"Manchukuo", Japan, and Soviet Russia had been received and stated that the plan appeared to be practical. From a Moscow despatch published in Tokyo on March 18 it now appears that the negotiations between Mr. Ota and Mr. Stomoniakov are being accelerated. Mr. Ota is reported to have proposed the establishment of a commission to be composed of representatives of "Manchukuo" and the USSR and charged with the task of re-demarcating the frontier from Lake Hanka on the eastern border of "Manchukuo" to the Tumen River where the USSR, "Manchukuo", and Korea meet. He is further reported as saying that if this proposition is agreed to, the Japanese Government is ready to accept at once the USSR's proposals regarding the formation of a standing mixed commission for examination of border incidents occurring along this section of the frontier. In reply, Mr. Stomoniakov is believed to have inquired whether Japan is willing to bring about the formation of similar commissions to deal with the conflicts along the Outer Mongolian border. He then told Mr. Ota that he assumed that commissions for the prevention of incidents would be formed for the entire Soviet-Manchurian frontier and not merely for separate sections. The negotiations just outlined have caused the Asahi to comment that they are an expression of the "positive diplomacy" to which Mr. Hirota's Cabinet is pledged. Meanwhile there appear to have been two incidents of minor importance along the frontier. On March 13 a Domei report from Hsinking declared that the "Manchukuo" Foreign Affairs Commissioner at Heiho protested to the Soviet authorities against the armed occupation of the island of Panchantao in the Amur River. On the same day a Moscow report from Habarovsk was published in Tokyo stating that on March 5 a Japanese-"Manchukuo" patrol fired on Soviet workmen across the Amur who were making an excavation. The patrol then crossed the river into Soviet territory and inspected the excavation. MONGOL-MANCHU BORDER There have been no reports of fighting along the Outer Mongolian border for a period of more than one month although Japanese reinforcements are said to have been concentrated nearby. There has, however, been an apparent change in the former policy of the USSR not to reveal the nature of the relationship existing between the Outer Mongolian Government and that of Soviet Russia. It will be remembered that on February 23 a report in the Asahi alleged that the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had been definitely informed that the USSR had accepted responsibility for the independence of Outer Mongolia. This report appears now to have been confirmed in a +Embassy's despatch No. 1716, March 4, 1936. [Footnote in the original.] conversation between Mr. Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspapers and Mr. Stalin " on March 3.12 According to the version of this unusual interview which was widely published in Japan Mr. Stalin told Mr. Howard that the USSR must stand ready to help the Mongolians in the event of a Japanese attack. On March 13 a further report from Moscow declared that General Demid, the War Minister of Outer Mongolia, had publicly stated that as a result of the recent visit of Outer Mongolian officials to Moscow, definite assurances had been received that the USSR would aid Outer Mongolia if it should be attacked. In addition to the new development mentioned above, the correspondence between Outer Mongolia and "Manchukuo" concerning the border fights during February continued during the past two weeks. Under date of March 6 "Manchukuo" answered the Mongolian note of February 29 proposing the establishment of a commission of investigation. The reply is said to have given "Manchukuo's" assent in principle to the proposed commission but to have denied responsibility for the incidents in question, to have inquired as to the location of the proposed commission as well as to which incident would be dealt with, and to have affirmed a desire for a policy of "the good neighbor" vis-à-vis Outer Mongolia. On March 16, according to a Domei report from Hsinking, Outer Mongolia's reply was received with "signs of dissatisfaction" on the part of the "Manchukuo" authorities. According to a Moscow report which was published at the same time in Japan the reply reaffirmed Outer Mongolia's wish to settle the incident of February 12 first and then, if successful, to proceed to the consideration of other incidents. It was further proposed by Outer Mongolia that the commission should meet alternately at Tamskume and Kansurmiao on the Outer Mongolian and "Manchukuo" sides of the border respectively. The dissatisfaction of the "Manchukuo" officials with this proposition appears to be caused by its failure to comply with "Manchukuo's" wish to open formal diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia. If no other comment is justified at this stage of the negotiations it may, however, be said that the Mongol-Manchu border question is gradually being revealed in its true light as a conflict of interest between Soviet Russia and Japan with each country less reluctant than formerly to acknowledge its concern in the matter. ARREST OF JAPANESE STAFF OF SOVIET EMBASSY IN TOKYO Taking advantage of the unusual conditions prevailing in Tokyo as a result of the incident of February 26, the police arrested eleven "Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. 12 See telegram No. 76, March 2, 6 p. m., Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 288. Japanese interpreters, translators, and language teachers connected with the Soviet Embassy. The arrests, which became known on March 12, were for alleged subversive activities including the gathering of detailed information during the suppression of the insurgent movement in Tokyo. So far as is known, with the single exception of an employee of the Chinese Embassy, no Japanese connected with other Embassies and Legations in Tokyo were molested. The arrests are reported to have been the subject of immediate but unavailing protests from the Soviet Embassy here and the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. As the men have not been released, the Soviet Embassy has been handicapped in carrying on its normal routine. According to biographical sketches published in the Asahi most of the arrested employees have previously been detained by the police because of radical activities. Several at least have been members of Communist societies in Japan. Members of the Diplomatic Corps have voiced the opinion that the Japanese authorities have been waiting for an opportunity to remove these undesirable elements, and that they determined on the present as a favorable opportunity. Visitors to the Soviet Embassy have long remarked on the unusual type of Japanese to be seen there and it is not