892.01/9-544: Airgram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, September 5, 1944. [Received September 30-5 p. m.] A-1085. With reference to the Department's secret telegram 6486, August 16, 5 p. m., regarding the British attitude towards Thailand, there is given below the text of a secret letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Ambassador 15 on this subject: "I welcome your secret letter of 18th August as giving me the opportunity for a much-needed clearing of the air in regard to our respective attitudes towards Siam. Frankly we were very disappointed at the reception by the State Department of our honest attempt to show that we were no less favourable than in the United States and China to the idea of a free and independent Siam after the war.16 Nothing could have been more definite in its discouragement of our attempt than the first paragraph of the statement handed to Lord Halifax on 20th March and, incidentally, the remark that our proposed declaration would 'augment' distrust of our intentions produced, if I may say so, an unfortunate impression here. If you will consult the statement of 20th March again I think you will agree that the burden of the criticism was not, as suggested in paragraph 1 of your letter, that our declaration failed to give any intimation that Šiam would be continued as an independent Power (a point dealt with in fact in the last sentence of our draft declaration). The criticism appeared to be rather that the declaration did not include an 'unequivocal commitment' that Great Britain had no territorial ambitions in Siam, and the suggestion was made that this omission should be remedied in any declaration on our part. This suggestion was an invitation to go further than the United States Government had themselves gone in their proposed declaration, which was silent on the territorial point. Moreover, it implied the existence of a doubt on a matter already covered by this country's undertakings in the Atlantic Charter 17 and the Cairo Declaration.18 I am relieved to see that your present letter offers a different and more hopeful approach to the subject and I am happy to take advantage of it. Our two Governments have, I think, the same basic objects as regards Siam. We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent State, subject only to its acceptance of such special arrangements for secu 15 Dated September 4. 16 For statements by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt on this subject, see telegrams 293, February 27, 1943, from Chungking, and 362, March 17, 1943, to Chungking, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 13 and 36, respectively. 17 Joint Statement of August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. 18 Made by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill and released by the White House December 1, 1943; for text, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448. rity or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system. Before this stage is reached we have to drive out the Japanese and to this end we wish, as do the United States, to encourage the Siamese themselves to create the maximum difficulties for the Japanese and thus to make the maximum contribution to their own liberation. But at present we and the United States Government have not got our ideas coordinated and if we are to get this problem straightened out it is essential that we should recognise that we necessarily view it from somewhat different angles. The United States Government do not regard themselves as being at war with Siam. His Majesty's Government do. Moreover, while appreciating the possible advantages of Siam's resistance to the Japanese, His Majesty's Government do not rate its practical value very high and feel that it is in any case of doubtful wisdom to encourage the comfortable view that the Siamese can count on an easy and assured future regardless of their attitude towards the Japanese and the efforts which they make to help themselves and us. We feel, in fact, that if resistance is to be encouraged it may need a spur rather than a sugar-plum. Again, we are bound to consider the effect upon neighbouring territories of any public declaration about Siam and it is here that any reference to territorial integrity presents difficulties. As declared at Cairo, 'we have no thought of territorial expansion', but it goes without saying that Siam cannot be allowed to keep the ill-gotten gains which she has accepted from her Japanese ally at the expense of Malaya, of Burma and of French Indo-China.19 Some special strategic arrangements may also be necessary in the Kra Isthmus within the framework of an international security system. I am glad to note the assurance in your letter that our right to present such problems of territorial security or integrity to the United Nations for consideration would not be prejudiced, so far as the United States Government are concerned, by any undertaking we might now give. But there is a danger that any pronouncement about territorial integrity might create popular misunderstanding unless hedged about with reservations on the particular questions referred to above. A detailed statement on the other hand would be likely to have the undesirable result of encouraging premature discussion of a matter which it is our policy to leave to the peace settlement. Even in the case of Allies we have refrained from any commitment about territorial integrity and I cannot believe that the United States Government would wish to press us to treat an enemy more tenderly than an Ally. Any formal statement on Siam, whether for publication or otherwise, would require Cabinet approval and the concurrence of the Dominions. But I trust that this personal letter in which I have attempted to make our position quite clear will serve the purpose of removing any uncertainty about our intentions. I need hardly say that I shall welcome further consultation on the whole question." WINANT 19 For French Indochina-Thailand border dispute, see indexes in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 1041, and ibid., vol. v, p. 934; for texts of convention of peace between France and Thailand and its protocol, and French-Japanese and French-Japanese-Thai protocols, all signed at Tokyo May 9, 1941, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. CXLIV, pp. 805, 800, and 802, respectively. 