not the only way towards the framing of a new constitution which rests completely in Indian hands. (3) When a constitution is agreed upon Britain is ready to relinquish authority but this cannot take place until at least the two principal parties (Congress and Muslim League) come to terms. (4) India is a natural unit and it is up to Indians to devise arrangements so that the Hindu and Muslim.communities can live within this unit. (5) Until the detained Congress leaders prove their willingness to cooperate in driving the enemy to the gates of India, and withdraw the quit India resolution, demands for their release are barren. The first reaction of both the Congress party and Muslim League press is disappointment and the assertion that the speech offers nothing new. 4 The leading Muslim press newspaper is bitter at the Viceroy's reiteration of the opposition to Pakistan expressed by his predecessor 5 in December 1942. The Viceroy spoke courteously of the jailed Congress leaders recognizing their ability and high-mindedness and refrained from calling them pro-Japanese. He made it plain that they will not be released until they abandon their August 1942 stand. The Hindu press is bitterly disappointed in this, stating that a new constitution cannot be drawn up with these leaders in jail, and their imprisonment makes impossible the negotiation of a compromise between Congress and the League. Dawn states that Gandhi wants an unconditional release by an apologetic government. The Viceroy apparently insists that admission of their errors and a promise of loyal cooperation during the war must precede release. Dawn sums up this situation neatly by stating that there is a spirit of unconditional surrender on both sides. One Indian Nationalist characterized the speech as "frank but cautious, disappointing but hopeful, tone not bad”. I feel that this speech does not alter the political situation materially and that there will be no progress until either the imprisoned Congress leaders, or the British, or both modify the stand both sides have taken of questioning the good faith and sincerity of the other. Full text of speech forwarded by air mail." MERRELL 4 The concept of a separate Moslem state in India after independence and the touchstone of the political objectives of the Moslem League. 5 The Marquess of Linlithgow. 6 Influential Moslem newspaper. 'Despatch No. 366, February 21, not printed. 554-184-65-16 845.00/2253: Telegram The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State NEW DELHI, May 6, 1944-11 a. m. [Received May 6-8:29 a. m.] 324. Gandhi was released unconditionally at 8 p. m. today. A communiqué issued by the Government of India at midnight reads in toto as follows: "In view of the medical reports of Mr. Gandhi's health, Government has decided to release him unconditionally. This decision has been taken solely on medical grounds. The release takes place at 8 p. m. on May 6". MERRELL 845.01/272: Telegram The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State NEW DELHI, May 19, 1944-1 p. m. [Received 1:08 p. m.] 357. May I now in accordance with the Department's 505, September 12, 4 p. m., 1942, request the Department's instructions regarding the disposition of the President's letter to Gandhi? 8 I feel sure that Gandhi understands why he did not receive a reply to his letter of July 1, 1942,9 and he probably would not expect one at this late date. If a reply is made it might encourage him to correspond further with the President. It is probable too that the receipt of the reply would become known to the Government of India whose suspicions would be (my 674, Sept 3, 3 p. m., 1942) 10 aroused as to how Gandhi's letter evaded censorship in India; the mission however is in position to assure the Government of India that it had nothing to do with the transmittal of Gandhi's letter. In view of the changes in the world situation as well as the present political situation in India, I doubt that the implied emphasis in the President's letter on military considerations is any longer time [timely]; and I anticipate that paragraph 5 page 5 of the Secretary's radio broadcast of July 22 [23] 1942,11 would awaken only skepticism now as Gandhi in common with most Indian Nationalists probably doubts that the U.S. has used the full measure of its influ 8 Telegram No. 505 not printed; for President Roosevelt's letter of August 1 to Gandhi, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. 1, p. 703. 9 Ibid., p. 677. 10 Ibid., p. 728. "Text in Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1942, p. 639; President Roosevelt had enclosed a copy of the text of this radio broadcast in his letter of August 1 to Gandhi. ence during the past two years to support the attainment of freedom by India. I accordingly feel that no reply should be sent unless it is one which takes cognizance of the circumstances existing at present and is intended to serve a constructive purpose vis-à-vis the Indian political situation. Such a purpose might be served by the inclusion in a new letter of the following: "I am hopeful that you will experience a speedy recovery from your illness and am pleased to note that, according to reports reaching me, you intend upon your return to health to discuss Hindu-Muslim understanding with Mr. Jinnah; 12 I feel sure that the reaching of such an understanding would enlist maximum world sympathy. With reference to the above suggested paragraph, Gandhi on May 14 telegraphed to the leader of the Khaksars 13 in response to latter's suggestion that Gandhi and Jinnah should meet to explore the possibilities of an agreement and said that as soon as he was well enough he would be ready to discuss the question with Jinnah. MERRELL 