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this provision of the act of 1872, before its re-enactment into these Revised Statutes, and what has been said upon this subject already need not be repeated.

But there are some further remarks proper to be made beside the points and considerations that there is no express repeal, no express purpose by this provision to change that provision. It has prevailed from 1789 down to the enactment of the act of 1872, if that act made the change contended for. Here are these two sections found in their proximity, one to the other.

It seems to me in the light of all these considerations, without going over the ground that has been gone over already, viewing the subject in the light of the adjudications and rules upon the point of repeals by implication, that it is entirely incredible that Congress should have meant by section 635 to repeal section 631, so far as the time for appeal is concerned, and that section contains nothing else. I say it is incredible that Congress ever enacted one provision by section 631, and on the same page could have intended to enact a repealing provision-repealing by implication, section 631. The considerations which have been adverted to, and which I will not consume time by repeating, it seems to me, fully sustain this rule and exclude any other conclusion upon the points here under consideration.

But it is said that the language is, "no judgment, decree, or order of a District Court" and that this term, "decree," necessarily includes decrees in admiralty, and the inference follows, if this be so, that there is a repeal by implication to the extent contended.

Firstly, I have to remark, that it is a canon of statutory construction, asserted many times in the best considered adjudications that the intent of the Legislature-if it can be ascertained-constitutes the law; and in connection with that proposition, that a thing may be within the letter of the law

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clearly and not within its meaning, and that a thing may be without the letter of the law and yet within its meaning, and in either case the intent thus established constitutes the law; and judicial determinations to this effect are very numerous. A very well considered case upon this subject is to be found in Slater y. Cave, 3 O. S. Rep. 80.

Now under that view of the subject, if it were necessary I should hold that the word "decree" here, has no meaning, and that it would be the duty of the court to exclude it from consideration and to consider it inadvertently inserted as having no effect in fixing the construction of the language found in this statute. And again, see the case of the United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters, which has been adverted to. The act of 1803 went in comprehensiveness beyond the act of 1789 in this: that the act of 1789 was confined in terms' to decrease in admiralty. The act of 1803 uses the language, "all judgments or decrees," and yet the Supreme Court of the United States in the case mentioned had no hesitation in saying that the act of 1803-notwithstanding this difference -was intended to be confined by the law-making power to decrees in admiralty alone. That no judgment, technically as such, and no decrees, technically as such, was intended to be embraced in that language, except simply decrees in admiralty.

On the authority of that case, as well as other numerous adjudications, if it were necessary, I should have no hesitation in holding in the light of the entire context of these several provisions, that it was the intent of the Legislature not to extend the time within which appeals in admiralty should be taken, but that having fixed the rule upon that subject, then out of abundant caution it was the intent of the Legislature to provide that all other judgments or orders of the District Court, or decrees, if there could be any such besides decrees in admiralty and in equity should be prose

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cuted within one year from the time of the entry of the decree, and should not be prosecuted after that time.

It has been said with very great force of argument, and I confess that for the moment I was very much impressed by the suggestion, that it is a canon of interpretation, that if it be possible to do so, every word and phrase in the statute shall be taken. Such is to be presumed to be the intention of the Legislature.

This may be the rule on the subject of repeals by implication. If the Legislature had intended to make so improvident and material a change under the circumstances, it can very well be taken that in the act of 1872 a repeal of the provision in question, of the act of 1803, would have been expressly made, and that section 631, which was a re-enactment of the act of 1803, would not be found in these Revised Statutes. But it is by no means to be admitted that this latter canon of interpretation may not be applied here consistently with the maintenance of integrity to both of these provisions-631 and 635. There follows section 631, before reaching 635, this provision, "Final judgments of a District Court in civil actions where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of costs, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in a Circuit Court, holden in the same district, upon a writ of error."

Now, as regards such final judgments, there is no limitation as to the time in which they may be reviewed, so far as I am advised, except by this one year limitation in section 635. That section declares, "No judgment, decree, or order ' of a District Court." There is material, so far as judgments are concerned, upon which this limitation can operate. Then, as it regards orders, that term is not necessarily to be considered here, but it is obvious it will occur to any one on a moment's reflection, that there may be a very great variety in the earliest proceedings which may be taken up for review.

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I need not remark further upon that subject. An order is not always applicable to a decree in admiralty. That, therefore, does not touch the point here under consideration.

There is no difficulty, then, in giving this section 635 full operation as to judgments or orders without interfering in any way with provision 631.

Now, as to decrees.

It has been said that there is no decree which can be ren'dered by a District Court, except a decree in admiralty and a decree in certain causes in equity, and that, therefore, according to the contention which has been insisted upon, this limitation of one year applies necessarily to decrees in admiralty and decrees in equity. That, we think, is a mistaken view of the fact. I have not had the time to examine this point as thoroughly as I should have desired, if time had been allowed me.

There were, during the war, provisions in force, under which the property of rebels was forfeited, and many decrees to that effect were entered, but the act is no longer in force. There is the case of the United States v. Miller, which I have not had time to examine, but which I recollect perfectly well. In that case a decree of forfeiture was entered. So in the case of the United States v. Conrad, a large amount of his real estate was confiscated under the statutory provisions of the United States, touching the property of acting rebels against the government, and a decree of forfeiture was entered at New Orleans by the District Court. It was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States, as was the case of the United States v. Miller, and the decrees in both cases were reversed, but they were decrees in forfeiture, and not a decree in admiralty, or a decree in equity.

Now it is sufficient in this connection to remark generally, and without going in detail, that the subsisting revenue laws, both as they regard custom duties and as they regard internal

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revenue duties, so to speak, provide proceedings for forfeitures, and would not be, in the judgment of this court, a misnomer; on the contrary, as I understand the law, it would be in accordance with the settled principles of law to term the final adjudication of the court a "decree," upon the subject of forfeiture, against the respondent or against the libellant, dismissing the libel or information, as the case may be. Now, in further illustration of that particular view of the subject, I advert to rule 22 of the Supreme Court of the United States, established for the government of the inferior courts of the United States in their action in this class of That rule is as follows:

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"All informations and libels of information, upon seizure for any breach of the revenue, or navigation, or other laws of the United States, shall state the place of seizure, whether it be on land or on the high seas, or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and the district within which the property is brought, and where it then is. The information, or libel of informa tion, shall also propound, in distinct articles, the matters relied on as grounds or causes of forfeiture, and aver the same to be contrary to the form of the statute or statutes of the United States in such case provided, as the case may require, and shall conclude with a prayer of due process to enforce the forfeiture, and to give notice to all persons concerned in interest to appear and show cause, at the return day of the process, why the forfeiture shall not be decreed."

It is not necessary to advert to any particular legal statutory provision denouncing forfeitures in the various cases to which these provisions have been extended; it is sufficient to remark generally that they are very numerous.

I have already remarked, and repeat, that it would be no misnomer; on the contrary, it is sanctioned by the language of the rule, and it is in accordance with the settled principles