For the whole eighteen years the production has thus apparently amounted to $1,620,400,000 or on the average $90,022,222 yearly. Except so far as relates to the United States, there has been but a moderate increase in the annual yield since

1847.

To obtain the weight of metal produced we must multiply the amount in dollars by 25.8 grains for gold and by 412.5 for silver, thus

or nearly in the proportion of eight tons of silver to every ton of gold produced. The above, however, is gold and silver nine tenths fine and to reduce them to fine metal a tenth must be deducted. The quantity of fine gold produced was thus approximately 5,542 tons avoirdupois or 307 tons a year, and the quantity of fine sil ver 43,969 tons or 1,832 tons a year.

A cubic inch of water weighs 252 grains and the specific gravity of gold is 19.3, or gold is so many times heavier than water. Hence, a cubic inch of gold weighs 4,873 grains, or 0.69618 lbs. avoird. A cubic foot is 1,728 such cubic inches, and the weight of a cubic foot of gold is about 1,203 lbs. avoird. The whole of the fine gold produced in eighteen years was 5,542 tons or 11,084,000 lbs., an amount which would occupy a space equivalent to 9,2134 cubic feet. A solid shaft 92 feet high and 10 feet square would represent this amount. It would build a wall 1,842 feet long, one foot thick and five eet high. If melted it would fill 68,916 wine gallons or about 1,094 hogsheads of 63 gallons. Such illustrations will aid the mind in comprehending the magnitude of the gold heap collected from the various sources yearly, or, as above, in a period of years. Cut into slabs one inch thick, the same amount would cover a space of 110,562 square feet! Divide any of the above sums by 18 and you obtain the weight. bulk or extent of the annual gold crop.

The specific gravity of silver is 10.5, or it is so many times heavier than water. It will therefore take not much more than one half the weight of this metal to perform the same offices we have assigned to gold in the above calculations.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHIPMENTS.

PEOPLE who are not engaged in commerce do not understand the means by which the prices of flour and provisions are kept up in the home market above the prices which rule in foreign markets to which they are shipped. We will relate the case of a flour merchant in New York which will give a clear idea of the means. He received from the West about 5,000 barrels of flour every week; for which he gave his note on twenty days. This closed the transaction as far as the Western dealer was concerned. The demand for home consumption took about 1,000 barrels, leaving him 4,000 on hand. With these he went to a shipowner, who advanced him the market prices in Liverpool on them, deducting the freight. This was so much freight to his shipping, and this freight was consigned to his agent in Liverpool, who, of course, had his commission for selling it. By shipping the surplus flour, he kept the home price up, and the advance received from the shipowner enabled him to meet his notes when they matured. If the market in Liverpool ruled in his favor, he made a handsome profit both at home and abroad; but if it ruled against him then he loss sustained on the money advanced to him. home market were so great that he could afford out difficulty and still maintain his credit. But eventually a series of good crops abroad so depressed the foreign markets, and the more he shipped the more he lost. The freight of shipment, the rent of storage, the insurance, and the commissions, absorbed far more than the profits of the home market, and he failed for over $500,000, and had no assets, yet sustained the reputation of an honest

man.

refunded to the shipowner, the Frequently the profits of the to pay this reclamation with

The argument used by the merchants in favor of such a mode of traffic is that it tends to make business brisk. It gives employment to trucking, shipping and commission merchants, and makes money circulate. But its morality is questionable. It compels the poor, who are least able to bear it, to pay perhaps fifty per cent more for their flour than they would if trade took its legiti mate course. That is, if those who wanted our breadstuffs or provisions, came into our markets and bought them.

We are happy to learn that this style of transacting business is not so common now as it has been. Shippers have been too often bitten by reclamations, to send flour or provisions abroad without a fair prospect of profit. Flour is often cheaper in Liverpool than in New York. We heard of a case not long since where a shipper said that he had 2,000 barrels of flour on board of a ship then about due in Liverpool, which he could afford to carry back to New York from which the flour was shipped, and make a handsome profit on it. While the present exorbitant prices are sustained in our markets, there will not be much provisions or flour shipped for England, and as there is an abundance of both in the country and no demand from abroad, prices in the home markets must give away.

INTERNAL REVENUE RETURNS.

The following is a recapitulation of the total collections of internal revenue for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1863, '64, and '65, respectively as published in the Times

Dullness in business circles-Inflation and contraction-Sudden changes in the Money Mar ket-Rates of loans and discounts-Prices of American securities at London and New YorkTreasure movement at New York-Public debt statement-Prices of railway shares and railway earnings-Course of gold and exchange for the month.

The dulness in business circles, noticed in our last number, still continues ;uncertainty with regard to the future of our monetary affairs is the principal cause. Congress has as yet taken no action on the finance bill reported, though it is believed that in its present shape it cannot pass. In the absence of any decided Government policy, imaginary, as often as real causes, affect prices. Ru mor at one time says that our National Banks are to be granted an additional circulation, and consequently that we are to have a policy of inflation with higher prices; the next day it is stated as positively settled that the opposite course will be pursued. Under these circumstances business men find it more difficult than ever before to for cast the future, and act, therefore, with great caution.

Under a deranged and depreciated currency this sensitiveness and uncertainty of the money market must always exist. What we want is a settled policy of slow but sure return to specie values. No axiom of political economy is better established than that money, like other things of prime necessity, rises or sinks in value according to the great law of supply or demand. It is only by the light of this principle that a paper currency can be regulated, and a better illustration coul scarcely be cited than our Continental paper money. When first emitted in June, 1775, this new paper currency was welcomed as National money, and was much more valued than the local bills of the several States; thus it passed freely every where at par with coin. This satisfactory position of

* Including $295,076 08, amount refunded.

things continued as long as there was no more currency afloat than the business of the country required. When, however, the point of saturation was passed, every addition to its quantity brought new depreciation to its value, and though penalties and patriotism were in turn appealed to, and all imaginable expedients except a diminution of the quantity were put in force to avert the fatal catas trophe, popular confidence was gradually undermined; the Continental notes sank lower and lower in value, till at length, like other worthless shinplasters, they became a public nuisance, and by a convulsive effort were driven from the circulation altogether, and ceased to circulate as money.

