informed of British representations they should know for a matter of our own prestige we likewise intervened on their behalf. I should be glad to receive any comment as to policy to pursue in these circumstances. Sent Department; repeated London, Moscow. MORRIS 891.6363/11-3044: Telegram The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] TEHRAN, November 30, 1944-2 p. m. [Received November 30-1:35 p. m.] 882. I had a long conversation with the Shah who invited me to come to see him the day before yesterday. His Majesty took occasion to affirm that he had not changed his mind in any way in regard to the Russian concessions. He added that Prime Minister Bayat had given assurance that he would follow the policy of Saed. The Shah felt that Iranian policy would be reinforced and made clearly evident if a new government which had not negotiated with anyone on petroleum would come into power and maintain the policy of no negotiation about concessions until after the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Iran. He felt strongly that it was more logical and defensible to hinge concession negotiations upon withdrawal of foreign troops rather than upon the termination of the war in Europe. He felt the Iranian public would understand and approve this viewpoint. The Shah's remarks on other matters were of a general nature and not worthy of comment but I think I should say that his attitude was distinctly more friendly than in any previous audience. I had sent him previously clippings from the American press discussing favorably the Iranian position in the Russian controversy. This had evidently had a markedly good effect and the Shah expressed his satisfaction at the understanding shown in the US in regard to the position of his country in respect to the Russian issue. MORRIS 891.6363/11-2544: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) WASHINGTON, November 30, 1944-7 p. m. 702. Urtel 871, November 25. You may inform the Iranian Government that this Government addressed a note to the Soviet Government with regard to the oil controversy. You may add that the Soviet Government was informed of the position taken by this Government in the matter as set forth in your note to the Iranian Government (urtel 795, October 30) and was told that our action was based on the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943. STETTINIUS 891.6363/12-344: Telegram The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, December 3, 1944. [Received December 7-1:08 a. m.] 895. The Majlis yesterday received and enacted during the same session the following introduced by Dr. Mossadegh.90 "Article 1. No Prime Minister or Minister or Acting Minister or Under Secretary of State may undertake any official discussions or discussions having a local character or sign any agreement regarding a petroleum concession with official or unofficial representatives of neighboring or distant governments or with representatives of oil companies or with any other person. Article 2. The Prime Minister and the Ministers may undertake negotiations for the sale of petroleum and with regard to the manner in which the Iranian Government is to exploit and administer its oil wells; the Majlis must however be informed of the progress of the negotiations. Article 3. Any person or persons violating the above provisions will be sentenced to from 3 to 8 years of imprisonment and will be permanently debarred from Government office." Sent to Department repeated to Moscow, London, Cairo, Baghdad. MORRIS 891.6363/12-544: Telegram The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State TEHRAN, December 5, 1944-noon. [Received 4:40 p. m.] 900. ReEmbs 895, December 3. Law forbidding oil concession negotiations with foreign representatives was put through the Majlis in 2 hours from time of presentation, meeting only feeble opposition. The success of this tour de force was undoubtedly made possible only by the personal prestige of Dr. Mossadegh but the brevity of the debate and certain other indications point to the possibility that a large group of Deputies knew of the project in advance and had agreed to act quickly in order to forestall opponents. If this was the case, how "Mohammed Mossadegh, Deputy in the Majlis. ever, they seem to have maintained complete secrecy as there was no advance hints or rumors of the move. Tudeh Deputies from whom real opposition might have been expected appear to have been taken absolutely by surprise and could only make technical objections and plead almost abjectly for time to consider the bill, a request which was briskly denied by the majority. A story to which I am inclined to give considerable credence says that the bill was prepared in consultation with Saed and Court Minister Ala. Another rumor attributes it to British inspiration, but I have no reason to believe this was the case. Mossadegh himself said the idea was given him by another Deputy some weeks ago. Whatever the source, the law is entirely in accord with Mossadegh's previous public statements and bears the marks of his handiwork. From the one point of view the law is superfluous since the Iranian Constitution has always required that any projected concession be approved by the Majlis before taking effect. However, its significance under present circumstances is clear. At one and the same time it ratifies in effect the oil policy of the Saed Cabinet and specifically takes the question of such policy out of the hands of the present and any future Cabinet. It provides the Government with extremely strong defense against future pressure or persuasion which will now have to be directed at the Majlis, a more difficult target for attack by virtue of its numbers. Article 2 of the law has reference to a proposal frequently put