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“Chairman, Provisional Government, Republic of Korea", and the second addressed to yourself by the "Minister of Foreign Affairs” of that “Government”, Y. Tjosowang.16 They contain more or less identical letters, each with two enclosures, a "Statement” signed by the “Minister of Foreign Affairs" and a memorandum entitled "Korea's Role in the Anti-Axis War". Similar covers, with the same enclosures, were addressed to Vice President Wallace and to myself. A copy of the letter addressed to the Vice President is attached.17 The original has been handed to Mr. Wallace.
Summary of the enclosures: (1) The covering letter. Each of the letters offers hearty congratulations to the addressee and to the Government and people of the United States on the opening of the second front, occupation of Rome, and the continued advance in the Pacific which will expedite the downfall of the enemy both in the East and West. Reference is then made to the enclosures, and the statement is made that:
"We Koreans are anxious to establish as early as possible direct and effective contact with the Government of the United States of America and those of the leading Allied Powers so that we may coordinate the movement for our national liberation with the present and immediate operations of the Allied armies in Eastern Asia."
(2) The “Statement” expresses the hope that as an anti-Fascist measure the four leading Powers will recognize the Korean “Provisional Government”; this is supported by four principal arguments: (a) the unification of the Korean Independence Movement has already been achieved; (6) Korea has already started on her march toward modern democracy; (c) she has begun to coordinate her activities with those of the United Nations; and (d) the "Provisional Government" represents the unification of all Korean constituencies.
(3) The “Memorandum” reviews the historic position of Korea; notes the "statesmanlike decision that Korea 'should be free and independent in due course'"; and lengthily undertakes to outline briefly the ways in which Korea could contribute to the United Nations' war efforts. Under "I. Actual Potentialities”, it is suggested that the Koreans functioning in scattered groups on the various fronts in North and Central China could serve as a nucleus for a large combat
16 Both dated June 17, not printed. The letter to President Roosevelt was transmitted to him on July 27 by the Secretary of State with a covering memorandum containing this statement: "In as much as the United States Government has not in any way extended recognition to the organization above-mentioned [the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea), I believe that no reply should be made to Mr. Koo Kim's communication.” (895.01/6-2144) Telegram 7246, September 5, 5 p. m., from London, reported that communications had been sent by the Korean Provisional Government to the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and that the British Foreign Office did not see any reason to contemplate recognition at that time (895.01/9-544).
17 Not printed.
force to be recruited from the reported 3,600,000 Koreans in North China and Manchuria as well as from the 300,000 in eastern Russia; liaison work behind the enemy's lines could also be extended. Under "II. Why the Korean Provisional Government Should be Recognized” an effort is made to show that such recognition would muster Korean resistance, forestall a possible Japanese move to create a puppet independent Government, and would be a step toward the setting up of a truly democratic Korean government. Respectfully yours,
C. E. GAUSS
895.01/8–1644 : Telegram
WASHINGTON, August 16, 1944—9 p.m. 1084. The Department will soon engage in exchanges of papers and in informal discussion with the British Foreign Office regarding postwar Korea. A questionnaire covering the major problems to be considered has been agreed upon. Because of China's special interest in Korean affairs the Department and the Foreign Office propose that there take place similar exchanges in Chungking with the Chinese Foreign Office. The proposed parallel bilateral discussions have as their primary purpose the exchange of information and ideas and it is not intended that they shall in any way commit the respective Governments in regard to policy. Instructions are being sent by air pouch.18
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State No. 3147
CHUNGKING, November 14, 1944.
Received November 25.] SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch no. 3014, September 28, 1944 19 on the subject of postwar Korea, in which it was reported that the proposal for the study of the problem by the United States, China, and Great Britain had been referred to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.20
18 Instruction 785, August 24, not printed. Appended to the instruction was an “Amended Draft Questionnaire on Korea” whose opening paragraph accepted as the "settled policy” of the three Governments concerned the Cairo Declaration statement that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” It then raised a series of 20 questions under the headings of "Political”, “Military', "Economic", and "Koreans Outside Korea." (895.01/8-1644) 19 Not printed. 0 On September 26.
