there must be an actual wrongful act, and that mere intent alone is not enough. But the words which have been frequently misunderstood, if Lord Herschell is right, and which are at page 613 of 23 Q.B.D. are these: "Now intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse. Such intentional action when done without just cause or excuse is what the law calls a malicious wrong (see Bromage v. Prosser, Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty per Lord Blackburn.)' That is a statement without any qualification. But on the next page he says: "Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbidden; so is the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming always that there is no just cause for it"; and he remarks, "To the argument that a competition so pursued ceases to have a just cause or excuse when there is ill-will, or a personal intention to harm, it is sufficient to reply (as I have already pointed out) that there was here no personal intention to do any other or greater harm to the plaintiffs than such as was necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the defendant's ships the entire tea freights of the ports"; and on the following page he says: "This seems to assume that apart from fraud, intimidation. molestation, or obstruction, of some other personal right in rem or in personam, there is some natural standard of fairness ' or reasonableness' (to be determined by the internal consciousness of judges and juries) beyond which competition ought not in law to go. There seems to be no authority, and, I think, with submission, that there is no sufficient reason for such a proposition." Those passages seem to show that intentional action, which he mentions on page 613, did not bear the meaning of intentional action such as Lord Esher had held unlawful in Bowen v. Hall and in Temperton v. Russell. It may be noted that although Allen v Flood is supposed only to have decided that an act which does not in itself amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable merely because done with a bad motive, yet any person reading the judg ments would, I think, naturally come to the conclusion that the doctrine of traders having any special allowance given to them by the law, and, consequently, any idea of there being a conspiracy for trade interference, was intended to be overthrown by the rulings of the majority of the House of Lords. The judges and some of the Law Lords had based an elaborate argument upon a succession of cases starting from Keeble v. Hickeringill, a case of decoy shooting. That series of cases was examined with the greatest minuteness by Lord Herschell, and riddled. The deduction that might be drawn from it was, that not only had the question of motive been decided against as being of importance, but that also any special protection to traders had likewise gone. It is, therefore, from this point of view that the judgments in Quinn v. Leathem are so important. It may be noted that in deciding Allen v. Flood, Lord Herschell seems to have purposely had in his mind the possible effect that the judgment, as he intended it, would have in strikes and in labour competition. He begins (I am citing first of all at page 127) with these remarks: "It was said at the bar by the learned counsel for the respondents in answer to this difficulty, that there was an exception in favour of trade competition. I know of no ground for saying that such an exercise of individual right is treated with exceptional favour by the law. I shall revert to this point presently in connection with another branch of the respondent's argument.' Then he says at page 129: "I understood it to be admitted at the bar, and it was indeed stated by one of the learned judges in the Court of Appeal, that it would have been perfectly lawful for all the iron workers to leave their employment, and not to accept a subsequent engagement to work in the company of the plaintiffs'. At all events I cannot doubt that this would have been so. I cannot doubt either that the appellant or the authorities of the union would equally have acted within his, or their, rights, if he, or they, had called the men out.' They were members of the union. It was for them to determine whether they would become so or not, and whether they would follow or not follow the instructions of its authorities, though, no doubt, if they had refused to obey any instructions which under the rules of the union it was petent for the authorities to give, they might have lost the benefit they derived from membership. It

