« PreviousContinue »
CULTURAL RELATIONS PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA, AND TO FACILITATE GREATER CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THESE COUNTRIES
811.42700/179b: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul
General at Beirut (Wadsworth)
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1944—8 p. m. 77. Department has approved grant of $45,000.00 to American University Beirut and International College for each country named below five full 2-year scholarships or eight partial scholarships, approximately $900 per year maximum plus travel, to be awarded to students from Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. Students will be chosen by national ministers of education in consultation with American ministers and in accordance with University requirements. University will have privilege of final choice. Staub 2 has accepted and countries have been informed.
Please ask Dodge 3 to send missions above countries necessary information about requirements, qualifications and needs of students of American University Beirut and International College. Letter with details will follow.
* This was in pursuance of a program of cultural relations and technical assistance for the countries of the Near East and Africa, which was being organized by the Department of State from late 1942, and which represented an extension to the Moslem world of a program already successfully established with respect to the American Republics in 1938–1941 and China in 1941-1942. Focus of the program was centered mainly on American-founded schools in the area, the Department, via the Near East College Association of New York City, making grants-in-aid for special projects in education, health, engineering and agriculture, and sponsoring the exchange of professors and students. Throughout 1943 and 1944 this program was financed from the Emergency Fund for the President, as the Act of Congress approved August 9, 1939 (53 Stat. (pt. 2) 1290), which provided the legal basis for the American Republics program, had not yet been extended to include such activities conducted by the Department outside the Western Hemisphere. (811.42700/7–1344, 132)
2 Albert W. Staub, American Director, Near East College Association. * Bayard Dodge, president of the American University at Beirut.
PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE JOINT POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF SUPPLYING AFGHANISTAN WITH ESSENTIAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS
890H.24/151c: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan
WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944–7 p. m. 23. The Department feels that every effort should be made, taking into account wartime conditions of supply and shipping, to accede to Afghanistan's desire to meet its requirements by importations from the United States.
For the duration of the present informal arrangement for joint screening with the British of Afghan requirements, the criteria for recommendation of imports from the United States are, as you know:
1. Essentiality of import to Afghan economy.
2. Unavailability of imports from Indian production or other closer sources of supply.
With reference to point 2, the availability of imports from areas other than the United States should be considered in the light of our lend-lease contributions to those areas. The ability of closer areas to supply commodities furnished to such areas under lend-lease, or to supply commodities containing lend-lease components would not, except in special cases, justify adverse recommendation from the Legation. The same considerations apply to commodities the local production of which is substantially supplemented by lend-lease contributions.
It is realized that the Legation may not always have at hand information which will enable it to be guided by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. Those considerations are pointed out, however, as applicable insofar as information readily available to the Legation permits.
For your confidential information the Department is informed that United States ships can be made available for transport of consignments to Indian ports, including those destined for Afghanistan.
For previous correspondence concerning this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 20 ff. passim.
As the British Legation may view Afghan requests with less liberality, it is realized that attitudes of the two Legations toward recommendation may not always be identical. The Department desires full information when such divergence of opinion exists. In event that joint recommendation is unfavorable, basis therefor is desired in detail in order that the position of this Government may be fully explained to the Afghan Legation in Washington.
890H.24/154 : Telegram The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State
KABUL, February 11, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received February 15—9:23 a. m.] 19. Afghan authorities urge that a separate shipping quota be established for United States exports to Afghanistan and that within this quota Afghan representatives themselves be permitted to assign priorities for shipment of goods licensed for export by the United States.
British Legation inclines to view that this would simplify procedure without depriving India of any significant tonnage and without interfering with control by export license. Beecroft 2 and I concur. Joint screening would of course remain necessary here both for preliminary determination of source of supply and to estimate total shipping program.
British Legation is consulting its Government.
890H.24/172a : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert)
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1944–6 p. m. 48. Part 1. The Department informed the India Supply Mission of recommendation contained in Legation's no. 19 of February 11 with request that recommendation be implemented. Mission replied that it would request instructions from the Government of India and now states that a telegram has been received to effect that proposal made by you which "originated with the Afghans” has been dropped as it would not facilitate procurement which is principal problem at present.