John Stuart Mill, in an essay which has just been published in this country, offers, on the subject of depreciation, the following very just observations :

Several times since paper credit existed, governments and public bodies have got into their hands the power of issuing a paper currency without the restraint of convertibility, or any limitation of the amount. The most memorable cases are those of Law's Mississippi scheme, the Assignats, and the Bank restriction in 1797. On these various occasions a depreciation did, in fact, take place; but the intention was not proposed of producing one, nor were its authore in the slightest degree aware that such would be the effect. The important truth that currency is lowered (cæteris paribus) in value by being augmented in quantity was known solely to speculative philosophers. The practicals had never heard of it, or, if they had, disdained it as a visionary theory. Not an idea was entertained that paper money, which rested on good security, which represented, as the phrase was, real wealth, could ever becom depreciated by the mere amount of the issues.

But now this is understood and reckoned upon, and is the very foundation of the scheme. Everybody, with a few ridiculous exceptions, now knows that increasing the issue of inconvertible paper lowers its value, and thereby takes from all who have the currency in their possession, or who are entitled to receive any fixed sum, an aliquot part of their property or income; making a present of the amount to the insurers of the currency, and to the persons by whom the fixed sums are payable.

The cause of depreciation then is over-issue. It is important for us to know this; for in finance, as in medicine, the knowledge of the disease is half the cure. The Continental money, the assignats, all the paper money ever issued by any atable government-if it has depreciated, has uniformly lost its value from this one efficient cause, redundancy. And if, on looking back through the history of our old continental paper money, and of the assignats, we see that they passed through the swiftly recurring stages of par value, depreciation and demoralization, till they finally expired without a groan, we may rest well assured that these results were produced by over-issue.

Great, however, as were the evils which made the old continental currency of so fearful and ominous a memory to our Revolutionary fathers; the wide-spread ruin which would be produced among us at present by such a calamity would be infinitely more intolerable. For a highly organized civilization is exquisitely sensitive, while a simple agricultural community is more hardy. In 1775, the population of this continent was below three millions, and the external trade twenty millions, while the internal traffic was small. There were few manufactories, and the farmers required scarcely anything which they did not raise. Hence most of them could lose little by the war, except the growing crops, which might be renewed the next year. It is on this account argued that the Southern States suffered less by the frightful expansion and final collapse of their paper money bubble than if they had lived by manufactures and commerce, and con

sequently if their industrial system had reposed more completely on the sensitive and tremulous foundation of public and private credit.

The cardinal defect of all these issues of paper currency was, that the quantity was regulated, not by the demands of trade, but by the exigencies of war and the financial wants of the Government. This was the case with our own present paper issues to a great extent, and in consequence we have now in circulation eight hundred millions of active currency, though the business of the nation does not require two-thirds of that sum, and will probably require less still when the derangement of industry due to the war shall have passed away; for in the nor mal activity of peace and prosperity, it is one important characteristic that much less currency is necessary for the transaction of business than in presence of war. In view of these principles and facts it is strongly urged that the weakest point in our financial position at present seems to be that Congress has lost sight temporarily of its clearly defined policy with regard to the currency. Merchants and capitalists, manufacturers and professional men are alike interested with the widows, the orphans and the weaker members of our community in the momentous questions which arise out of the past depreciation and the future restora tion of our paper money. To the question, what is a dollar? it is impossible to give any answer that will hold good for a week. The legal tender dollar may be worth 10 or 15 per cent more next month than to-day. How then shall our business men, without incurring serious risk, make engagements, as they must do, and incur obligations extending over two, three or four months? How shall the multitudes of our citizens who live on fixed incomes and annuities adapt their expenses to their incomes?

This uncertainty was submitted to during the war, as an abnormal condition which might not be avoided, but now that peace is restored, an anxiety is spreading throughout all departments of our social, political and commercial life, which is not a little significant. An evening paper thus refers to some of the symptoms of this wide spread solicitude:

"Wall street is unsettled by the incertitude which still hangs over the policy of the Treasury, relative to the reduction of the currency, and reports are industriously circulated that the volume of paper money is to be increased by the addition of fifty millions to the three hundred millions of national bank notes already authorized. The compound notes are now so much in demand, and are becoming so generally popular throughout the country, that considerable surprise is expressed that no steps are taken to reduce the active currency by exchanging for these compound notes a part of the greenback legal tender circulation. This conversation has been abundantly proved by experience to be a safe and effectual method of contracting the currency and checking inflation and there is no necessity to wait for the passage of the new loan bill or of any other law whatsoever, as the act of June 30, 1864 authorizes the conversion int compound notes of the whole or any part of the outstanding greenback circulation. It is claimed, moreover, that the present time is peculiarly propitious for such a change, as money is easy and the government credit good. Besides, the contracting action of the compound notes is so gentle and grad· ual that there is no danger of the money market being perturbed or invaded by stringency from the adoption of this conservative policy."

Now in this emergency there are two things for which the people look to Congress. First, all parties expect an early positive pledge that under no pretext whatever shall the volume of our outstanding paper money receive any increase whatever, either by the issue of national bank notes or in any other way and secondly, that our representatives shall in some clear positive way ex