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is not for your Lordships to express any opinion, on the policy of trade unions, membership of which may undoubtedly influence the action of those who have joined them. They are now recognised by law; there 21 Mar. 1904. are combinations of employers as well as of employed. The members of these unions, of whichever class they are composed, act in the interest of their class. If they resort to unlawful acts they may be indicted or sued. If they do not resort to unlawful acts they are entitled to further their interests in the manner which seems to them best and most likely to be effectual." And at page 152, at the bottom, Lord Macnaghten says: "Against spite and malice the best safeguards are to be found in self-interest and public opinion. Much more harm than good would' be done by encouraging or permitting inquiries into motives when the immediate act alleged to have caused the loss for which redress is sought is in itself innocent or neutral in character, and one which anybody may do or leave undone without fear of legal consequences. Such an inquisition would, I think, be intolerable, to say nothing of the probability of injustice being done by juries in a class of cases in which there would be ample room for speculation and wide scope for prejudice. In order to prevent any possible misconstruction of the language 1 have used, I should like to add that, in my opinion, the decision of this case can have no bearing on any case which involves the element of oppressive combination. The vice of that form of terrorism commonly known by the name of boycotting, and other forms of oppressive com. bination, seems to me to depend on considerations which are, I think, in the present case conspicuously absent." Then at page 164, Lord Shand says: "The case" (that is, Temperton v. Russell) was one of competition in labour, which, in my opinion is in all essentials analagous to competition in trade, and to which the same principles must apply; and I ask myself what would be thought of the application of the word malicious to the conduct of a tradesman who induces the customer of another tradesman to cease making purchases from one with whom he had long dealt, and instead to deal with him, a rival in trade. The case before the jury was, in my view, in no way different, except that in the one case there was competition in labour-in the other there would be competition in trade." Lord Herschell alludes to the policy of trade unions, and practically in the first quotation seems to say that they may do things which other judges most distinctly seem to have held that they may not. Now when Quinn v. Leathem came up there was a case involving some very cruel boycotting; but still Allen v. Flood, having swept away the motive, made it difficult to see how, if acts not illegal in themselves were done by a number of persons acting in concert, those acts could be illegal. But the judges, in addition to any question of breach of contract, which alone, in so far as the headnote would apparently seem to suggest, was decided in Quinn v. Leathem (as harmless and mild a headnote, I suppose, as was ever on the top of a case of that character) had to find some method of dealing with the state of facts before them; and so they brought out, so it has been sometimes suggested, from the armoury of the law, this doctrine of conspiracy to injure, resting it upon the case, as the leading case, of Gregory v. The Duke of Brunswick; and further, in some of the judgments of the Law Lords, it appears as if the doctrine of trade interference which had been so attacked in Allen v. Flood, was once more revived and was still held to be good law. Certainly since Quinn v. Leathem, an opinion, which I quote merely for the purpose of showing what the opinion of the time was, it having been written in 1898, would not hold good at the present time. This was the view that a writer held in 1898 upon what Allen v. Flood showed; it is as follows: "So much for the questions of general law raised in this case. Let us now turn to its special bearing on trade unions. The first point to notice is that henceforth trades unions and the employers' federations will within the limits of the law have a free hand as to strikes and lock-outs. This, I believe, is the first unequivocal judicial declaration that operatives incur no civil liability in striking or in notifying a strike, whatever may be the case. The doctrine put forward, and now rejected, would have conferred upon the judges complete civil jurisdiction over them in these respects. For, of course, intentional damage to traders is a necessary element of every strike, and the only question would be whether the damage was done without just cause or excuse, and of this the court would be the judges.

members of the union except perhaps in some remote and indirect way, but directly and primarily for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff." Of course, on that last point of directly and primarily endeavouring to injure the plaintiff arises the question of whether that can be done, whether without doing something that might give rise to that possibility, or appearance of possibility, anything can be done in a strike with any satisfactory results for the object of the strike--or rather that there is a risk, and all these cases show that there is a risk, of the men or the leaders of men in any strike being brought before the Courts and its being put as to whether they were doing it for the purpose of advancing their own interests, or for the purpose of injury only, without its being defined what that injury was.

156. (Chairman.) Will you give us the citation in Giblan's case ?-18 Times Law Reports, page 501. That wording is taken from The Times Law Reports, and that was when the case was before Mr. Justice Walton; afterwards his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, but this is simply a question which has nothing to do with the reversal of the legal decision which he was putting before the jury. One may compare with what Mr. Justice Walton says, to show the difficulty, what Lord Justice Kay said in Lyons v. Wilkins (1889, 1 Ch. 832); he made these remarks: "If they" (the Executive Committee of the Trade Union)" by any means prevent Schoenthal working for Messrs. Lyons, that is an illegal act. They have conspired together and combined to take means to prevent somebody from working for Messrs Lyons, who otherwise would do so. No Act of Parliament justifies that. It would have been illegal before this Act. There is nothing in this Act which justifies it, and it is illegal still." I cite that simply to show the difficulty that men are under in knowing what the law is upon the subject. I think I am right in saying that at any rate I do not remember any single case in which upon the grounds of advancement of the interests of labour the men have won, and there have been a great many cases before the Courts.

