army had endeavored from the first to remove the causes of the evil. He further declared that extreme rightists were as dangerous to the State as extreme leftists and advised the higher military authorities to guide properly the younger officers, in order to prevent the growth of dangerous ideas. His speech was greeted with loud and prolonged applause and was later commented upon most favorably by several newspapers, indicating clearly that the general sentiment in the country is favorable to the critics of the Army and opposed to that section of the Army which has advocated extreme reactionary principles. The Army has been somewhat embarrassed by these demonstrations of lack of sympathy, and consequently is apparently taking strong measures to eliminate from the Army those elements which have called down upon the Army the wrath of the public. The most striking example of these measures is the sentencing to death of LieutenantColonel Aizawa, the murderer of Lieutenant-General Nagata in August last (see Embassy's despatch No. 1821, dated May 12, 1936). This sentence, imposed by the First Division Court Martial (held in camera) on May 7, 1936, is much more severe than the sentences imposed upon the young Army and Navy officers involved in the murder of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932. It will be remembered that the young officers involved in that affair received prison sentences of from one to fifteen years, with, of course, commutation of sentence 50 Not printed. for good behavior and by Imperial clemency, although the civilian participants in the May 15 affair, who were tried in the civil courts, received life sentences. The sentence imposed upon Colonel Aizawa 51 is also an indication of the severity of the sentences which will be imposed upon the young officers involved in the incident of February 26 and of the determination of the Army to rid itself of those who are subjecting the organization to the criticism of the public. At the same time, the Army does not seem to be greatly worried over the criticisms in the Diet and the newspapers. It is proceeding calmly and smugly on its way, believing thoroughly in its mission as the savior of Japan. It continues to keep Tokyo in the grip of martial law, has asked for larger appropriations than ever, has formulated and proposed bills for the mobilization of industries, for the preservation of national industrial mobilization secrets and for the control of "seditious literature". These measures, if passed, obviously would increase the power of the Army to control the internal administration of the country. In addition there have been inaugurated so-called "Three-Minister Conferences", composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, for the purpose of discussing Japan's foreign policies. The Three-Minister Conferences have received criticism in the Diet, but the Army and Navy maintain that, from the broad viewpoint of national defense, their Ministers should have the right and opportunity to express their views in regard to foreign policy as well as to internal administration. It would appear, therefore, that the military, rather than being crushed by the shame of the February 26 incident, have in fact taken advantage of the incident to tighten their hold upon the Japanese Government and to further the so-called "Showa Restoration" (which in fact means the restoration of some form of government resembling the Shogunate). At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the military sincerely believe that the nation stands in grave danger of involvement in a serious war in the not distant future and that it is therefore of pressing necessity that the defense forces be augmented and the nation unified under the Emperor (with, of course, the leadership of the military). The military's insistence upon dominance in the Government can be ascribed quite as well to the immediate necessity, real or fancied, of defense, as to the more vague idea of a return of military government in Japan. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS As will be observed from a perusal of the addresses of the Premier and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance and War before the Diet on May 6 (Embassy's despatch No. 1830, dated May 14, 1936 52), no concrete measures were announced for the execution of the economic, social and administrative reforms promised the nation by the Hirota Cabinet upon its inauguration. The policies outlined in the speeches before the Diet were vague and not very convincing, and the Cabinet has not introduced any reform measures of importance, the bulk of the bills introduced having been carried over from the previous government. The only social reform bill of importance introduced by the Hirota Cabinet is one compelling industrialists to build up retirement allowance funds for their employees. This lack of concrete reform measures has disappointed the nation, which apparently had expected much of the present national or "transcendental" Cabinet. Several of the prominent newspapers, including the Asahi, the Kokumin, the Yomiuri and the Jiji, have commented editorially upon the vagueness of the speeches of the Ministers, the unsatisfactory nature of their replies to interpellations and the failure of the Cabinet to carry out the promised administrative reforms. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of May 13 stated that the Army also is dissatisfied with the lack of zeal for administrative reform in the civilian government. The Army, according to the newspaper, feels this especially strongly because the Army itself has been endeavoring, with success, to purge itself of the elements leading to unrest and indiscipline. It believes that the civilian authorities should show the same zeal in effecting reforms, instead of issuing vague promises only. Mr. Hirota's announced policy, however, was to undertake economic and administrative reforms slowly and gradually, in order to avoid any great disturbance of the life of the people, and in reply to interpellations in the Diet, the Cabinet Ministers involved have stated that administrative reforms and changes in the economic system will be studied after the present session of the Diet. Observers of the situation are becoming of the opinion, however, that the Hirota Cabinet is deliberately procrastinating in regard to reform measures, in the expectation that the agitation for such measures will die out, and that the Government then will be able to maintain the status quo, with only such minor reform measures as may be forced upon the Government by discontented elements in and out of the administration. The possibility always exists, however, that if the Government adopts such procrastinating and half-way tactics, and instead of earnestly endeavoring to correct the maladjustments and abuses in Japan, attempts to suppress by use of force all symptoms of unrest and discontent, there will arise other and perhaps worse incidents than those of May 15, 1932, and February 26, 1936. Respectfully yours, "Not printed. JOSEPH C. GREW 894.002/292 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1864 TOKYO, May 28, 1936. [Received June 15.] SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the Embassy's translations of Imperial Ordinance No. 63, which appeared in the Official Gazette of May 18, 1936, and No. 64, which appeared in the Official Gazette of May 19, 1936.53 These two ordinances are amendments of the regulations governing the organization of the Army and Navy Departments, respectively, and provide that appointment to the posts of Minister and Vice Minister of the Army and Navy Departments shall be confined to generals and admirals on the active list. By an ordinance issued in 1913, permission was granted for the appointment of officers in the first and second reserves to the abovementioned posts. Aversion of the military to the ordinance of 1913, coupled with the fact that no reserve officer was ever appointed either War or Navy Minister under its authorization, appears to have induced the decision to limit formally by Imperial Ordinances, the choice of Army and Navy Ministers to officers on the active list. Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW 894.20/166 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1876 TOKYO, May 29, 1936. [Received June 15.] SIR: I have the honor to report that the introduction to the Diet by the Hirota Cabinet of the Seditious Literature Emergency Control Bill and the Mobilization Secrets Preservation Bill aroused stubborn opposition both within the Diet and among the public to regimentation and the invasion of individual freedom by repressive legislation. The struggle against these bills provided the most outstanding feature of the 69th Diet session. The Seditious Literature Bill was introduced to the Lower House on May 14 and the Mobilization Secrets Bill on May 18. The Government sought by the former bill further power to suppress pamphlets, "secret documents", and the distribution of unsigned or uncensored literature tending to subvert army discipline, disturb the existing financial organization of Japan, or provoke public unrest. By the latter bill which was to supplement the Fortified Zone Act and the Military Secrets Preservation Law it sought further power to safeguard military and important industrial secrets against the perils |