support. They made no satisfactory answer to a question concerning the number of Moroccans who shared their views.

In reply to their request for my views and advice, I stated that I did not think that the American people and Government would look with favor upon any political movement which would tend to distract us from our present all-encompassing absorption in the prosecution of the war. Having in mind our desire to see agricultural production increased in Morocco, I suggested that the best way to evidence their sincere interest in democratic government would be to encourage Moroccans to contribute as much as they could to the war effort and thereby to earn the gratitude and admiration of the United Nations. I also advanced the opinion that broad changes might be anticipated after the war in the concepts of colonial administration and the administration of mandates and protected countries. My interlocutors replied that they could not wait until after the war to take action because then France, having presumably regained her power, could not be driven from her privileged position in Morocco. They protested that they had no intention of provoking a disturbance, but added that they did not know what their partisans might do if the French took reprisals against them for presenting the memorial. In closing the conversation, they said that they wanted the American Government to know that their plans had not been instigated by the Germans, a theory that, they said, the French would be sure to advance. They affirmed that they were true democrats and, in support of their assertion, added that before the war they had been in close touch with the French socialist and communist parties.

In view of the potential consequences of the move contemplated by the nationalists, I deemed it expedient to acquaint the Protectorate authorities with the information I had received and therefore called yesterday afternoon upon the Chief of the Civil Cabinet. I told M. de Rose that I had learned on what I thought was good authority (I did not of course state who my informants were) of the nationalists' plan to present a petition for far-reaching reforms to the Sultan and Resident. I suggested that the authors of the petition might hope thereby to provoke the French authorities into taking harsh repressive measures which would enable them to emerge as martyrs of the nationalist cause, not only in their own country but also in Great Britain and the United States, where they might hope to gain the support of an aroused public opinion. M. de Rose told me that the Residency had received similar reports from other sources but had understood that the plan had been abandoned for the time being. He added that the British Consul General had called on the Resident General on New Year's eve to inform him about rumors to the same effect which had been reported by the British Consul at Fez. M. de

Rose assured me that the Residency would not take any hasty action against the nationalist agitators.

I called this morning on the Resident General, at the latter's request. He thanked me for the information I had given M. de Rose and referred to the remark that he had made to me on New Year's day (see my A-1, January 4, 10 a. m.29). In view of the reports he had received concerning the alleged plans of the Nationalists, he had made a point of asking the Sultan if he had any changes or reforms to propose, pointing out that under the Protectorate treaty it behooved the Sultan, rather than the latter's subjects, to propose changes and reforms. The Sultan denied that he desired any change in the administrative structure of Morocco and took occasion to express his satisfaction over the dahir concerning the instruction of Moslem girls, which is referred to below.

I pointed out to the Resident how, in view of the interest of the American Government and people in the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter 30 and the Four Freedoms,31 any harsh measures which might be taken against nationalist agitators in Morocco might cause profound reactions in American opinion. The Resident assured me that he would deal "with justice but firmness" with any situation that might arise. He would not in any event take preventative measures (i.e. arrest the agitators before they acted) as some of his predecessors had done under similar circumstances. He then inquired about the extent of American interest in native affairs. I said that I thought it was considerable and, in answer to his further inquiry, indicated that it was not centered particularly on Morocco but extended to all Arab countries generally. He asked if I thought the Arab nationalists had received any encouragement from Americans, to which I replied that I thought they may have received some encouragement in the past from certain Americans who were no longer in Morocco..

M. Puaux then spoke of the reforms decided upon or contemplated for Morocco. A dahir providing for the instruction of Moslem girls had already been signed. The Sultan was very interested in this question and the dahir had been prepared at his suggestion. Reforms in the system of moslem justice were also being studied (I had learned previously from a Residency official that what is contemplated is the training of legal advisers to the cadis-the dispensers of native justice-in an effort to bring about greater uniformity in the interpreta

29 Not printed.

30 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

31

Contained in President Roosevelt's message to the Congress, January 6, 1941, Congressional Record, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44.

tion and application of Koranic and customary laws). Mr. Puaux mentioned other measures which are projected. In answer to my inquiry if greater opportunity for education was to be given to the natives, he replied in the affirmative, adding that in particular the establishment of trade and agricultural schools was contemplated. He said that he had been shocked to find upon his arrival in Morocco that not more had been done in this sense for the natives.

The Resident General also volunteered the information that he had been studying the cases of the exiled nationalists Brahim El Wazzani (who is interned at Itzer in the Sahara) and Si Allal Fassi (who is interned in Gabon 32). He had decided, he told me in confidence, to permit El Wazzani to take up residence at Mazagan, where he would enjoy a better climate and the usual amenities of Moroccan life; he had concluded after careful consideration, however, that he could not permit the return of Allal Fassi, whom he described as an incorrigible fanatic.