157. (Mr. Sidney Webb.) Is not that because the ordinary objects of a trade union have never been, I think, admitted by the judges, as for the advancement of labour? -I think that is quite a correct statement.

158. The object of the trade union is to maintain a standard rate, and I do not think that has yet been admitted in court, although it has by the political economists, as a valid object of public policy?—I think if you take Lord Lindley's dictum with regard to what strikes are, at the beginning of Lyons v. Wilkins, it shows clearly that he applies it to a much smaller circle.

159. Is not that really that the judges are still expounding the political economy of the 18th century in the 20th century?-Well, I should not like to give an opinion upon that.

160. (Chairman.) May I interpose here? It seems to me that when you said that the men had never won upon the ground that the trade union was promoting the advancement of labour, and then Mr. Webb asked you a question as to the objects of trade unions as interpreted by the judges you were rather meaning different things? I take it that in a case it is not the object of the trade union which may justify it, but it is the object of the particular action of the trade union, which is rather a different thing? -Yes; I see the difference you are pointing out.

161. Am I not pointing out the difference which goes to the root of what you said when you said you knew no case in which the men had won upon the ground of justification through an anxiety to promote the interests of

labour?-Then it comes in the end to somewhat the same thing, because almost all the possible actions the trade unions could follow in the course of a strike have been brought before the courts, and not one of them has been held to be such as could be employed in the interests of labour so as to justify the union in what they did.

162. (Sir Godfrey Lushington.) Do you think Allen v. Flood was not a case in which full justice was done to the interests of trade unions ?-That was not a case of competition between parties; if it was a case of competition, then as Lord Herschell says, the majority held that the man was not liable, and, I think, certainly in that case the action of Allen was defended.

163. (Mr. Sidney Webb.) Surely in Allen v. Flood there was no question of trade union action at all, because it was expressly decided on the ground that there was no conspiracy?-Exactly.

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164. Therefore that is not a case; but further, would it not be right to say that no action by a number of men in order to maintain the standard of life has been held justified in these recent cases ?-I think that is so. Of course, 24 Mar. 1904 it may be answered to that that the cases which have been brought before the court have been very badly selected cases, and on the suggestion that they are badly selected cases attempts have been made to draw a difference between them, and to show that there are certain elements in what has been called justification which are necessary, and that none of these cases with regard to the men, as one might say, can be referred to any financial gain. 165. But have not those attempts always proceeded on the assumption that financial gain was a necessary ingredient of the advancement of labour ?-I am inclined to think that that is so.

166. Is there any justification whatever in history or economics for suggesting that pecuniary advantage is the only form in which the interests of labour can be advanced ?—Now you are taking me into economics and political economy; I am inclined prima facie to agree with you.

167. (Sir Godfrey Lushington.) I will ask you a legal question do you say that the courts have ever expressed an opinion that it is impolitic or wrong for workmen to combine to raise their standard of life or to ameliorate their condition in any way? Have they ever said so ?— No, I do not think so.

168. Is not this what they have decided, that where these motives have really actuated the parties, or it is professed that they have actuated the parties, wrong steps-illegal steps-have been taken to carry out those objects ?-In the majority of cases I should say yes.

169. All the cases have gone against the trade unions— that you say?—Yes.

170. But it is on that ground, it is not on the impropriety of their combining to improve their position ?— Not on the mere fact of the combination to improve their position-no.

171. (Mr. Sidney Webb.) Would you say that combining to improve their position was an unknown object of a trade union ?—No, I do not think so.

