conversations with Mr. Arita had not resulted in any progress in settling the differences between Japan and China. Mr. Chang Ch'un told Sir Alexander there was still a lack of agreement in regard to a fundamental issue between the two Governments, but it seemed possible that some agreement in regard to various details might possibly be reached. Sir Alexander said that he had observed to Mr. Chang Ch'un that there were two ways of handling such a situation as exists between Japan and China; one way would be to try to reach a basic understanding and leave details for later consideration, while the other way would be to adjust such differences as could be adjusted, hoping thus to reach, ultimately, a settlement of the fundamental issue. To this Mr. Chang Ch'un had said that the second method seemed to be the only one feasible. I remarked that the fundamental issue which Mr. Chang Ch'un had referred to as still being a point of disagreement between Japan and China was probably the refusal of China to submit to Japanese tutelage, and Sir Alexander concurrred in this supposition. The British Ambassador said that he had talked with Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, and Mr. Suma had confirmed the general feeling that no progress had been made in the conversations between Mr. Arita and General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Chang Ch'un. In fact, Mr. Suma said, some of the outstanding questions which were formerly under negotiation had been "discarded" by the Chinese. Sir Alexander said that he had not been able to ascertain clearly what Mr. Suma meant by this statement. My own supposition is that Mr. Suma meant either that the Chinese had refused to carry to a conclusion some of the discussions which were in progress, or that Mr. Suma meant that the Chinese Government had repudiated some of the positions formerly taken by it. For example, the press has carried statements made by Japanese officials that the Chinese Government had "accepted" Mr. Hirota's "three principles", whereas published statements of Chinese leaders assert that these "three principles" have not been accepted by China, except as subjects for discussion. Sir Alexander inquired what I thought had been the result of the February 26 incident in Tokyo, that is, what phase of Japanese policy toward China had gained the ascendancy in the Japanese Government as the outcome of that incident. I replied that, while my impressions were all gathered at secondhand, I felt that the rather socialistic attitude toward alleged unequal distribution of wealth in Japan had gained some headway and that the plan to expand on the continent through military occupation of territory had probably become more firmly entrenched as the policy of the Japanese Government. Sir Alexander said that nothing important had happened since the February 26 incident in the way of Japanese military activi ties in north China, and I observed that I had heard several important Chinese express the opinion at the time the incident occurred that China might expect a lull of several months, until normality had been restored in the political scene in Tokyo. Sir Alexander said that it irritated him to hear Japanese complain of China's lack of friendship for Japan and he intimated that in his conversation with Mr. Suma he had pointed out the unreasonableness of expecting the Chinese to be friendly toward Japan so long as Japan maintained in power a puppet like Yin Ju-keng in the demilitarized zone of eastern Hopei Province, and did not take steps to prevent Japanese smuggling into Hopei Province. During our conversation I referred to a recent informal dissertation I had heard given by Mr. Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan, on what he termed the historic urge of Japan to expand on the Asiatic mainland. It was President Tai's opinion that this urge had existed for centuries, would continue to form Japanese foreign policy and would ultimately be the cause of the destruction of Japan. Sir Alexander said that it was all very well to talk about a mere "urge" to expand on the mainland, but doubtless Japan is in a desperate situation and must do something to improve it. This fact must be taken into account. I remarked that this office had recently prepared a translation of an editorial which appeared in a Nanking popular journal, drawing lessons for China. from the bold action of Germany in breaking the shackles of "unequal treaties". Sir Alexander said he feared that the writer of the editorial had not carried his argument to its logical conclusion and called attention to the fact that Germany has become powerful through discipline and energy, whereas China seems to remain perpetually an inert mass. I observed in regard to this that General Chiang seemed to be doing his best to create a powerful military machine and that he was reported to be sending large numbers of troops to the region of Haichow, north Kiangsu Province, in apparent fear that the Japanese might attempt to seize the Lung-Hai Railway. Sir Alexander said that he had heard of the Chinese apprehension that the Japanese might seek to seize this railway, beginning at the port of Haichow. I remarked that the editorial to which I had referred showed that Chinese are beginning to think of China in relation to the general international set-up. For example, they were drawing lessons from the demonstrated ability of Ethiopia, a nation at least as backward as China, to oppose Italy for many months and were beginning to wonder whether if China were to oppose Japan's encroachments actively, other nations would not think more highly of China and would not come to China's assistance. Such Chinese were speculating what would be the attitude of the leading nations, say Great Britain and the United States, if China should begin such active resistance. Sir Alexander said that "feelers" on this subject had been put to him and he had not hesitated to reply that the Chinese might expect nothing from Great Britain. I observed that the Chinese might feel themselves warranted in expecting some support from Great Britain, since that country had been, in public opinion, foremost in measures designed to place some restraint on Italy in its imperialistic schemes in Ethiopia. Sir Alexander replied that the Chinese ought to be able to see that the two situations are entirely different; in