forward in recent weeks by some Deputies and newspapers that Iran should form an organization of its own to exploit and market petroleum. In his speech on December 2 Mossadegh urged the creation of a Petroleum Ministry to undertake this task and proposed that the products be sold to the Soviets or any other interested country at the world market price; he envisaged employment of foreign technical assistance but under Iranian administration. Press reaction will be forwarded when analyzed. MORRIS 891.6363/12-644: Telegram The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 907. ReEmbs 900 of December 5. On December 2 Ambassador Harriman 91 and I paid a call upon the British Ambassador. While we were talking, Sir Reader was called to the telephone and informed 91 Ambassador Harriman was returning to the Soviet Union from the United States. that the Majlis had just passed the law forbidding negotiations with foreigners on oil concessions. Sir Reader, both by word and in manner, registered complete surprise and I am confident that he had no previous knowledge of this action and therefore any stories to the effect that this measure was British-inspired I think are without foundation. From the British Embassy Mr. Harriman and I proceeded to the Russian Embassy to call upon the Ambassador and Vice Commissar Kavtaradze.92 Interpretation was carried out by Major Pantuhoff of General Connolly's 92a staff and an English-speaking secretary of the Russian Embassy was also present. We remained about an hour with the Soviet representatives and the atmosphere was entirely cordial insofar as Russian-American affairs are concerned, some aspects of which were briefly touched upon. The attitude of the Soviet officials towards the Government of Persia was one of contempt and sarcasm intermingled with an air of injured innocence. Ambassador Maximov was the more outspoken relative to relations with Persia. He also had just learned of the action of the Majlis. He expressed the view that it was the United States and the Soviets who were the losers by this action and addressing himself to me by name made a broad hint that we might put our heads together to contemplate defensive steps. It was pretty clear he had in mind that the British being already established would benefit by the exclusion of Russian and American interests in regard to oil. He disclosed somewhat his line of thought by asserting that new elections for the Majlis would have to be held within 5 months and it was possible to expect that Deputies might be elected who would not hold the views on oil concessions which the present Deputies appeared to possess as judged by their resolution. There can be little doubt that he was thinking of influencing the selection of Deputies and perhaps meant to implant the same thought in my mind. He spoke of the wretchedness of the Persian working classes which he attributed to the exploitation by the 500 (according to his enumeration) ruling families who owned the land and exchanged governmental positions amongst themselves in rotation. He suggested that such a government could not be of an enduring nature. At this juncture Kavtaradze interrupted to highlight the conversation by quoting from Lord Byron to the effect that while waiting for empires to crumble slowly it occurred that an empire might disappear over 92 For Ambassador Harriman's report of this conversation, see last paragraph of his telegram 4771, December 11, 6 p. m., p. 354. 92a Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commander of the Persian Gulf Service Command. night. I have so far been unable to find the quotation. I do not know whether Lord Byron was correctly cited. However, rightly or wrongly, there is no doubt as to what Kavtaradze had in mind. Mr. Harriman tactfully attempted to find out when Kavtaradze thought of returning to Moscow. The Commissar replied good humoredly that he was enjoying a vacation here which was doing him a lot of good. That is about as far as we got on that point. Ambassador Harriman was shown the recently unveiled plaque in commemoration of the historic meeting of last November 93 and we took our departure in an atmosphere of cordiality. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow, Cairo, Baghdad and London. MORRIS 761.91/12-844 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt WASHINGTON, December , 1944.94 As agreed in our recent conversation, I present below for your convenience, a summary of the status of Soviet-Iranian relations and a recommendation as to this Government's attitude. The British Government has taken up again with the Soviet Government the question of Soviet pressure on Iran which has resulted in the resignation of the Iranian Prime Minister and which, while it appeared to have relaxed for a brief time, is now apparently being renewed. The British are basing their plea for the respect of Iranian sovereignty on the Declaration of Iran of December 1, 1943 and on the tripartite British-Soviet-Iranian treaty. Mr. Eden hopes very much that the American Government will also press the Russians to respect Iranian sovereignty. We are of course following the developments in Iran with the closest attention, and should be prepared to make representations to the Soviet Government if the situation appears to warrant such a step. I am not yet convinced that we should immediately take up the question with the Russians as the British request but would like to have your approval in advance in order that we may be able to take quick action if that appears necessary. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. 93 The Tehran Conference. 94 Notation by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen): "Apparently went to the White House without a date. Probably about Dec. 6." |