172. Is not maintaining the standard of life part of the object of every trade union ?—I should say so.

173. And that of course is much more than combining among the men to improve their own condition ?-I do not quite follow that.

174. Is not the object of the trade union to maintain the standard of life for the whole trade, and is not that much more than the attempt of any particular combination of men to advance their own standard ?—I agree to that.

175. (Chairman.) Will you proceed now with your statement ?-Perhaps I might shortly give you some notes, for which I am indebted chiefly to the ideas of Mr. Chalmers-Hunt, who has written some articles on the subject, as to how he endeavours to separate these cases. These are words which are practically the same as he uses, namely, "The Mogul case decides that a concerted attack by a shipping combine against shipowners not within the ring, both parties concerned plying for hire on a certain line or route for a certain class of business by such means as reducing the rates of freight, compelling or inducing shippers to deal only with them and agents to act only for them, is not an illegal or oppressive combination; not a single act throughout the whole proceedings was resorted to which was not in any way pre-eminently calculated to effect the desired object; a direct and actually existing opposition of interest was there; and nothing was done which was not purely incidental to the successful appropriation of other persons' chances." That is the way in which the Mogul case is put.

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176. (Mr. Cohen.) There is no mention of oppressive combination"; the word was not used in the Mogul case ?-It is not an illegal or oppressive combination." 177. I think you will find that "oppressive combination " was not used at that time at all?-I daresay not. These are not my words. "Temperton v. Russell, 1893, decides that a concerted attack in support of the time work system of labour is oppressive and illegal. The loss was inflicted to enable an unknown proportion of the persons combining to obtain a purely uncertain advantage as against the rest of the persons combining

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That would mean that it was not referable to pecuniary gain at all. "Allen v. Flood specifically decides that for a person to report that an aggressive operation of two or 24 Mar. 1904. more acting in combination will take place on a given contingency, he not having identified himself in fact by his previous conduct or otherwise with the aggressive intention of the combiners, is not illegal. Quinn v. Leathem decided that a concerted intimidation of a trader with a view to injuring another trader under circumstances from which it cannot be inferred that the aggression would achieve any present advantage or at any rate any tangible advantage at all, for the combination is aggressive, illegal, and actionable. Giblan's case was a case in which there was a mere intention to make a man pay his debts, and Gregory v. The Duke of Brunswick was a case in which there was only a mere intention to further the cause of morality and propriety."

178. Those are the views of Mr. Chalmers Hunt ?— -Yes.

179. Are they your views ?-Not with regard to Gregory v. Brunswick. He also alludes to the conduct of the iron workers in Allen v. Flood and he suggests various elements such as time, space, the vicariousness of attacks, the question of indirect attacks, and various types of oppression which may or may not be allowed and the relative proximity of result, all those elements that may be very interesting to discuss and to work out in a Court of Law, but which people in the ordinary conduct of everyday life might find very difficult to decide upon which side of the line the case was, or to use Lord Justice Bowen's words in the Mogul case :- -"The good sense of the tribunal which had to decide would have to analyse the circumstancos and discover on which side of the line each case feli." The difficulty of discovering on which side of the line each case fell is still more clearly brought out in the judgment of Lord Justice Romer in Giblan's case. I have taken these words from 19 Times Law Reports 710, and there Lord Justice Romer says: "But, although I think there is no difficulty in stating the law, I fully realise that considerable difficulty may often arise in particular cases in ascertaining what is a justification' within the meaning of my statement."

