part of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. There is good cooperation on the civilian and diplomatic side. It is sound. policy to implement the work of our Minister at Tehran 17 and to make possible the success of Dr. Millspaugh, head of the American Financial Mission. The War Department's help, in the form of broadening General Connolly's directive, is necessary if our aims are to be achieved. It seems clear to us that some cooperation by General Connolly in these matters would benefit our aid to Russia program. Assistance in grain transport would help to obviate a need such as arose a year ago, when we and the British Government arranged to ship 25,000 tons of wheat to the Persian Gulf for the people of Tehran, thus using cargo space and port and railroad facilities which otherwise might have been used for supplies to Russia. Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: WALLACE MURRAY Adviser on Political Relations 800.24/1507 Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) WASHINGTON, 24 December, 1943. DEAR MR. MURRAY: In your letter of 1 December 1943 you suggested the advisability of broadening the War Department directive to General Connolly to permit him to give technical assistance to the Iranian Government when possible without interference to the movement of supplies to Russia. As I have advised Mr. Winant,18 it was believed desirable to hold this question in abeyance pending the completion of the recent Teheran Conference. It is my understanding that arrangements were made then at Mr. Landis' request for some assistance from General Connolly in the agricultural field.1o 17 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. 18 Frederick G. Winant, Adviser, Eastern Hemisphere Division, Department of State. 19 A final decision on this matter apparently had been made by President Roosevelt at Cairo about December 6, 1943. As a result, the Army in midFebruary authorized the assignment of 27 officers and men from the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) to the services of Floyd F. Shields, American Director-General of the Iranian Road Transport Administration. Mr. Landis hailed the move as "essential to the realization . . . of the objectives of the Tehran declaration . . ." For subsequent developments regarding this situation, see pp. 339-340, and 346. The whole problem of Army cooperation in United States aid to Iran is treated in T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia in the official Army history United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 435 ff. We are now proceeding to obtain General Connolly's views on the broader question so that we may advise you in full. Reply to your suggestion will be made at an early date. Sincerely yours, LUCIUS D. CLAY 861.24/1773 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) [WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1944. Subject: Broadening Directives of General Connolly Participants: Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War Mr. Murray said that he was calling on Mr. McCloy at the suggestion of Mr. Stettinius 21 for the purpose of discussing the above subject. Mr. Murray reviewed briefly the history of American relations with Iran, with particular reference to the special interest we have had in that country since Mr. Morgan Shuster, a prominent American economist and financial authority, was appointed Adviser to the Iranian (then Persian) Government in 1912 [1911].22 Mr. Murray referred to the long history of American missionary, educational, philanthropic and cultural activities in Iran. He said that our interest in that country, however, had recently been increased to a remarkable extent, and for very realistic causes. Some 28,000 American troops are now stationed in that country, engaged in forwarding supplies to Russia. Large numbers of British and Russian troops are also stationed in the country. It is there, he said, that the three great Powers: United States, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., come in most intimate contact. We have every reason not only to desire but to insist that Iran be kept peaceful and that causes for disturbances there be eliminated. Mr. Murray pointed out that the fruit of our carefully cultivated policy towards Iran had ripened in the Tehran Declaration issued December 1, 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This Declaration, for which the American officials at Tehran were primarily responsible and the wording of which, in fact, had been prepared by our own officers, not only guaranteed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iran but also gave assurances 20 Wallace Murray became Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, January 15, 1944. 21 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State. 22 For correspondence regarding Iranian employment of American financial advisers, see Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 679 ff. that the three Powers concerned would aid in the economic development of that country. Mr. Murray said that recently General Patrick Hurley, the President's Personal Representative in Iran, had reported to the President that one of the principal means by which we could implement the policy of the Tehran Declaration would be for the War Department to broaden General Connolly's directives to enable him to take such measures as might be possible, without detriment to the primary objective of his mission, to render such assistance as he could, through men and matériel to the Iranian Government.23 At this point Colonel Johnson, the officer in immediate charge of Iranian matters in the Operations Division, joined the conversations at Mr. McCloy's request. Mr. McCloy asked for suggestions regarding the type of help General Connolly might render. Mr. Murray said that there frequently arose opportunities for the American forces in Iran to help the Persians in large or small matters. Reference was made to the question of digging wells with equipment which General Connolly controls, to the question of possible assistance in road-building or other construction projects, and to the supplying of technical personnel for communications. Colonel Johnson said that General Connolly recently had been asked to report on the possible assistance which he might render the Persians, but that his absence in Russia had doubtless prevented a reply. The War Department expected to receive an answer within a week or so. Colonel Johnson added that General Connolly had already reported a shortage of troops under his command and an inability to release any of his men for service in other war areas. Mr. Allen