of such withdrawal, unless it appeared that taking judgment against the corporation for when the plaintiff [first] gave credit to the their entire claim;-Held, that they could not, division he did not know that the defendant upon the insolvency of the corporation, go was a member. Tenny v. N. E. Protective against the partnership for any part of their Union, &c., 37 Vt. 64.

claim.

Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425. 74. The plaintiff, an attorney, had been re- 80. Where a change takes place in the memtained generally for the defendants, while part- bership of a firm, and the account with a ners, in all their business. C, one of the de- customer goes on as one continuous, open and fendants, sold out all his interest to the others current account, or the old balance is carried and retired from the firm. The plaintiff, on forward and blended in the general account the application of the other defendants, brought with other transactions, and he makes payments a suit in the name of the firm upon a cause of generally on the account, for the purpose of action existing before the dissolution, and reducing the general balance, such payments, rendered services therein. He knew that C had the rights of third persons and sureties not retired from the firm, but it did not appear that being affected, will be first applied to the exhe knew of the details, or that C had parted tinguishment of the earliest accounts. Morgan with his interest in the assets. In an action to v. Tarbell, 28 Vt. 498. recover for such services;-Held, that C was liable with the other defendants. Cahoon v. Hobart, 38 Vt. 244.

81. A surviving partner is not bound by the agreement of his deceased partner, to apply upon a partnership demand his individual 75. A and B, the plaintiffs, were partners indebtedness,—the application not having been in the ownership and running of a saw-mill. in fact made. Stearns v. Houghton, 38 Vt. A sold his half of the mill and lumber on hand, 583.

but not his half of the partnership accounts. 82. Certain promissory notes belonging to a These he left with an attorney for collection, partnership, though made payable to one of and absconded. B notified the defendant, a the partners who afterwards deceased with the debtor of the partnership, to pay no one but notes in his possession, passed into the hands himself, and demanded the accounts of the of the defendant as his administrator. Held, attorney, which the attorney refused to surren- that the defendant was liable to the surviving der. B then brought this suit in the name of partner in trover, for refusal to deliver the A & B, after which the defendant paid his debt notes on demand. Ib.

V. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES.

1. Between the partners.

to said attorney, taking from him a release, of which A was informed and he approved it. Held, that such payment and release were not a bar to the suit. Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 346. 76. Change of membership. The death of a member of a partnership designed to be 83. Action at law. In a partnership of continuing and to have perpetuity, as a division three, two cannot sue the third at law, for of the N. E. Protective Union, does not work property of the firm received by him, although a dissolution of the partnership. Tenney v. charged to him on the partnership books. Judd N. E. Protective Union, &c., 37 Vt. 64.

v. Wilson, 6 Vt. 185.

84. No action at law lies on a contract with a partnership of which the plaintiff is a memEstes v. Whipple, 12 Vt. 373.

77. The formation of a new partnership, alone, is no evidence of a dissolution of a previous one existing between some members of the ber. new firm; but the discontinuance of the busi- 85. ness of an old firm and the formation of a new one, who succeed in business at the same store, does tend to prove a dissolution. Southwick v. Allen, 11 Vt. 75.

Assumpsit will not lie by one partner against another, to recover an unliquidated and unsettled balance of a partnership business. Spear v. Newell, 13 Vt. 288.

86. If partners, by an express agreement, 78. Where the defendant's dealings with a separate a distinct matter from the partnership former firm are, by his consent, caried into the dealing, and one expressly agrees to pay the accounts of a succeeding firm and charged to other a specific sum for that matter, assumpsit him, they become proper matters for adjust-will lie on that contract, although the matter ment in the action of book account between arose from their partnership dealing. Collamer the second firm and the defendant. Eaton v. v. Foster, 26 Vt. 754. Whitcomb, 17 Vt. 641.

87. - in chancery. To settle and adjust

79. Where the property and liabilities of a | a partnership, and to recover from a partner partnership had become merged in a succeeding who has received none of the avails of the concorporation and the partnership extinguished, cern, a balance due to make up losses, a bill in and the orators had for some two years dealt chancery is the only remedy. Spear v. Newell, with the parties on this basis, transferring the 13 Vt. 288.

partnership account to the corporation and 88. Winding up of a "union store" in

chancery. Stimson v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 91. Henry to the shop at J, and to paying A the one-half. v. Jackson, 37 Vt. 431. Miner v. Pierce, 38 Vt. 610.