180. (Sir Godfrey Lushington.) That is justification for inducing a breach of contract ?-That is so. "As to this I can only say that regard must be had to the circumstances of each case as it arises and that it is not practically feasible to give an exhaustive definition of the word to cover all cases, and I would refer to what I have already said on a similar point in the judgment I have just delivered in the case of The Glamorganshire Coal Company v. The South Wales Miners' Federation (that is at page 707 of the same volume.) "I will only add that I do not think any excessive practical difficulty would arise in directing a jury on the point in any particular case, and I may refer as illustrating this to the direction given to the jury by Lord Justice FitzGibbon in the case of Quinn v. Lea hem (1901 A.C. 500). In the case now before

us I cannot say that I feel any difficulty in applying the law as regards the defendant Toomey, for, on the facts I have simply to determine whether two or more persons who have special power by virtue of their position to carry out their design are justified in combining to prevent, and in fact preventing, a workman from obtaining any employment in his trade or calling, to his injury, merely because they wish to compel him to pay a debt due from him."

181. (Mr. Cohen.) Have you got the last paragraph, as it would be very useful to add that:-" But I should be sorry to leave this case without observing that in my opinion it was not essential in order for the plaintiff to succeed that he should establish a combination of two or more persons to do the acts complained of. In my judgment if a person who, by virtue of his position or influence has power to carry out his design, sets himself to the task of preventing and succeeds in preventing a man from obtain ing or holding employment in his calling, to his injury, by reason of threats to or special influence upon the man's employers, or would-be employers, and the design was to carry out some spite against the man or had for its object to compel him to pay a debt or any similar object not directly connected with the acts against the man, then that person is liable to the man for the damage consequently suffered. The conduct of that person would be in my opinion such unjustifiable molestation of the man, such an improper and inexcusable interference with

the man's ordinary rights of citizenship as to make him liable in an action.":

(Witness.) I have called attention to the principal cases which more or less show the principles which will come up for the consideration of the Commission, and I think now I might quite shortly draw attention to some of the other cases so that any important point may not be considered to have been overlooked. The first one I have here is Jenkinson v. Nield (8 T.L.R. 540) "Action by a working tailor against the president of a branch of the Master Tailor's Association for publishing a black-list of names of working tailors which included the plaintiff's name, asking all master tailors not to employ the persons whose names were in the list. Held by the County Court Judge and a Divisional Court, Matthew and A. L. Smith, Lord Justices, that there was no evidence that the defendants were actuated by any other motive than self-interest. If that were so and they were not desirous of injuring the plaintiff, that was not actionable." The next case is Trollope and Brothers v. The London Building Trades Federation and others in 1895 (72 Law Times New Series, page 342). It was tried in consequence of a dispute with reference to the alleged preferential employment of non-union men by Messrs. Trollope. The Federation published a poster headed "Trollope's black-list" containing the names of nonunion men employed by the firm and also certain workmen who had remained working for the firm although others called out by the Federation had left their employment. Messrs. Trollope and some workmen named in this black-list brought an action against the Federation and others, claiming an injunction and damages. An interlocutory injunction was granted against the defendants, their officers, agents, and servants and the other defendants by name only, and this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. At the trial the Federation did not appear, and the other defendants admitted the publication of the black-list, but pleaded that its publication was justified by the law, that every statement in it was true, in fact, that it was published without malice and in the legitimate and bona fide interests of the association of which they were officials. The Jury found that the black-list was not published bona fide for the purpose of promoting the interests of the association, but maliciously. to compel Messrs. Trollope to dismiss two of their workmen or others who were under contracts to serve them, that it was published vindictively, that it was calculated to injure and did injure Messrs, Trollope financially. Judg. ment was given for £500 damages and the injunction was made perpetual. The next case I may mention occurred in 1898: Huttley v. Simmons, the cab driver's case; I have already spoken about it. It was before Mr. Justice Darling and that was decided when it was supposed that it was governed by Allen v. Flood, and I only mention it now to call attention to the fact that it was very strongly criticised both by Lord Lindley and by Lord Brampton in Quinn v. Leathem (1901 A.C. 540).

182. (Sir William Lewis.) There was no appeal upon that, was there ?—No, it is not very well reported, but it seems fairly plain that the Judge considered himself bound by what he interpreted Allen v. Flood to mean. In 1900 there was the case of Boots v. Grundy, 1900 (82 Law Times 769). That was a case in the printing trade where Mr. Justice Bigham and Mr. Justice Phillimore differed. The case is chiefly interesting for the careful summing up of the law of conspiracy by Mr. Justice Phillimore; he held that the case was within the law as he laid it down, and Mr. Justice Bigham held that it was not.

