in the letter of 6 March 1944 from the Under Secretary of War to the Under Secretary of State. For the Secretary of War: 711.91/8-2144 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State WASHINGTON, August 21, 1944. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have read with interest the letter from the Acting Secretary of State of August 12, 1944 outlining the policy of the United States Government toward Iran and suggesting that the cooperation of the War Department and its representatives in Iran will be of the greatest importance in furthering this policy. As is mentioned in the paraphrase of the telegram 91 sent to the American Legation in Teheran, which was enclosed with the Acting Secretary's letter, General Connolly's directives were broadened so that he could give assistance to the various Iranian Government Agencies, when such assistance was permitted without detriment to his primary mission of transporting supplies to Russia. I understand from General Connolly that the American Legation at Teheran and the Persian Gulf Command are now working together in close harmony. The information contained in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities in the War Department. As you know, General Connolly is presently in the United States and this information will be brought to his attention before he returns to Teheran. Sincerely yours, 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9-444 HENRY L. STIMSON President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) 92 WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944. MY DEAR SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA: I was pleased and touched to receive, on my return to Washington, your friendly communication of June 17, 1944. It is unfortunate that I was prevented by pressing matters, including my extended visit to the Pacific Coast and Hawaii, from receiving your communication directly from the hands of Mr. Ebtehadj. I 91 Telegram 462, July 31, 8 p. m., p. 343. Transmitted to the Chargé in Iran by the Secretary of State in instruction 483, September 6, for delivery to the Shah. should have been glad to learn from him at first-hand of your health and of developments in Your Majesty's intention to endeavor to intensify the cooperation already existing between Iran and the United States, both now and after the war. Although the pressures under which I have labored during the past year have not always made it possible for me to demonstrate, in ways I should have liked, my special interest in and personal regard for Iran, I know I can rely on Your Majesty's deep understanding of the exigencies which have demanded my attention during these past months. Iran and America have every reason to be close friends. Patience and understanding on both our parts are needed. If matters of irritation arise, I hope you will let me know your views in the spirit of frankness and cordiality which I hope will always characterize our relations. General Hurley has spoken to me often of Your Majesty and has assured me that you would understand and reciprocate my sentiments. With the warmest personal regards and wishes for Your Majesty's health and the welfare of your people, I am Cordially yours, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9-444 President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) 93 WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944. MY DEAR SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA: Of course, I do not pretend to know Iran well on account of the shortness of my visit, but may I write you about one of the impressions which I received on my air trip to Teheran? It relates to the lack of trees on the mountain slopes and the general aridity of the country which lies above the plains. All my life I have been very much interested in reforestation and the increase of the water supply which goes with it. May I express a hope that your Government will set aside a small amount for a few years to test out the possibility of growing trees or even shrubs on a few selected areas to test out the possibility of trees which would hold the soil with their roots and, at the same time, hold back floods? We are doing something along this line in our western dry areas and, though it is a new experiment, it seems to be going well. 93 Transmitted to the Chargé in Iran by the Secretary of State in his instruction 483, September 6, for delivery to the Shah. It is my thought that if your Government would try similar small experiments along this line it would be worthwhile for the future of Iran. I do not need to tell you how much interested I am in that future, and the future of the people of Iran. With my warm regards, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/10-1244 The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt 94 SAAD-ABAD, [TEHRAN,] October 4, 1944. MY DEAR PRESIDENT: I have received from the hands of Your Ambassador, Leland B. Morris, who has made a very good impression upon me, the two letters which Your Excellency was good enough to write me on September 2nd. The friendly interest which You take in the welfare of my country has touched me deeply. Please believe that I fully reciprocate your sentiments and share the view that the United States and Iran have every reason to be close friends and everything to gain by intimate, confident relations. If we cooperate wholeheartedly and unswervingly abide by the principles for which you entered the War and which you have advocated in the Atlantic Charter, the progress and prosperity of Iran as well as the maintenance of peace and security in this part of the World will no doubt be assured to our mutual advantage. No misunderstanding or temporary friction must ever be allowed to affect in any way the cordiality and sincerity of our relations. Your suggestion regarding the reforestation