89. Account, and accounting. In an 95. Special cases. The covenant of one action of account to settle the affairs of a part-partner to the other, to pay all the partnership nership engaged in the business of buying and debts with the avails of the partnership propselling wool;-Held, that the several partners erty after the expiration of the partnership, is were entitled to interest on the money advanced discharged by a joint sale of all the partnerin the business, from the time it was advanced. ship property before dissolution, where the Hodges v. Parker, 17 Vt. 242. covenantee alone receives the pay, and by an 90. In an action of account between partners, assignment to the covenantee, after dissolution, the plaintiff was held entitled to charge a reason-of all the covenantor's interest in the partnerable compensation for his services in closing up ship. Austin v. Cummings, 10 Vt. 26. the business of the firm after its dissolution, 96. Where one partner, not well acquainted although there was no agreement to that effect, with the affairs of the firm, purchased of the and although, by the terms of co-partnership, other a part of his interest, and gave a note he was not to receive compensation for services therefor, on the false representations of the during its continuance. Bradley v. Chamberlin, latter, afterwards discovered to be fraudulent, 16 Vt. 613. as to the value of such interest, the firm being

91. Where, on the dissolution of a partner-in fact insolvent at the time, and so the interest ship, one partner agreed to collect the partner- purchased worthless;-Held, that such facts ship demands, and divide after deducting "all were a defense to the note, and this without an expenses and costs of collecting," and he sent offer to rescind; for, there being no residuum out his clerk for this purpose and paid the clerk after payment of debts, the purchase was of a only his customary wages during the time;- thing which did not exist, and therefore could Held, that such partner was not entitled to not be restored. Smith v. Smith, 30 Vt. 139. claim any larger sum, on the ground that such 97. P and K dissolved their partnership, clerk's services would have been worth more to K taking the partnership property and giving him, if the clerk had remained in his indi- P a note for $938, and agreeing to pay all vidual employment. Porter v. Wheeler, 37 Vt. partnership liabilities. K afterwards failed, 281. leaving the partnership liabilities unpaid to

92. A partner is liable to make up, in his the amount of $1,500, and informed P that he accounting with the partnership, for losses could not pay them, and that P must. Finally, occasioned by his diversion of the funds, and upon K's proposal, P agreed to pay K $700 for his fraud and unfaithfulness occasioning upon being indemnified by certain persons loss. Pierce v. Daniels, 25 Vt. 624. named against such partnership liabilities. K

93. A, B, C and D entered into an arrange- procured the indemnity proposed, and paid P ment to purchase a patent right, to pay equally the balance of the note after deducting the towards the purchase, and each to own one- $700, and P surrendered to him the note and quarter of the patent right, and to share equally discharged the mortgage given to secure it. in the profits and loss upon sales. The pur- Held, that the indemnity was a sufficient conchase was made by one of the associates, who sideration for the compromise, and that, in the falsely represented the price paid by him to be absence of fraud on the part of K, P could greater than the truth was, and the other asso- not recover the $700, as due upon the note, ciates contributed towards the purchase accord- or otherwise. Parmenter v. Kingsley, 45 Vt. ing to the report so falsely made. Upon a bill 362.

in chancery for settlement of the partnership 98. K, the plaintiff, one of the partnership and for an account;-Held, that, upon the of B and K, engaged in the manufacture adjustment of the accounts, such over-pay- and sale of slate mantels, sold his interest in ments were a proper charge in favor of the the business and property of the firm, includparties making them, so as to make the parties ing debts due, to the defendant, upon condition equal in the purchase. Penniman v. Munson, that the property sold should remain the 26 Vt. 164. property of the plaintiff until paid for, and 94. A and B were co-partners and equal until the liabilities of that firm, which the owners in trade, having a shop at J and one at defendant assumed, should be paid. B retained W. The business at J was managed by B his interest in the business and kept along alone. From that business A never received in it as partner with the defendant. The anything, and B showed no losses, but the defendant, with the consent and concurrence effects there had been expended. All the effects of B and in the usual course of business, sold at W had gone into the business and to pay a portion of said property, without having partnership debts. On a bill to settle the part- fully paid for his purchase and without having nership ;-Held, that B could not object to paid any of the liabilities of K & B, not being charged with the value of the goods taken intending at the time to appropriate the avails

thereof contrary to his agreement; but, subse-ner, the defendant may set off a claim against quently, he did appropriate such avails to his the plaintiff individually, unless it appears that private use, and abandoned the business. partnership creditors have a lien upon the Held, that the defendant was not liable in balance of the plaintiff's account. trover for the property so sold. Fox, 45 Vt. 348.