845.01/6-1444 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1944. I informed you on September 9, 1942 that delivery of your letter of August 1, 1942 to Gandhi 14 was impractical because of the latter's imprisonment. You agreed to the suggestion that the letter be retained in the files of the Mission at New Delhi until delivery to Gandhi might be feasible and appropriate. The Mission now requests instructions. It recommends against delivery on the grounds that the context is not now entirely timely; that failure to have received a reply will be understood by Gandhi because of his having been held incommunicado; that difficulty may be experienced in convincing the Government of India that this Government was not a party to the evasion of censorship which occurred when Gandhi's letter was delivered to you; and that it is inadvisable at this time to encourage Gandhi to communicate further with you. A copy of the Mission's telegram no. 357 of May 19, 1944 on the subject is attached.15 12 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Moslem League president. 13 The Khaksars were a minor Indian political group; Allama Mashriqi, the Khaksar leader, had in 1942 written a booklet, Which Way to Pakistan, which was a condemnation of both the Moslem League and Hindu political organizations regarding the Pakistan question. There appear to be three possible procedures: (1) that the letter not be delivered, with the resultant possibility that some day Gandhi may accuse you of a lack of interest in India's problems; (2) that the original letter be delivered with appropriate explanation from the Mission, and-in order that no charge of subterfuge may be brought by the Government of India-after prior advice to the Government of India; (3) that a new letter with more timely context be drafted for delivery in the same manner, with the resultant possibility that, as in procedure no. 2, difficulty may arise from the censorship angle, and that Gandhi may be encouraged to endeavor to communicate further with you in a manner embarrassing to you and both embarrassing and annoying to the Government of India. An expression of your wishes in the matter is requested.16 C[ORDELL] H[ULL] 845.01/272: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) WASHINGTON, June 16, 1944-2 p. m. 427. The President desires that his letter to Gandhi (your 357, May 19) be delivered, after you have appropriately advised the Government of India. You may wish to utilize Gandhi's son as an intermediary for delivery. Appropriate explanations regarding the delay will of course be in order. HULL 845.01/7-744: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) WASHINGTON, July 7, 1944-8 p. m. 467. Please inform Department of present status of matter discussed in Department's 427 of June 16. Drew Pearson's 17 column of July 6 featured a story on this subject. There is some indication that he received his information from Indian nationals in the United States. Does the Mission believe that the existence of the letters in question could have been made known by Indian Congress circles to sympathizers in the United States. HULL 16 Notation by President Roosevelt to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State: "E. R. S. I think No. 2 best. F. D. R." 17 Drew Pearson was the writer of a syndicated newspaper column. 845.01/7-1044: Telegram The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State NEW DELHI, July 10, 1944-6 p. m. [Received 7:20 p. m.] 503. Pearson's article was published in Extension India on July 8 (Department's telegram 467, July 7, 8 p. m.). The Government of India previously having been advised, the President's letter was handled [handed?] by Berry 18 to Birla 19 at Bombay on about June 24 for delivery to Gandhi. Birla was proceeding to Poona the following day. Several newspapers mentioned the letter in connection with Berry's trip to Bombay and I believe that this was probably the source of Pearson's information rather than any direct communication by the Indian Congress circles to sympathizers in the United States. In fairness to the Government of India and in compliance with the Foreign Secretary's 20 request that I deny the report that the Government of India was responsible for the letter not having been delivered prior to Gandhi's release I gave a statement today to Reuter's correspondent to the effect that the American Mission had at no time requested the assistance of the Mission [or permission?] of the Indian Government to transmit a letter to Gandhi and that the report in the press is therefore erroneous. MERRELL 845.00/7-2244: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, July 22, 1944-6 p. m [Received July 22-3:30 p. m.] 5810. Personal for the Secretary from Phillips."1 Following a statement on foreign affairs in Parliament by the Prime Minister 22 on August 2d, it is possible that there will be a debate on the Indian 18 James L. Berry, Secretary at New Delhi. 19 Probably G. D. Birla, Indian industrialist and member of a family prominent in Indian industrial, commercial, and financial life. 20 Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in charge of the External Affairs Department. 21 Appointed in December, 1942, Personal Representative of the President in India with the rank of Ambassador, William Phillips had been absent from his post at New Delhi since April 28, 1943. From September, 1943, he had been serving on a special assignment as the Secretary of State's representative at the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, European Theater. For correspondence regarding the mission of Ambassador Phillips in India, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 178 ff. 22 Winston S. Churchill. |