There is now enclosed a translation of a third person note dated November 8, 1944, from the Ministry, 21 in which it is stated that the Chinese Government is prepared to undertake a study of the question and to exchange opinions and reports with the American and British Governments. 22 Respectfully yours,
GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.
2 Not printed. 22 Despatch 2, December 13, from Chungking, reported that the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wu) had indicated, in discussing the draft questionnaire with American and British Embassy representatives on November 28 and 30, that the "Chinese Government was sympathetically inclined toward the 'Korean Provisional Government'.” (895.50/12–1344)
CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE PHILIPPINES 1
811B.01/641 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Philippine Affairs (Lockhart)
[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1944. Mr. Hall ? and Col. Boekel 3 came to see me today for the purpose of making inquiry regarding possible plans which the Department may have evolved, or which may have been evolved elsewhere, looking to the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines following the reoccupation of the Islands by American military forces.
I told Col. Boekel that so far as my knowledge goes the Department of State does not have in mind, at least at the present time, any plans for the establishment of a civil government or temporary civil administration in the Philippines when our forces return there; that in my judgment there already existed a government—that government being the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines—which could function, and would be expected to do so, as the civil administration in the Philippines as soon as the Japanese are driven from the Islands and the military authorities had given their consent for such an administration to function; that the Commonwealth Government is still recognized as the government of the Philippine Islands and that it is a government which was created as the result of legislative action on the part of the Congress of the United States * and as a result of the choice of the people of the Philippine Islands; that it is a constitutional government in every respect, well organized and functioning, and that I felt sure no one in the Department would be disposed to set aside this legal government for some newly-created civil administration which might be proposed on the reoccupation of the Islands; that in my judgment the Commonwealth Government now in exile in Washington, with Mr. Quezon as president, would return to the Islands almost as soon as the reoccupation occurred and that it would be ready to resume its functions as the regularly constituted government of the Philippine Islands. I said that the officials are experienced in Philippine affairs and that they were selected by popular vote of the Filipino people and that they had a burning desire to return to their duties in the Philippines as quickly as possible and that legislation had recently been enacted providing for the succession to the Presidency as soon as the Commonwealth Government returns to the Philippines.
Continued from Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. III, pp. 1097-1117.
Monroe B. Hall, Secretary of Commission at New Delhi, on consultation in the Department.
*Lt. Col. W. A. Boekel, Civil Affairs Officer attached to Headquarters of Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India. • The Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.
It was pointed out that there is a strong personal and official relationship between the President of the Commonwealth Government, Mr. Quezon, and General MacArthur and that the latter had repeatedly announced his determination to return to the Philippines with his troops and that my own personal view was that he would see that Mr. Quezon and the Commonwealth Government would return almost simultaneously with him. The actual time of renewing Government functions in the Philippines would in my judgment have to be determined by agreement between General MacArthur and President Quezon, with perhaps the sanction of the President and the Secretary of War; that the question of when and how the Commonwealth Government would enter the scene seemed to be one to be determined largely on the basis of military exigencies then existing.
I discouraged any idea on the part of Col. Boekel that General Stilwell's command should make any definite plans for setting up a special new civil government in the Philippines following reoccupation of the Islands, the reasons being substantially those set forth above. I said that the situation in the Philippines, on this point, was distinctly different from areas which our forces have occupied in Northern Africa, Sicily and Italy in that an adequate and legally constituted government of our own creation is already in existence and that it would be a mistake to repudiate it and set up, or attempt to set up, a new administration. While Col. Boekel did not so declare himself, I received the impression at the close of the interview that he was satisfied with the situation as unfolded to him and that he would do nothing to disturb the present arrangement which apparently could take over civil functions in the Philippines at the proper time and administer them in an entirely satisfactory manner.
FRANK P. LOCKHART
* Public Law 186, approved November 12, 1943; 57 Stat. 590.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander of United States Army Forces in the Far East.