Meader v. Kellogg v. Leslie, 2 Vt. 569. Meader v. Scott, 4 Vt. 26. 31 Vt. 565.

99. The defendants, T and D, gave their bond 108. Individual contract. An order to E, the plaintiff, conditioned to indemnify drawn upon a firm for the funds which the him against all claims, &c., due from the firm drawer had in the firm, directing the firm to of E, T and D, among which were certain notes pay the plaintiff whatever they, or either memof this firm to the firm of E and L. The notes ber of the firm, might have in possession, was having fallen due, E & L charged them to the accepted by the defendant, one of the partners, private account of E, with his consent, and individually, he having the control and managegave them up to him. Held, that this was a ment of the business out of which the money payment of the notes by the plaintiff, and that was expected to come. Held, that the defendthe defendants were liable to him upon the ant was individually liable on his acceptance, bond, his being a member of both partner- either on a special count, or for money had and ships not affecting the question. Emerson v. received. Prentiss v. Foster, 28 Vt. 742. Torrey, 10 Vt. 323.

2. As to third persons.

PATENT.

100. Joinder of parties. Where one member of a partnership contracts separately, and Where a patented invention is only a new and so declares, he cannot afterwards in a suit combination of old materials before in use, it against him object that his co-partner is not is not an infringement to use one or all the joined, though such partner may have been materials forming the composition, and for the interested in the contract. Goddard v. Brown, same purpose, provided they are not used in 11 Vt. 278. the combination patented; nor is it an infringe

PAUPER.

101. Where one member of a partnership ment to use them in combination with some makes a contract, and the partnership is not other material—the difference not being merely disclosed nor known to the other party, but colorable. Byam v. Eddy (U. S. C. C.), 24 credit is given to such partner alone, he may be Vt. 666. sued without joining the other partners. Blin v. Pierce, 20 Vt. 25. Hagar v. Stone, 20 Vt. 106. Cleveland v. Woodward, 15 Vt. 302. 102. Where a contract is made with one of several partners by one who is not aware of the partnership, but supposes he is contracting only with the individual, such partner may maintain an action upon the contract in his own name; or, he may bring it in the name of all the partners. Curtis v. Belknap, 21 Vt. 433. 103. One who is a nominal and ostensible partner may be joined as plaintiff, although he has no interest in the firm. Waite v. Dodge, 34 Vt. 181.

104. A partner whose "name was not known nor used in the business of the firm," was held to be a dormant partner. Waite v. Dodge.

105. A dormant partner may, or may not, be joined as plaintiff in a suit, and the joinder or omission is no ground for abatement, nonsuit, or writ of error. Ib. Lapham v. Green, 9 Vt. 407. Hilliker v. Loop, 5 Vt. 116. Morton v. Webb, 7 Vt. 123.

106. Joinder of claims. A plaintiff may join, in one action, his individual claims with those he has as a surviving partner. Wood v. Insurance Co. 31 Vt. 565.

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

OVERSEers of the Poor.
SETTLEMENT.

1. In one's own right.

2. By derivation.

3. Act of 1801.

REMOVAL Of Pauper.

1. Who are subject to removal.

2. Order of removal.

3. Appeal.

4. Pleadings.

5. Validity and effect of order.

EXPENSES FOR RELIEF OF PAUPER.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AND BETWEEN
Kindred.

VI. WRONGFUL TRANSPORTATION OF PAU

PER.

VII. CERTAIN CONTRACTS.

I. OVERSEERS OF THE POOR.

1. Binding out pauper. Authority of overseers of the poor to bind out pauper children as apprentices, under the statute of 1797. 107. In an action by one as surviving part- Warner v. Swett, 7 Vt. 446. 22 Vt. 580.