suggested that while General Connolly might feel an over-all shortage, certain categories of technicians might be available from time to time as their jobs are completed. Mr. Allen thought that there were two reasons which General Connolly might give for declining to assist the Iranians: (1) A lack of any surplus of men or matériel, and (2) a lack of any authorization from the War Department to accord such assistance, even if he had the men and matériel. Mr. Allen thought that the principal object of the present discussion was to remove the second possible objection. Colonel Johnson said that General Connolly had received numerous requests from the Iranians for assistance and referred to a very improper request from the President of the Medjlis 24 to build a private road on his property. Mr. Murray said that the State Department was certainly not proposing that General Connolly be au 23 For General Hurley's letter of December 21, 1943, to President Roosevelt, and the latter's comments thereon, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 420. 24 The Iranian Parliament. thorized to render any assistance to private individuals, but to the Iranian people. Mr. McCloy said that he personally saw no reason why General Connolly's directives should not be broadened and that the War Department would examine the question as sympathetically as possible. He said that Colonel Johnson would keep us informed of developments, particularly as regards any reply which might be received from General Connolly. 761.91/2591 Memorandum by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1944. SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF IRAN There has been noticeable for some time a tendency on the part of the Soviet Government to negotiate with the Iranian Government agreements and contracts in which the scales are tipped heavily in Russian favor. This trend has developed to the point where it amounts to consistent Soviet exploitation of the Iranians. The agreements find Iranian acquiescence only because the Iranians fear the consequences of opposing the much-feared Russians. Previous examples of such agreements in which the Russians have imposed their desires on the Iranians include an arms agreement 25 in which the Iranians provide capital and materials to produce arms for the Russians, a financial agreement 26 in which the Russians dictated terms much less favorable than those given to the Iranians by the United States and United Kingdom, and an arrangement under which the Iranians finance to a great extent the railways and roads which the Russians are using for war purposes in the north of Iran. There are many instances of less important but equally objectionable action on the part of the Russians, such as failure to pay rent on premises occupied. A more detailed statement of examples of such Soviet exploitation is contained in the annex hereto.27 Two new examples of this Soviet attitude toward Iran have just come to light: one in the form of an agreement already signed; 28 and the other an agreement now proposed by the Soviet Government. 25 Signed January 23, 1943; for correspondence regarding United States interest in this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 628 ff. 26 Signed March 18, 1943; text transmitted to the Department in despatch 513, April 8, 1943, from Tehran (not printed). 27 Not printed. 28 This agreement of November 4, 1943, consisted of two contracts, one for the sale of rice to the Soviet Union by Iran and the other for the sale of certain manufactured goods to Iran by the Soviet Union; in actual fact related to each other, they were understood by the Legation to be legally separate (891.6131/4). Texts of these contracts were transmitted to the Department in despatch 811, January 24, 1943, from Tehran (not printed). The first of these consists of two contracts, on a cash basis, under which the Iranians will furnish the Russians 36,000 tons of rice at half the price the Iranian Government must pay to acquire the same rice, in exchange for cotton piece goods, newsprint and miscellaneous goods. The cotton piece goods, which comprise two-thirds of the value of the Russian items, are to be furnished at almost 50 percent more than the same goods would cost the Iranians in India. The second case concerns an agreement the Soviet Government is now endeavoring to negotiate with the Iranians covering the operation of the northern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway. This agreement, discussed in the annex, is considered consistently unfair to the Iranians. Preliminary examination of the text bears out this statement. The Iranians naturally wonder whether the guarantees of the Atlantic Charter 29 have any significance if a strong nation is able to impose its will upon a weaker one through this kind of negotiation. We have every reason to hope and expect that the Russians will cooperate more fully and frankly with the allies in matters of common interest in Iran as a result of the declaration on Iran made at the Tehran Conference, which pledged the three powers to assist Iran economically. We have the right also to anticipate, as a result of this declaration, more friendly and fair treatment of the Iranians by the Soviet Government in economic matters. We may, in fact, take the Tehran Declaration as a point of departure to mark the inauguration of a new era of better allied cooperation in Iran and of more considerate treatment of the Iranians. It is believed that the British Government, which gave evidence at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences of desire to support such a policy, would welcome any suggestions we might make as to how to bring about this desired end. SOME INSTANCES OF SOVIET ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF IRAN 1. The Agreement for Manufacture of Small Arms. A SovietIranian agreement was made early in 1943 providing for the manufacture of certain small arms and ammunition in Iranian plants for delivery to the Soviet Government. Under this agreement, the Iranian Government is required to finance the preparation and operation of the plants and to furnish raw materials. The Russians agree to cooperate with technical advice, plans and, in some instances, machinery and tools. Soviet military delegates are to be stationed in the plants to observe and stimulate production. Severe financial penalties are to be levied against the Iranian Government in case of failure to meet the impossible rates of delivery called for in the contract. In spite of the fact that the Iranians finance the plants, the Russians have 29 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367. |