difficult to believe the police contention that these people are in fact Communist sympathizers. In connection with this incident reference is made to the Embassy's telegram No. 55, March 3, 6 p. m.,13 in which the Soviet Ambassador's opposition to the assignment of a private detective to protect him during the present emergency is set forth. As indication of the extraordinary atmosphere which apparently prevails at the Soviet Embassy a member of the British Embassy assured a member of my staff that whenever the Soviet Ambassador leaves his Embassy by car with his Japanese detective seated beside the driver, an armed Russian (rumored to be a GPU man) sits beside the Ambassador to protect him from his protector. This story originated with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff who sought to illustrate thereby the perfidy of the Japanese! For a brief discussion of the probable course of the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia as affected by the February 26 Incident and the consequent change of Government in Japan, the attention of the Department is invited to the Embassy's Strictly Confidential despatch No. 1741 of March 18, 1936. Respectfully yours, 18 Not printed. JOSEPH C. GREW 761.94/895 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1741 TOKYO, March 18, 1936. [Received April 6.] SIR: In the Embassy's confidential despatch No. 1694 of February 2014 the factors were enumerated which led to the conclusion that a recourse to war was not at that time intended by either Japan or Soviet Russia but that the border situation remained menacing. Now, after a change of Government in Japan brought on by the violence of February 26, the situation requires reexamination. In the main the factors enumerated before the Incident still obtain. The Japanese Army is not equipped to fight the USSR with good prospects of success; its leaders, for this reason if for no other, are believed to remain opposed to a war in the near future. The danger of an imminent war, deliberately provoked by the Japanese, could only be acute if the younger officers were in control of the Government, a condition contrary to fact. According to a telegram* to the Department from the Embassy at Moscow the "Kremlin feels that although the Japanese Government has no desire for an immediate war with the Soviet Union, there is a grave danger that some incident may occur which might strengthen the hands of an aggressive and active minority in Japan which is of the opinion that if the Soviet Union is to be eliminated as an important factor in the Far East that elimination must take place this year". February 26, however, was not an incident of this kind. Although many of the reforms demanded by the insurgents have been included in the program of the new Government†, a minority which believes that the elimination of the Soviet Union from the Far East must take place this year has not gained control. It is the responsible leaders of the Army who have increased their influence in governing Japan and it is they who have insisted with popular support upon the adoption of a more "positive policy" in foreign affairs. This "positive policy", as the Prime Minister explained it to me, means the acceleration of Japan's policies with respect to China and the USSR. It means that the old policies will be carried on more intensively but it is not a threat of imminent war. The present leaders of the Army may be counted upon not to advocate a war with Russia so long as the present disparity in military preparedness obtains. 14 Not printed. *Moscow's No. 45, February 13, 1936, 2 p. m., Strictly confidential. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed on p. 56.] +Embassy's despatch No. 1735, March 19, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed on p. 761.] #Embassy's 74, March 13, 1936, 7 p. m. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed on p. 759.] Moreover, the implications of the reported rapprochement between England and Soviet Russia and the Franco-Soviet pact have been noticed here; a typical comment is that of the Miyako Shimbun of March 2, "the pact will facilitate the execution of the Soviet's policy in the Far East". The pact may be said to provide the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister with powerful arguments in favor of prudence and patience in dealing with the USSR while it also provides the War Office with an additional argument for increased military strength. For the present the danger of war now appears little greater than before February 26, although, as heretofore, the discipline of the younger Japanese officers along the Manchurian frontier cannot be relied on with assurance.§ Taking a longer view, however, the situation seems more disquieting. The ordeal which Mr. Hirota went through before being enabled to form his Cabinet has demonstrated where a large measure of control now lies. The Army has committed Mr. Hirota to a more "positive policy"; it is urging upon him (as he told me himself |) an increase of the Japanese forces in Manchuria until they more nearly equal those of the Soviets across the border. This desideratum is freely voiced in the press as are other specific requirements. The following are said by the Domei news agency to be the General Staff's plans for expansion to commence with the 1937-1938 fiscal year: 1. Increase in the army in "Manchukuo" as the number of Japanese soldiers there is strikingly small compared with the 230,000 Soviet soldiers in the Far East. 2. Perfection of aviation and air defense. The Soviet Army has 4000 airplanes in contrast to but 1000 for the Japanese army. 3. Light machine guns, heavy machine guns, field guns and "infantry cannon", all inferior to those used by the Soviet Army, will be perfected and as many manufactured as possible. 4. Mechanized equipment will be perfected, for the Soviet Union is one of the leading powers of the world in this branch. Japan is said to have about one tenth as much mechanized equipment as the Soviet Union. 5. Perfection of preparations for chemical warfare is considered important. The above requirements, it is to be noted, are related to the materiel said to be in the possession of the Russians. Furthermore Mr. Hirota and Mr. Baba, the Finance Minister, are apparently pledged to raise the funds for a program of this nature. It is commonly accepted in Tokyo on the basis of Mr. Baba's own somewhat ambiguous statements that he will not seek to limit the defense appropriations as strictly as did Mr. Takahashi; 15 it is hinted that he holds office on §Mukden's 196, January 31, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not found in Department files.] || Embassy's 74, March 13, 1936, 7 p. m. [Footnote in the original.] Japanese Minister of Finance, assassinated on February 26. 919456-54-12 |