Europe it was possible for Great Britain to enlist the joint support of other nations, whereas in the Far East there would be no nation to join Great Britain in opposing Japan's encroachments on China. He pointed out that it would be impossible for Great Britain to exert any military strength of its own in the Far East. I assented to his general view and admitted that the nearest Great Power, the United States, would be extremely unlikely to take any part in the matter, since American participation in any war is enormously more expensive than participation by any other nation, and there were no American interests in China which would seem to warrant the colossal expenditure that past experience indicated would probably be necessary. Sir Alexander said that he was glad to have had his experience as Ambassador in China before taking up his new post of Deputy UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, although he felt that his experience in China had been too brief to give him a genuine insight into the problems here. I replied that I did not feel that this was the case, that Sir Alexander had acquired a thorough comprehension of the psychological factors which mould political events in the Far East and that the details were more or less inconsequential. Sir Alexander said he hoped to have an interesting talk in Tokyo with the British Ambassador there. Sir Alexander expressed the hope that if I should pass through London I would establish contact with him, so that our relations might be continued. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: WILLYS R. PECK Counselor of Embassy 793.94/7823: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, April 2, 1936-6 p. m. [Received 7:35 p. m.] 163. Paragraph 4 of the Embassy's 102, March 3, 11 a. m.31 31 Not printed. In this telegram the Embassy stated: "Angered by recent student activities, Sung Che Yuan has taken severe measures during the past few days, arresting more than 20 students and 3 professors allegedly for Communist leanings. . . . The arrested professors are understood not to be Communists but to have incited students to participate in recent student demonstrations." 1. Some tens of students among those arrested in late February and in March are still in custody. In addition to these, about 50 were arrested March 31 for participating in demonstration at Peiping National University in memory of the one student known to have died (of pneumonia) while in custody. The demonstrators numbered about 1,000 students from various universities. 2. The situation is quiet at present. Many students appear to be aware of the fact that if demonstrations get out of hand, the Japanese may use that as an excuse for interference in educational institutions on the ground that Communism is endangering them. It is reliably reported that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council is not taking steps to obtain control of the administration of the universities and is not interfering other than to arrest demonstrators and alleged agitators. The proposal for the establishment of an education committee under the Hopei-Chahar Political Council for control of education is not being pushed at present. 3. Of the three professors mentioned in the telegram referred to above, two have been released. The whereabouts of the other professor and his wife is not known. No students have been sent to Nanking for discipline. 4. It is possible that the student question may have serious implications for the future for the reasons that, (1), students are restless and dissatisfied and these factors are being made use of by communistic students, that (2), the Chinese authorities may make matters worse by inept handling, and that (3), the Japanese military, although they are merely watching the situation at present, may in the future make use of student troubles to aid their own interests in some way. By mail to Tokyo. JOHNSON 893.01 Outer Mongolia/88: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, April 2, 1936-6 p. m. [Received April 2-5: 45 p. m.] 164. Embassy's 160, April 1, 7 p. m.92 Tass report of April 2 under Moscow dateline states the Mongol forces repulsed the attack in the region of Tomsykbulak with heavy losses, driving the Japanese-Manchurian detachments back over the border. 32 Not printed. JOHNSON 893.01 Outer Mongolia/89: Telegram The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Moscow, April 3, 1936-9 a. m. [Received April 3-6:50 a. m.] 97. Last evening in the course of a conversation at which I was present, Voroshilov 33 said to Ohta, Japanese Ambassador, that although the Soviet Union desired peace any attack by Japan against Outer Mongolia would be met by an attack twice as severe. The Japanese Ambassador answered that the fighting on the Mongol-Manchurian frontier was not to be taken seriously; that it was due purely to the fact that the frontier was not clearly marked. Voroshilov replied that the frontier was extremely clearly marked and that the Soviet Union would repel any troops which might cross it. Ohta replied that the new commander of the Japanese Armies in Manchuria was a man who had the complete confidence of Hirota and that he anticipated no further difficulties. Voroshilov answered that he did anticipate further difficulties and that if war should break out soon Japan unquestionably would be defeated. BULLITT 793.94/7824: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, April 3, 1936—noon. [Received April 3-7:20 a. m.] 168. 1. Paragraph 4 of the Embassy's 135, March 16, 4 p. m., and 89, February 25, 5 p. m. Major General Takayoshi Matsumuro arrived March 28 from Tientsin to succeed Doihara as chief Japanese negotiator in North China and since then has been conversing at Tientsin with Sung Che Yuan and other Chinese leaders. The Embassy has been informed that Matsumuro is to establish a special military mission at Peiping which will be directly responsible to the Tokyo General Staff and not to the North China Garrison. Japanese allegations that Sino-Japanese affairs in North China are not to be directed by the Kwantung army lose significance because Matsumuro was formerly of the Kwantung army, is allegedly strongly reactionary and is understood to have obtained his present assignment as the result of representations made at Tokyo by the Kwantung army. 23 Soviet Commissar for Defense. |