183. Were there any further proceedings in that ?— No, it ended there. I have already alluded to Bulcock's case which is another black-listing case and Giblan's case has also been mentioned. The point in Giblan's case was that the Jury found that the action complained of, namely, attempting to prevent an obnoxious workman from getting employment or retaining his employment, was taken by the general secretary and the local secretary of the trade union in order to compel him to pay certain money he owed to the trade union, and by the general secretary, but not the local secretary, in order to punish the plaintiff for not paying this money. The judge at the trial held that the general secretary of the trade union, in calling out the plaintiff's fellow-workmen as he did, not for the purpose of protecting or advancing the interests of the trade union,

but merely for the purpose of punishing the plaintiff for not paying the arrears of his defalcations, had acted outside the scope of his authority as an officer of the union, and that the union was not responsible for this action of their general secretary, but this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal. That court held that a combination of two or more without justification, to injure a workman by inducing employers not to employ him or to continue to employ him, is actionable. Persons who have special power to carry out their design are not justified in preventing a workman from obtaining employment merely because they wish to compel him to pay a debt due from him. Here the defendants intended to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining employment in order to compel him to pay a debt due to the union. The union and the other two defendants were all parties to wrongful acts in interfering with the plaintiff's right to dispose of his labour as he chose. The union in general meeting adopted the acts of the two secretaries who acted for the benefit of the union and in the union's service; therefore the union was liable as well as the other defendants.

184. That was to prevent a man getting employment, was it not?—It was to make him pay a debt; that was the idea in Giblan's case. There was a case to which I do not know that any importance need be attached, because it is very badly reported, of Thomas v. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, which was tried at Manchester on April 19th, 1902, before Mr. Justice Wills. One report of it may be found in The Times, 28th April, 1902, and another is in the Labour Gazette, for May, 1902, at page 132. The facts were shortly these: The boycotted workman's alleged offence was his having worked in a shop not recognised by the union, and the jury found that the guiding motive of the action taken by the defendants was not to promote the interests of the trade union and its members, but to punish the plaintiff for having taken piece-work under the circumstances. In neither case was there held to exist sufficient justification for the boycotting proved to have taken place, and the boycotting was accordingly in each case held to have constituted an actionable wrong. The Tallow conspiracy case was decided in Ireland in November, 1902, and shows that a conspiracy to induce persons not to deal with a tradesman is good ground for an action for damages by the boycotted tradesman where such conspiracy is found to be malicious, and that if the intention is to punish conduct on the part of the plaintiff, considered harsh and tyrannical by the defendants, that fact constitutes no sufficient justification. It is to be remarked that in this case the Lord Chief Baron refused to leave to the jury the question whether the object of the defendants had not been to produce a change in the land laws of Ireland.

185. (Sir Godfrey Lushington.) What is the reference to that?-Where I find it reported is in The Times, November 13th and 14th, 1902 and also June 5th and 9th, 1903. I have not checked it with the Irish Law Reports. A case in which the facts were of a similar nature was decided at the Sligo Quarter Sessions on February 2nd, 1903, the Kilmatigue conspiracy case.

186. (Mr. Cohen.) Was that case before the sessions only?—That was at Sligo Quarter Sessions.

187. (Sir Godfrey Lushington) What is the reference to that?-The Times of the next day, February 2nd, 1903.

188. (Mr. Cohen.) Was the Tallow conspiracy case an action to recover damages ?—I think so.