of our arid mountain slopes is very valuable, coming as it does from one who is an expert in the matter and who has done so much on the same lines for his own country. I am drawing the attention of my Ministry of Agriculture to the necessity of testing out in certain areas the possibility of growing trees. In conjunction with reforestation and afforestation, which will in themselves increase the supply of water, there is the very important, I might say, vital problem of irrigation. The soil of Iran is extremely fertile if we can only get water to it. There are immense desert regions which could be made to blossom into fair fields of corn and wheat etc. We are beginning to tackle this problem, and here again "Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 73, October 12, from Tehran; received October 26. the vast experience and technical and material assistance of America will be most useful and welcome to us. I can quite realise how busy you must be in these days of preparation for the Presidential Elections. With warmest wishes [etc.] MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI 761.91/10-2444 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) 95 [WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1944. We should pay the closest attention in the immediate future to the question of Soviet-Iranian relations. Recent evidence of the Soviet displeasure towards Iran obviously because of the cancellation by the Iranian Government of all negotiations for oil concessions is increasingly ominous. When the news of the decision of the Iranian Government was published in the Soviet press in the form of a Tass despatch, Soviet displeasure was made known in the charge that the Iranian Government, in calling off the negotiations with the Soviet Union for a Soviet oil concession in the north, was acting "contrary to public opinion in Iran". While this was in itself a disturbing indication of Soviet attitude, at least the Tass despatch dealt openly with the question at issue. The violent attack on the Iranian Government and on Saed, the Iranian Premier and Foreign Minister, which appeared in Trud on October 22 is more serious. (Trud, although technically the organ of the Soviet trade unions, like all publications in the Soviet Union expresses official Soviet policy.) The disturbing feature of this attack is that it does not make any specific mention of the oil concession question. It accuses the Iranian Government and Saed in particular of tolerating and even encouraging acts of sabotage of the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union on the part of "pro-fascist elements in Iran" and of the persecution of Iranian officials who were loyally trying to carry out the treaty obligations between Iran, the USSR and Great Britain. The article is replete with characteristic charges of pro-fascist tendencies and opposition to pro-democratic elements on the part of Saed and the Iranian Government. In fact, this article has all of the customary elements of the build-up in order to justify extreme Soviet pressure if not action against the present Iranian Government. Its immediate purpose appears to be to force the resignation of Saed and 95 Addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) and the Deputy Director (Matthews). the formation of a new government in Iran which would be prepared to continue the negotiations for an oil concession. In view of the obvious dangers which may result from the tactics of the Soviet Government in regard to Iran, we should formulate in advance of any crisis in Soviet-Iranian relations the policy and attitude of this Government.97 CHARLES E. BOHLEN 761.91/11-2844: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State LONDON, November 28, 1944-7 p. m. [Received November 28-6:02 p. m.] 10498. In commenting to us on the Soviet-Iranian situation 98 a Foreign Office official today said the following: The new Iranian Prime Minister . . . is friendly to the Allies. The Cabinet is composed of men about whom little is known. The Foreign Office believes however that the new Cabinet is not likely to give in to the continued Russian pressure. The Foreign Office feels real concern over the Soviet attitude towards Iran, and believes that this situation created by the Soviets is in fact a test case of future Soviet relations with Iran, and, indeed, with other countries adjacent to the Soviet Union. Kavtaradze 99 and those Iranian newspapers controlled by the Soviets are keeping up their campaign about the oil concessions, which is worrying. The British Embassy at Washington has been instructed to inform the Department about the new British note to the Soviets 1 on this general subject, a note which is a reminder that the British expect an answer to their previous note to the Soviet Government 2 on this matter. 97 WINANT For instructions to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to deliver a note to the Soviet Government regarding the views of the United States concerning the oil concessions problem, see telegram 2566, October 30, 10 p. m., p. 462. 98 Mohammed Saed had resigned as Prime Minister on November 9, it was widely believed, under Russian pressure; a new government had been formed on November 26 by Morteza Qoli Bayat; for correspondence on the political crisis, see pp. 445 ff. 99 Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who headed the Russian delegation which came to Iran in September seeking oil concessions for the Soviet Union. 1 On November 20 the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr) had sent a letter to Molotov inviting a clarification of Russian intentions in Iran; see telegram 4459, November 22, 10 p. m., from Moscow, p. 475. 2 November 2; see telegram 810, November 3, 2 p. m., from Tehran, and telegram 4438, November 20, 7 p. m., from Moscow, pp. 466 and 474, respectively. |