2. Overseers, in binding out to apprentice- the support of the child, could not interfere ship a pauper child, have no authority to bind with the plaintiff's custody of the child. Ib. the town by a covenant for faithful service of 11. Pauper in jail. An actual committhe apprentice for the term. Baldwin v. Rupert, ment to jail of a pauper, casts upon the jailer 8 Vt. 256. and overseer of the poor, after the requisite 3. Binding town by contract. Overseers notice, the duty of providing for his support; may bind the town by contract for the support and this duty is not dependent upon the legalof the poor; and one of them, requested by the ity of the process on which he stands comothers to take charge of a particular pauper, mitted. Newfane v. Dummerston, 34 Vt. 184. may contract for his support so as to bind the 12. Overseer's book. A book of accounts town. Washington v. Rising, Brayt. 188. kept by an overseer of the poor, under the

4. The selectmen and overseers of the poor requirements of G. S. c. 20, s. 33, showing the cannot bind the town by contract to pay for the expenditures for the poor, was held to be origisupport of a pauper having a legal settlement nal evidence, in behalf of the town, of the fact in such town, beyond the sum of five dollars, of an expenditure for a particular pauper. without an order from a justice of the peace, Cabot v. Walden, 46 Vt. 11.

in pursuance of section 20 of the pauper act of

1797. Ives v. Wallingford, 8 Vt. 224.

5. Otherwise, in case of a transient pauper. Harrington v. Alburgh, 14 Vt. 132.

6. An overseer of the poor has authority to employ counsel, at the charge of the town, to give legal advice and assistance in the matter of paupers, their removal, &c. Burton v. Norwich, 34 Vt. 345.

II. SETTLEMENT.

1. In one's own right.

13. Act of 1779. A legal settlement was acquired in a town by one year's continuous residence therein, between the years 1779 and 1787, under the pauper act of 1779. Corinth v. Newbury, 13 Vt. 496. Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416.

ton v. Calais, 1 Vt. 385.
burgh, 13 Vt. 215.

7. Personal liability. The defendant, one of the overseers of the poor, contracted, in behalf of the town, with the plaintiff, for the 14. Act of 1797. "Coming and residing support of a poor person belonging to the town in this State," as provided in the settlement act and needing relief, but he neglected to procure of 1797, does not require the coming from an order from a justice for an allowance, another State, but applies also to such persons according to section 20 of the act of 1797, so as were within the State at the passage of the that the town, in a suit for such support, was act who had no settlement in it. Burlingheld not liable beyond the sum of five dollars Starksboro v. Hines(8 Vt. 224). Held, that the defendant was liable in assumpsit for such support, above the 15. "Able-bodied." The health ordinarily sum of five dollars. Ives v. Hulet, 12 Vt. 314. enjoyed by men of health, and the physical abilWilliams, C. J., and Redfield, J., dissenting. ity ordinarily possessed by men of sound bodies, 8. An overseer of the poor received a small make one "healthy and able-bodied,” within legacy due the plaintiff, who was a non compos the meaning of the act of 1797, s. 1, relating to without a guardian, and a town pauper, and legal settlement; and this, notwithstanding casgave his receipt therefor, as overseer, to the ual and temporary illness, or bodily unsoundexecutor, and applied a part of the legacy, ness producing an occasional and temporary properly and judiciously, in the necessary effect upon the man's capacity to gain a livelisupport of the plaintiff. Held, that the estate hood by his bodily exertions. Starksboro V, of the overseer was liable for the balance unex- Hinesburgh, 15 Vt. 200. pended, but for that only. Thurston v. Holbrook, 31 Vt. 354.

16. Repeal. The repeal of the settlement act of 1797 by the act of 1801, although withThe plaintiff out a saving clause, did not terminate a settleagreed with a town, in town meeting, to board ment acquired under the first act. Starksboro for one year, at a small price per week, a certain v. Hinesburgh, 13 Vt. 215.

9. Custody of pauper.

ment acts does not require that the head of the family should remain constantly in the town with his family, if he there keeps up his family

child of six years who was a fixed charge upon 17. Residence. Residence under the settlethe town as a pauper. Held, that the plaintiff thereby acquired the right to the custody, control, and earnings of the child, for the year, and that the overseer of the poor had no right to establishment, and intends living in that town remove the child, even for the purpose of binding him out-the town, his superior, having acted. Houston v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 575.

unless he finds a place that suits him elsewhere. Burlington v. Calais, 1 Vt. 385.

18. The residence of a man in a town so as 10. Held, also, that the father of the child, to confer a settlement, is not continued by his who was wholly destitute of a home and means wife and family in his absence from the State, of support, and who had never contributed to where the family establishment is discontinued

and broken up. Middletown v. Poultney, 2 Vt. act of 1823, a previous residence, without 437. 7 Vt. 410.

