these statements. Perhaps he hopes we will intervene to keep him in office. However Saed recently criticized Millspaugh Mission very severely in conversation with me (my 116 of February 21) and the last few weeks have seen an ever swelling volume of press criticism directed at almost all American advisers. There is talk of Majlis. investigation of their work. I do not think therefore that Soheily's. remarks can be lightly dismissed. I plan to see British Minister this evening, tell him frankly substance of Prime Minister's statements regarding advisers and sound out his attitude toward a possible joint démarche, if such action should seem advisable. I also plan a more discreet approach to Soviet Embassy, and shall try to see Minister of Court and with a view to gauging court sentiment directly. FORD. 891.20 Missions/11 No. 899 The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, March 28, 1944.. [Received April 18.] SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter 80 written by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf,81 the American adviser to the Iranian Gendarmerie, to the War Department concerning certain difficulties he is encountering in carrying out his work in Iran. The Schwarzkopf Mission has encountered an extraordinary series. of ups and downs during its stay in Iran. The long period of being mere advisers with no legal authority to put their reforms into effect finally terminated last December with the signature of the agreement providing for the engagement of this mission.82 Immediately subsequent to that event and for some time thereafter, everything went smoothly for this mission, and Colonel Schwarzkopf upon his return from the United States was delighted and greatly surprised at the cooperation and the eagerness to please that he met in all Iranian circles. He was made Director of the Gendarmerie and his word was said to be final, subject only to the control of the Minister of the Interior. Several months ago Colonel Schwarzkopf became involved in a struggle with the Iranian Army over the independence of the Gen 79 Sir Reader W. Bullard. 80 Not printed. Former head of the New Jersey State Police, appointed by the Iranian Government to organize the Iranian Gendarmerie (rural police); for previous correspondence regarding the Schwarzkopf Gendarmeric Mission, see Foreign Relations. 1943, vol. IV, pp. 510 ff. 82 Signed at Tehran, November 27, 1943, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 361, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1262. 554-184-65-26 darmerie in which he appeared to achieve a marked victory, obtaining separation from the Army of all matters pertaining to the promotion, discipline, and pensions of the Gendarmerie. He won this fight against the opposition of the Shah and his advisers and against the advice of several of the more reliable members of the War Ministry. A number of persons felt that the Gendarmerie could not be completely divorced from the Army since in the final analysis, it was upon the latter that the country must depend for security, a security that the Gendarmerie could not possibly hope to achieve by itself. (I must admit that there is much to be said for the argument in favor of a quasi-unified organization to keep the tribes in order and give Iran her great dream of peace and quiet.) Whatever the pros and cons of his argument, Schwarzkopf emerged from the struggle with increased prestige and also with a number of new enemies and a reputation for stubbornness which caused alarm to a number of people, including General Ridley.83 Some time ago Colonel Schwarzkopf reported to me that he was encountering considerable opposition to his reforms from the Under Secretary of the Interior, and he appeared seriously worried about this development. When the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Hajir, returned from London a few weeks ago, he evinced no particular interest in cooperating with the mission and was felt by the members of the mission to be under the influence of his Under Secretary. The matter, as will be seen by the enclosed letter, has come to a head with the complete flouting of Colonel Schwarzkopf's wishes in the question of the New Year's promotions. This particular matter is not in itself overly serious, but it does indicate that the appropriate Iranian officials intend to cooperate with the mission only when it is in their interest so to do. This trend will bear particularly close attention since the Gendarmerie mission has since its arrival enjoyed far more popularity in Iran than any of the other American advisory organizations and since the present campaign in the press against the American advisers makes it most inadvisable that any of these men become involved in controversies with their Iranian superiors. A great deal of Colonel Schwarzkopf's difficulties arise from his rank, the prestige minded Iranian officials resenting a mere Colonel requesting the attentions usually reserved for Generals and issuing orders which they, who consider themselves his superiors, are supposed to obey. This office has recommended on more than one occasion that Colonel Schwarzkopf be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in order to obtain the prestige in Iranian eyes that he 83 Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley was American military adviser to the Iranian Government on matters pertaining to the services of supply to the Iranian Army; for correspondence relating to the Ridley Mission, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 510 ff. must have for his mission to be a success. I cannot emphasize this matter too strongly and I recommend that the Department take all the steps in its power to convince the War Department of the importance of this promotion. It would also be helpful if Colonel Schwarzkopf's second in command, Lt. Colonel Boone, were to be promoted to the rank of full Colonel. In addition to the importance of these promotions as far as the success of the mission is concerned, both men are in my opinion fully deserving of raises in rank. As an example of what the mission suffers by the lowness of its chief's rank, I am enclosing a translation 84 of an article appearing in Mihanparastan on March 15 on this subject. If