participation in a future international regime for Tangier if as is assumed we are to share responsibilities in the control of strategic parts of the world among which Tangier is of conspicuous importance. I can perceive no useful purpose in refraining now from joining with the other principally interested parties in an approach to Spain concerning the termination of the special mission assumed by the Spanish in Tangier.

2. My understanding of the Department's motives in taking cognizance in November 1940 of the Spanish unilateral action in Tangier is that notwithstanding fact that we were not a party to the Tangier Statute it was felt that already in 1940 our relation to world political problems had so changed and Tangier had become of such strategic importance to us as a great maritime power as to make it at that time of vital importance in the national interest to assert our views with respect to Tangier and to serve notice on Spain that our interests in this area were not to be ignored.

3. Our note to Spanish Government in November '40 99 specifically stipulated we would not recognize any unilateral action taken by Spain with reference to Tangier.

4. The accumulating force of our interest in this area was evidenced by the energetic protest made in '41 in connection with Spain's unilateral action in taking over the Cape Spartel lighthouse.

I am still of the opinion as expressed in the memorandum of March 2, '44 enclosed with Department's instruction 176 of April 14, '441 that a suitable moment, i.e. on the eve of the close of hostilities in Europe, the Spanish Government should be approached by the American and British Governments with reference to Tangier. The joint or identic démarches might recall that in June '40 in communications made in Madrid and Tangier (see enclosures to Tangier despatch 1545, June 15, '402 and Madrid's telegram 192, June 14, '40 ) the Spanish Government gave notice of its intention to occupy the Tangier Zone provisionally to insure its neutrality and that the Spanish Government's task in the opinion of the interested powers has now ended and that the continued Spanish occupancy of Tangier is considered inconsistent with the aims and purposes of the United Nations as expressed in the Atlantic Charter and other declarations

"For text of note, see telegram 297, November 9, 1940, 6 p. m., to Madrid, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, p. 789.

1 Not printed.

2 Not printed; see telegram 21, June 15, 1940, 11 a. m., from Tangier, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, p. 785.

3 Ibid., p. 783.

* Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, ibid., 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

5

as well as in the Stimson Doctrine (see last paragraph on page 1 of the section headed "Provisional Interim Regime" in the memorandum on the future status of the International Zone of Tangier enclosed in the instruction mentioned). In view of the changed position of France since that memo was written it may be desirable that France be associated in the démarche. The Department will doubtless also desire to keep Russia informed as well as those powers belonging to the United Nations or benevolently neutral nations who by virtue of their adherence to the Tangier Statute or the international instruments relating to Morocco are entitled to be informed of our intentions.

Repeated to Paris and Madrid.

Б

CHILDS

See telegram 2, January 7, 1932, noon, to Nanking, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. III, p. 7. This telegram and a telegram the same mutatis mutandis to Tokyo instructed the presentation of notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments in which the statement was made that the United States would not recognize situations, treaties, or agreements brought about contrary to the obligations of the Pact of Paris. The Pact of Paris renounced war as an instrument of national policy and by its terms the contracting parties agreed never to seek the settlement of disputes among them except by peaceful means. For text of this Pact, signed August 27, 1928, see Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. I, p. 153.

PALESTINE

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE AND THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE1

867N.01/2093

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1944.

Some three days after my conversation with the British Ambassador 2 on December twenty-second, I had a further conversation with him on the telephone regarding the Jewish question. The Ambassador said that he had just heard from Mr. Eden to the effect that they were giving urgent consideration to my suggestion about the White Paper 5 and related phases of the Jewish situation. I thanked him and said that that in itself would not be sufficient unless he contemplated a further reply which would give this Government a chance to say something publicly on the White Paper. I desired respectfully to urge that the British Government acquiesce in our saying something just as Mr. Churchill was saying something on this question to important people who are interested in it.

867N.01/2373

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

MR. SECRETARY:

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1944.

H. RES. 418 AND 419

"Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be

1

Continued from Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 747–829.

2 Viscount Halifax.

3 See memorandum of December 22, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, p. 827. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

5

British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy, May 1939. The immigration clauses of the White Paper, establishing a new policy for Jewish immigration into Palestine, provided for ". . . the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. . . . After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it. . . ." For correspondence regarding American interest in the White Paper, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. IV, pp. 732 ff.

8 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

(This is approved by both McCormack and Martin.)

Mr. Sol Bloom telephoned me today to state that the foregoing resolution had been introduced by a Republican and a Democrat,10 and approved by the majority and minority leaders.

Unless otherwise advised, he plans to call his Committee for Tuesday; have no hearings but merely read Prime Minister Churchill's statement objecting to the White Paper; 11 and then report the resolution out favorably and let it go at that.

A. A. BERLE, JR..

867N.01/2192

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State

(Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1944.

Sir Ronald Campbell 12 came in to see me at my request. Representative Sol Bloom telephoned me just prior to Sir Ronald's arrival that H. Res. 418 and 419, regarding the opening of Palestine to immigration and its constitution as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, had been introduced with both Republican and Democratic support; and that he expected to put it through his Committee. He asked that we speak to the British about it. I therefore said to Sir Ronald that this was the situation: that, in my judgment, the support. of these Resolutions assured their passage; and that we thought his Government should be informed. We should be glad to have any ideas they might have. I added however that, in my judgment, there was real likelihood that the Resolutions would be passed by a large majority, if not unanimously.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

John W. McCormack, Majority Leader, House of Representatives. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Minority Leader, House of Representatives. 'Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 10 Representatives Ranulf Compton of Connecticut and James A. Wright of Pennsylvania, respectively.

11 The New York Times had reported on January 18, 1944, that the American Jewish Committee, a non-Zionist organization but opposed to the White Paper, had submitted a memorandum to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, calling attention to the Churchill opposition to the White Paper policy of the 1939 British Government; for Mr. Churchill's speech in opposition in the House of Commons as a private member, on May 23, 1939, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 347, cols. 2167 ff.

12 British Minister.

867N.01/2187

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State

(Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell came in to see me with reference to the resolutions recently proposed in the House asking that Palestine be opened to colonization and set up as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, of which I had previously informed him. He said obviously the British Government would not wish to comment on an American legislative matter; it might be pointed out that such a course involved certain obligations, including military, and that the British policy in this respect might be influenced by American willingness to join in maintaining the ensuing situation. He added that we were quite familiar with their views on the subject.

I thanked him for coming down. I told him that, as he well understood, I had brought this matter to his attention merely for information, and indeed had done so at the suggestion of Chairman Sol Bloom of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It did not follow, of course, that we would want to say anything.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

867N.01/2198

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary

of State

[Extract]

No. 13,676

LONDON, February 3, 1944. [Received February 22.]

SIR: In a general discussion on Palestinian affairs on January 29th, a Foreign Office official told a member of the Embassy staff that the British Government does not expect any particular trouble on March 31, 1944, the expiration date of the five-year period for the entry of 75,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine as set out in the White Paper. During this period the quota has not been filled, despite the great efforts made by the British to get prospective immigrants out of Nazi-controlled territory. At the present time there are still some 30,000 places to be filled in the immigration, and it has been agreed that these will be permitted to come in after March 31st.

The Foreign Office official said that the present Jewish agitation, which is, of course, extremely strong in the United States, has as its objective the withdrawal of the White Paper. The British Government does not intend, he continued, to give in to this campaign, as it