19. The time a person is a patient in any lunatic asylum is not to be computed toward making up a settlement. (G. S. c. 20, s. 40.) Peacham v. Weeks, 48 Vt. 73.

registry, is not to be computed towards the gaining of a future settlement. Newfane v. Dummerston, 34 Vt. 184.

28. Residence-voluntary. In order that one's living in a town should confer a legal set20. A single woman, in the year 1812, went tlement, it must not be the result of legal coerto her brother's in T, taking with her her bed, cion, but there must be liberty of choice chests, chairs, &c., which remained there for whether to live there, or elsewhere. Woodstock several years, though she was generally absent v. Hartland, 21 Vt. 563.

in other towns. She returned to her brother's 29. A person non compos cannot be said to in T, winters, staying with him from one to go to a town to reside, though he may have three months; and, generally, she went to her lived there 14 years. He is to be regarded, all brother's once or twice summers, staying a few the while, as a transient person, except in the days. Held, that for purposes of settlement, town of his legal settlement. The animus her residence, or home, was in T. Newbury v. manendi cannot be predicated of him. Ryegate Topsham, 7 Vt. 407. v. Wardsboro, 32 Vt. 411-414.

21. The residence of a pauper who is a single man, is at the place where he makes his home. [Certain facts stated indicating such home.] Williams, C. J. Kirby v. Waterford, 14 Vt. 414.

30. A pauper, by procurement of her brother who was under obligation to support her, went to live with another brother in Landgrove, and lived with him there for more than seven years. She was not "what is called bright;" was taken 22. Act of 1817-Sui juris. Since the care of and provided with everything, by way act of 1817 (G. S. c. 19), such residence, to of support; worked about the coarser kitchen give a settlement, must not only have been work; knitting and sewing some; handy about continuous during the entire seven years, but taking care of small children; and, on the must have been sui juris. Residence as wife, whole, doing sufficient service to compensate or child not emancipated, cannot be tacked to for her support. She could read in easy reada subsequent residence in one's own right, so ing, but not long hard words; in conversation as to make up the requisite period. Brookfield appeared broken and childlike; was accustomed v. Hartland, 10 Vt. 424. Poultney v. Glover, to attend church, and behaved with propriety. 23 Vt. 328. If left to look out for herself, she was not 23. A settlement by residence for the term capable of taking care of herself by seeking of seven years, under the act of 1817, is con- employment and making contracts, and profined to persons "of full age”—that is, the age viding herself with places to live, and with of legal majority. A residence during minor- proper clothing and support, nor of exercising ity, though the infant was emancipated, is not to an intent of remaining or moving in, and to, be reckoned. Hartford v. Hartland, 19 Vt. 392. and from, different places, except as she was 24. Chargeable. Where there is a neces- controlled by those who had care of her. Held, sity for granting relief to a poor person, and it that this was not a finding that the pauper was is granted, in good faith, by the town where he an idiot or non compos, but only that she was resides, this may prevent his residence ripening a person of weak intellect, yet having sufficient into a settlement, although such relief was not mental capacity to have a choice and desire as furnished upon his personal application, nor by to her place of residence; and, it not appearing his authority. Walden v. Cabot, 25 Vt. 522. that she was acting under any compulsion, or (G. S. c. 19, s. 1.) restraint, or against her wishes, nor that she 25. Aid furnished by a town to a poor per- did not act freely and of her own choice as to son, in discharge of an obligation assumed by her place of living, held that such residence contract, and not of a duty imposed by statute, gave her a settlement in Landgrove, although does not prevent his acquiring a settlement. Cavendish v. Mt. Holly, 48 Vt. 525.

acting under the influence of her friends. Ludlow v. Landgrove, 42 Vt. 137.

26. A poor person does not become charge- 31. The question whether a pauper has able to a town, so as to prevent his acquiring a come to reside in a town, is one of fact. Two settlement by residence, by receiving aid from things are necessary to show such a residence; the town upon a sufficient pledge of his proper- first, he must have come to the town actually, ty as security for payment, the town realizing not by mere intention or constructively; secondpayment from the pledge. This is only a bor- ly, he must have come there animo manendi, or, rowing of money. Montpelier v. Calais, 5 Vt. being there, he must intend to remain there, 571. and must have abandoned all intention of 27. Registry. Under the act of 1817, returning to the town whence he came. Coerresidence to give a settlement is to be computed cion or necessity, by taking away the intention only from the date of registry; and, under the of remaining, takes away from residence the