* Eric Beecroft of the Office of the Special Representative of the Foreign Economic Administration at New Delhi was at Kabul January 12 to February 13 studying the Afghan supply situation.
* Foreign Economic Administration.
In practice the Afghans are having no difficulty in securing shipping space at present and requests for allocations are made in each instance by them to an American agency rather than to the India Supply Mission. This arrangement is, of course, more acceptable to the Afghan representatives in this country than was the former which required that each request be transmitted in the first instance to the India Supply Mission. It may be, however, that the Afghans realize that actually the India Supply Mission still controls the allocations and hence that the existing agreement is also distasteful to them.
The Department does not entirely understand the basis for the opposition of the Government of India to this proposal and is prepared to insist that a specific tonnage allocation be allocated for Afghan requirements if circumstances so warrant. Before taking further action, however, an expression of opinion from the Legation is desired.
As there are a limited number of American flagships proceeding from the United States to India and as WSA4 is understood to be extremely sympathetic to the proposal, it is believed that a specific tonnage allocation for Afghanistan could be established irrespective of opposition by the Government of India.
Part II. Subsequent to the drafting of the aforegoing, Department has been informed by WSA that informal conversations on this subject have taken place between WSA and MWT5 Results of these talks will be communicated to you.
890H.24/180 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the
Division of Middle Eastern Affairs
[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1944. Participants: The Afghan Minister Abdol Hosayn Aziz
Mr. Oakes The Afghan Minister called at his request. He proceeded to discuss the following matters:
[Here follows section devoted to problems of Afghan students.]
(2) The Minister stated that the quotas provided by FEA for Afghan requirements were not satisfactory in that they included many items which the Afghans did not need, and omitted many items which were necessary. Mr. Oakes replied that because of delay in receiving
* War Shipping Administration. • British Ministry of War Transport. • Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
the schedule of requirements from Afghanistan, the requirements officers in FEA had been obliged to establish quotas without precise knowledge of Afghan needs. Mr. Oakes suggested that the Minister endeavor to have his Government submit its requirement lists more promptly, including therein an estimate of all items needed from the United States by either the Government or the people of Afghanistan, and of which the importation is contemplated.
(3) The Minister referred to the desire of the Afghan-American Trading Company to import into the United States 2,000 tons of wool, 500 tons of pistachio nuts, and 100 tons of almonds, and to the refusal of this Government to authorize import quotas in the amount requested. Mr. Oakes replied that our refusal had been based on several grounds: (a) The items were unessential (it is understood that Afghan wool is used in this country almost exclusively for carpets), and hence the conservation of shipping space was involved; (6) The railways in India were so over-taxed and their continued efficient operation so essential to our and our Allies' war effort in India that this Government considered it necessary to discourage the transportation to ports in India for shipment to the United States of unessential items; (c) Because of lack of shipping space it had been necessary to refuse import quotas for nuts to certain of our Allies in South America, and hence it was felt that we could not reasonably import nuts at this time from faraway Afghanistan without causing resentment by the South American countries concerned.
The Minister stated that he was not so concerned about the quota for nuts but that he would greatly appreciate it if we would endeavor to do something about the wool. Our failure to permit any appreciable quantity of wool to enter this country resulted, he implied, in the British offering to pay only an unreasonably low price for Afghan wool. He felt that conditions should be such as to compel purchasers to pay the world market price. With regard to the railroads, he stated that wagons proceeding to Karachi must in many instances be empty because of the large quantity of goods entering India at that port, and that in any event there was a railroad from a point near the southern border of Afghanistan passing through Quetta to Karachi, over which very little traffic flowed. Wool could be shipped by this route. He remarked further that irrespective of the validity of our argument regarding the railroads, he felt as a friend that it was not a desirable one for us to advance as the officials in Kabul could not understand why we rather than the British must give consideration to that point. He was told that while it appeared improbable that anything could be done about the nuts, we would see if there could not be obtained an increase in the quota for Afghan wool.
[Here follows discussion of miscellaneous questions.]