necessary, it might be wise to point out to the War Department the great interest shown by the President in the adviser program at the time of the Tehran conference 85 and to remind it that such promotions would be entirely in line with the War Department's recent change in General Connolly's directives. I do not mean to imply in this report that the Gendarmerie Mission has in any way been a failure, which it has not. It still is the most popular of our missions here and still, by the sincerity and ability of its members, is able to make its weight felt in Gendarmerie matters. It must, however, have the full support of our Government and at the present moment this can best be shown by promoting its officers. If, on the other hand, the situation in the Ministry of the Interior deteriorates, I recommend that we give this mission the fullest measure of our support by representations, formal or informal to the Iranian officials involved. Respectfully yours, RICHARD FORD 891.51A/1087: Telegram The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, April 11, 1944-4 p. m. [Received 4:15 p. m.] 249. Debate on Cabinet was resumed today.86 Deputy Kazemi spoke at length and bitterly against Millspaugh, emphasizing what he called Millspaugh's dictatorial attitude and demanding that he be removed. Kazemi likewise criticized subordinate members of Mission by name, among them Solomon (Financial Agent in Khlizistan), Vivian (now Director General of Industrial Development), Shuck 84 Not printed. 85 See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, footnote 33, p. 469 and editorial note, p. 564. 56 Mohammed Saed had replaced Ali Soheily as Prime Minister, and had organized a new government on April 6, 1944. man (Director of Movements), and [omission] (assistant in Price Stabilization Section). Deputies Etebar and Keshavar also criticized Millspaugh but in milder vein. No vote was taken today. Debate is to be continued April 13. FORD 891.51A/1114 No. 920 The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, April 18, 1944. [Received April 28.] SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch number 906 dated April 4, 1944 enclosing an editorial 87 from a Tehran newspaper on the subject of the Millspaugh Mission and to enclose a further collection of calumnies on this subject. Dr. Millspaugh has a tough skin and, while upset over the bitterly hostile press he has suddenly acquired, he does not appear to be unduly alarmed over it. Far more important to him are the attitudes of the Prime Minister and the Majlis which may be said to be definitely hostile at the moment. I intend to forward the Department a separate despatch 88 within the next few days recounting the stormy sessions of the past week in the Majlis with special emphasis on the violent attacks on Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. At this time however, I wish merely to transmit typical articles of the Iranian press on the Millspaugh question. Bad as the reputation of the Tehran papers may be, continued onslaughts of this sort cannot but do the Mission irreparable harm and I shall not fail to let the Department have the more interesting of these diatribes as they appear. Respectfully yours, RICHARD FORD 891.20 Mission/11a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) WASHINGTON, April 21, 1944-10 p.m. 243. The agreement signed on November 27, 1943 providing for the assignment of a United States Military Mission to Iran (Schwarzkopf) expires on October 2, 1944. Please ascertain discreetly and inform the Department by cable whether the Iranian Government desires to renew the agreement for an additional period of 2 years under the authority contained in Title I, Article 2 of the basic agreement. This is a routine inquiry, under the Department's policy of making adequate preparation in advance for renewal of missions. HULL 891.51A/1120 No. 922 The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, April 25, 1944. [Received May 4.] SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams number 246 dated April 10 and number 249 dated April 11, 1944 89 concerning the Majlis debate on the program submitted by the New Prime Minister, Mr. Saed, and the violent attacks it produced on the American Financial Mission. Reference is also made to the Legation's despatch number 920 dated April 18, 1944 covering the recent press campaign against Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh and his mission. The attacks on Dr. Millspaugh in the Majlis were not entirely unexpected, but the number of deputies desirous of voicing anti-Millspaugh sentiments, the violence of the attacks and the complete lack of any adequate defense of the mission have come as something of a surprise. The prestige of certain of the attacking deputies, moreover, especially Dr. Mossadegh, bodes no good for the future of the mission. Dr. Mossadegh's speech in opposition to the Financial Mission was devoted primarily to criticism of the Mission's handling of the food supply, price control and distribution, the phases of his work concerning which Millspaugh meets the most criticism and opposition. Mossadegh also flayed the Government for the type of men selected for the Mission, maintaining that all American advisers should be recommended and their performance guaranteed by the United States Government. This argument is, of course, completely ridiculous since all men coming to Iran for service with the Iranian Government come under strong Departmental recommendations and for the most part, all have been extremely capable men. Unfortunately as stated above, Dr. Mossadegh, despite his recent defeat at the hands of Seyid Zia edDin,90 is a very popular man in Iran, and his words carry a great deal of weight. His speech for the most part was from start to finish rather absurd and showed an amazing lack of knowledge for a man of his experience and reputation. Other deputies involved in the onslaught worthy of mention here were Etebar, Kazemi (a cousin of the famous Bagher Kazemi, now Minister to Sweden), Keschavar, Tussi, Farivar, and Abdoh. Many others joined in the chorus, but for the most part merely echoed what 89 Telegram No. 246 not printed. 90 Seyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai, Iranian Deputy in the Majlis. |