189. (Chairman.) These are both pure and simple boycotting cases?—Yes, neither of these last two cases was a trade union case or in furtherance of a trade dispute. 190. The man boycotted in the Tallow case happened to be a tradesman, but it was not a trade union case ?-No. 191. (Sir Godfrey Lushington.) The trade union cases are all determined by the general law of conspiracy and not by trade union law ?-Yes. The next case, and the last on points of this kind is the Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries, Limited v. The Yorkshire Miners' Association and others. That case is reported, the closing day, in The Times of February 9th, 1904, and in the Labour Gazette of March, 1904, page 71. As it is at present under appeal it has not yet got into the Law Reports, and I take this from the Labour Gazette 'By the rules of the anion its funds and property could

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only be dealt with as provided in the rules; Rule 4 vested the government of the union in a council, consisting of a president, general secretary, financial secretary, agent, treasurer,and one experienced member. A delegate was elected in 24 Mar. 1904. each branch who was a member of the council of that branch and also a member of the general council of the union. Rule 7 provided for the management of each local branch by a council of not less than five or more than nine members. Rule 64 enacted that if members of any branch had grievances affecting their wages, hours of work, etc., and if the grievances were not remedied, and after all proper and peaceful means had been tried to effect a settlement by deputations with the advice and assistance of the council, such members should be permitted to cease work by sanction of the union in accordance with the rules, and should receive strike pay. Rule 72 provided that no branch should be allowed to strike, unless the strike were sanctioned by two-thirds of the members of the branch; that the question of striking should be determined by ballot; the votes to be obtained at a special meeting of the branch called for the purpose; but in no case should a vote be legal unless three-fourths of the members of the branch recorded their votes, and two-thirds of the votes were in favour of the strike.

On behalf of the plaintiffs, it was argued that the Denaby and Cadeby branches had struck in defiance of the rules; that the union had paid large sums of money to men wrongfully on strike, contrary to the rules, and so prolonged the strike to the detriment of the plaintiffs; that the officers of the union sued were personally responsible for their acts in breaking the rules and encouraging the men to stay out; that the two local delegates were members and agents of the council of the union, and the union were liable for their acts; and that all the defendants had conspired to bring about or maintain an illegal strike. For the defendants it was contended that although the men came out illegally on 30th June, they might properly have given fourteen days' notice on 29th June, and by 12th July their contracts would have come to an end, therefore damages could only be recovered (if at all) in respect of that period of fourteen days; that the local delegates were not agents of the council so as to make the union responsible for anything done by them without authority; that the resolution of the council of 14th July had placed the union in a perfectly lawful position; that the union were doing nothing illegal in paying strike pay; and that personally the officials of the union (other than the delegates) had done no more than advise the men not to enter into certain contracts, which advice they were legally entitled to give.

The following questions were left to the jury-(1 and 2). Did the two delegates, or either and which of them, unlawfully and maliciously procure the men to break their contracts of employment by going out on strike on 29th June without giving notice? If yes, then were the delegates, or either of them, in so doing purporting to act as agents of the union and for its benefit? (3 and 4) Did the members of the committees of the Denaby and Cadeby branches, or any of them, unlawfully and maliciously procure the men to break their contracts of employment by going out on strike on 29th June without giving notice? If yes, then were the members of the committee in so doing purporting to act as agents of the union and for its benefit? (5) Did the union by its executive council, or by its officials, ratify the acts of the two delegates or the members of the committees in so procuring the men to break their contracts! (6) Did the union by its officials or by the members of the committees of the branches maintain, or assist in maintaining the strike by unlawful means-that is to say: (a) by molesting or intimidating men who were working for the plaintiffs with a view of inducing them to cease from so working; (b) by inducing, or attempting to induce, men, who were willing to enter into contracts of service with the plaintiffs, or to work for them, to refrain from so doing; (c) by the grant of strike pay against the rules of the union? (7) Did certain of the defendants named, maintain, or assist in maintaining, the strike by any of the above-mentioned unlawful means? (8) Did the defendants, or any, and which of them, conspire with each other, or with men in the employ of the plaintiffs, to do any and which of the things in Question 6? (9) Did the defendants, or any and which of them, unlawfully and maliciously conspire together, and with men formerly in the employ of the plaintiffs, to molest and injure the plaintiffs in the carrying on of their business, and were the