Following this interview with M. Puaux, I called upon the British Consul General. Mr. Bird told me that he had visited M. Puaux on December 31, following the receipt of more alarming reports from the Consulate at Fez. He read to me extracts from reports he made to his Government following this conversation with the Resident General. I noted with interest that Mr. Bird had reported that M. Puaux felt, as I had, that the plan of the nationalists was to provoke precipitate action on the part of the Protectorate authorities in an endeavor to arouse sympathy abroad, particularly in America and Britain. The report also stated that M. Puaux had expressed concern that the nationalists may have received encouragement from certain American officials.

Mr. Bird shares my view that since apparently neither the British nor the American Governments are desirous of assuming any responsibility for the maintenance of order in Morocco, it is unfair to the French to give any encouragement to Moroccan nationalist agitators or to the intriguers in the Sherifian hierarchy. . . . We are both inclined to believe, furthermore, that M. Puaux intends to respect the obligations that France assumed when it took on the role of protecting power in Morocco and, unlike most of Marshal Lyautey's 33 successors, will not attempt to administer the country primarily for the benefit of French commercial and industrial enterprises.

The foregoing has been reported in detail not so much because serious trouble is anticipated (although the possibility must not be overlooked) as because this would seem to be an appropriate occasion to review our attitude toward the French administration in Morocco.

In French Equatorial Africa.

Louis H. G. Lyautey, first French Resident General in Morocco following the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912.

The writer does not believe that Morocco can be said to have any national aspirations. . . .

Neither group 34 is representative of the Moroccan people as a whole, nor, it is suggested, merits encouragement from the American authorities. Yet both groups appear to feel that they have received, in different ways, such encouragement.

MAYER

881.00/2730: Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, January 8, 1944-1 p. m. [Received 10:47 p. m.]

11. Reference Tangier's despatch 1876, December 28. In opinion of Consulate the strength of Moorish Nationalists in French zone is not such that any real dilemma is presented if delegation of that group presents itself at Consulate. Even if such dilemma existed I believe strongly that, unless otherwise instructed, I should inform delegation that the United States has recognized French Protectorate in Morocco, that as American representative here I can only deal in official matters with French Protectorate authorities and that consequently I cannot receive their petition or representations. I then intend to see Chief of Cabinet Diplomatique and verbally inform him of such visit and of my statement to the delegation.

See my despatch 121 [1217], December 17 35 regarding my opinion of anti-French movements, also Rabat's airgrams A-1 36 and A-2. This telegram deliberately held so that Tangier despatch may be received and noted. Department will note that Childs, Mayer and myself substantially agree.

Repeated to Tangier as my no. 2, Algiers as my no. 1 and copy true reading to Rabat.

RUSSELL

881.00/2737: Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State

RABAT, January 12, 1944-3 p. m. [Received January 13-6 a. m.]

1. Nationalists yesterday presented to the Sultan a memorial calling for Moroccan independence under Sultan, adherence to Atlantic Charter and representation at Peace Conference. Although probably

34 i.e., the officials of the Shereefian Government and the intellectual class. 35 Not printed.

30 Dated January 4, 10 a. m., not printed.

not more than handful of natives have any hope of or desire for independence there is reason to believe that not only Nationalists but also members of Sultan's entourage think time may be ripe to obtain a change in Morocco's status. Their concepts of what new status might be have not crystalized but [garbled group] whether American Protectorate or of condominium of several powers including U.S.A. and Great Britain are among the possibilities contemplated.

How far movement will develop will depend probably upon the Sultan who has not yet made known his views. . . . The attitude he will adopt depends probably upon his estimate of how much support and sympathy he may be able to gain in Great Britain and more especially in the United States.

Although movement has little if any popular support, its leaders may promote popular unrest by playing upon general dissatisfaction over French authorities' policy of compelling natives to dispose of their stocks of grain, wool and other produce for benefit of liberated areas a policy we have strongly endorsed. Moroccans take no pride in contributing to war effort by being deprived not only of imported consumer goods such as textiles, sugar and tea but also of the commodities they produce.

In conversing with Moroccans I have expressed personal opinion that the United States would not wish to enter into any political commitments involving Morocco; that this is not opportune moment to agitate question of change in Morocco's status; that American Government and people could not look with favor on political movement which would tend to detract from war effort, and that broad changes may be anticipated after the war in concepts of administration of colonies and protectorates. The example of the Lebanon is, however, an incitation to press for immediate consideration of revision of Morocco's status, especially since many Moroccans believe Great Britain and particularly the United States will support their aspirations.

If Department wants to nip in bud this movement before it could reach serious proportions, I respectfully suggest desirability of official pronouncement to the effect that American Government cannot look with favor upon political movements in areas associated in war effort which might hamper progress of war.

Background on the foregoing will be found in my A-2, January 5, 1944. As is implied herein, I take a more serious view of situation now than then.

Repeated to Algiers and Tangier; true readings to Casablanca and Tunis.

MAYER