892.01/9-544: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) WASHINGTON, October 19, 1944-7 p. m. 8676. We have been giving further consideration to the question of Thailand and believe, subject to your concurrence, that you might now send to Eden a note, rather than a personal letter, reading in substance as follows: (Your A-1085, September 5). The American Government appreciates greatly the spirit of Mr. Eden's recent personal letter to Ambassador Winant on the subject of Thailand and his suggestion that he would welcome further consultation on this whole question with a view to seeking coordination of policy by the American and British Governments. While, as Mr. Eden suggests, our two Governments view the question of Thailand from somewhat different angles, we believe it desirable in the highest degree that our two Governments reach, if possible, a common policy toward Thailand. The American Government has noted with the utmost satisfaction the statement in Mr. Eden's letter: "Our two Governments have, I think, the same basic objects as regards Siam. We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent State. . . ." But it is apparent that there are several points which require mutual clarification before there can be that coordination of policy which both governments desire, and we believe that on these points and on any others which may arise, there should be as full and frank an exchange of views as possible. We note that Mr. Eden felt that the American Government had asked the British Government to make a public declaration going beyond what the American Government was willing to do. We desire to assure the British Government that at no time did the American Government so intend. In discussing with the British Embassy the possibility of a British public statement on Thailand, it had been the hope of the American Government that the British Government would feel able to associate itself with the public statements already made by President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek favoring a free, independent, and sovereign Thailand and expressly disclaiming territorial ambitions. In view of the feeling expressed by the British Government on July 31 that no useful purpose would be served by such a British statement at this time, this Government has not since pressed for any public declaration. On the contrary, it has sought only a confidential indication of British views respecting Thailand as a necessary step toward coordinating the policies of the two Governments and reaching a common understanding, We note, also, a possible doubt in Mr. Eden's mind as to the views of the American Government with regard to territories acquired by Thailand while under Japanese domination. We are glad of the opportunity to clarify this point. The American Government fully concurs with the views expressed by Mr. Eden with regard to such territories. We do not recognize the lawfulness of such acquisitions and agree that such territories must in fact be restored to Indochina, Malaya and Burma from whom they were taken. This statement of course is without prejudice to the presentation of claims by any nation, including Thailand, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by orderly, peaceful processes. Finally, we note that Mr. Eden's statement favoring restoration of Thailand as a free, sovereign and independent state is, however, qualified by certain important reservations. Such restoration, he suggests should be conditioned upon Thailand's "acceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system". Mr. Eden further states "Some special strategic arrangements may also be necessary in the Kra Isthmus within the framework of an international security system". It is not clear to the American Government precisely what is contemplated by these reservations. In furtherance of the desire of the two Governments to reach a common understanding and to coordinate their policies toward Thailand, the American Government would appreciate an indication from the British Government at an early date as to what it has in mind in connection with these reservations. HULL 892.01/11-2444: Airgram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, November 24, 1944. [Received November 29-6 p. m.] A-1404. There is given below complete text of Mr. Eden's reply to the Ambassador's note of October 21 regarding coordination of British and American policy toward Thailand, which was delivered in accordance with the Department's cable no. 8676, October 19. "22nd November, 1944. No. F 4969/23/G. Secret. "My Dear Ambassador, "Since my return to this country I have been giving some thought to your note No. 4013 of the 21st October about Siam. "Such difference as may still exist between the respective points of view of our two Governments results, I think, from the different angle of approach which I mentioned in my letter of the 4th September and which your reply recognises. To us Siam is an enemy who must 'work her passage' before she can rehabilitate herself; whereas the United States Government regard her, in spite of her declaration of war, merely as an enemy-occupied territory. "The two conditions suggested in my letter of the 4th September, on which you asked for further clarification, were in the nature of general reservations to be filled in in detail when the outline of the post-war settlement in the Far East is clear. I should like to meet your Government's wish for greater precision, but I do not really think that it is practicable to be more precise at this stage when there are so many unknown factors as regards the future. Nor could I in any case attempt a binding definition without prior consultation with experts in this country, with the Dominions, and with the Cabinet. But I shall be happy to review the matter with you from time to time as the situation develops. "I cannot think that the general reservation which I made in paragraph 5 of my letter of the 4th September will be other than acceptable to the United States Government. It is, I suggest, a matter of ordinary prudence, even in the case of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, to re[serve the right to stipulate that as a condition of their 20] ultimate freedom, sovereignty and independence they should accept such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary to the functioning of the post-war international system. "As regards the special reservation affecting the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military experts to recommend what régime may be necessary in the circumstances of the post-war world. But the part which this area played in the Japanese plans for the capture of Singapore and the ultimate subjugation of Burma suggest that it will have to figure in whatever arrangements may be made for the future security of South-East Asia, and in particular for the defence of Singapore within the framework of the future international system. "Finally, let me say that I welcome the statement in paragraph 5 of your note about the restoration of territory acquired by Siam at the hands of Japan from Burma, Malaya and Indo-China. This statement is valuable as it further narrows whatever difference there may be in the respective points of view of our two Governments. "Yours sincerely, (signed) Anthony Eden." WINANT 892.01/12-1244 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Landon) [WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1944. Participants: The Thai Minister, Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj; Messrs. Abbot L. Moffat 21 and Kenneth P. Landon, SP. The Thai Minister called at the request of Mr. Landon to receive a message with respect to the Free Thai movement contained in Stockholm's 5040 of December 8.22 The Minister was informed that a message had been received from Minister Arthakitti at Stockholm to the effect that his brother, the Regent at Bangkok,23 desired Minister Pramoj to organize a free government in the United States with himself at the head of it. 20 Insertion taken from telegram 10341, November 24, 5 p. m., from London (not printed). 21 Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs. 22 23 Not printed. Luang Pradist Manudharm became sole Regent with the resignation of Prince Aditya Dibabha from the Council of Regents on July 24, 1944. |