would raise a storm in the Arab world, and any serious trouble in the Middle East would constitute a grave menace to the war effort. For this reason the British believe that no solution of this vexatious problem will be possible before the conclusion of hostilities. . Respectfully yours, 867N.01/2-744 For the Ambassador: W. J. GALLMAN Counselor of Embassy The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) WASHINGTON, February 7, 1944. DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I have your letter of February 5, 1944 enclosing a copy of S. Res. 247 13 and requesting consideration of that resolution and a report thereon. Because of a suggestion that the passage of such a resolution might have an effect upon the military situation in North Africa and perhaps other Middle Eastern territories, you inquire particularly as to such possible repercussions. The subject of this resolution is a matter of deep military concern to the War Department. I feel that the passage of this resolution at the present time, or even any public hearings thereon, would be apt to provoke dangerous repercussions in areas where we have many vital military interests. Any conflict between Jews and Arabs would require the retention of troops in the affected areas and thus reduce the total forces that could otherwise be placed in combat against Germany. The consequent unrest in other portions of the Arab world would keep United Nations resources away from the combat I believe therefore that our war effort would be seriously prejudiced by such action. Sincerely yours, 867N.01/2-744 HENRY L. STIMSON The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) WASHINGTON, February 9, 1944. MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I wish to refer to your letter of February 4, 1944, regarding the resolution introduced into Congress 13 A measure drafted identical to the proposed House Resolution (see memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, January 28, p. 560) and placed before the Senate on February 1, 1944, by Senators Robert F. Wagner of New York and Robert A. Taft of Ohio. relative to Palestine, and your letter of February 5, 1944,14 with which you sent me a copy of your letter to the Secretary of War on the same subject. This Department has received a copy of the reply which the Secretary of War has addressed to you under date of February 7, 1944,15 expressing the view that the war effort would be seriously prejudiced by the passage of this resolution. In view of the military considerations advanced in this regard by the Secretary of War, it is believed that without reference to its merits no further action on this resolution would be advisable at this time. Sincerely yours, 867N.01/2193 CORDELL HULL Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1944. The Egyptian and Iraqi Ministers 16 called on me this afternoon at their request. The conference lasted approximately twenty-five minutes. The Egyptian Minister opened the conversation by saying he was greatly disturbed over the Resolution that had been introduced on the Palestine question. He stated that he had had several conferences with the President during the past few months in which the President had assured him that he hoped the whole question would be postponed until after the war. The Egyptian Minister then stated he greatly resented the attack made against his people recently by Congressman Celler of New York and asked if anything could be done. I told him that due to our democratic system of government any member of Congress could speak in any way he wished, and that it was impossible for the Executive branch of the government to exercise any restraint over members of Congress. The Iraqi Minister then said that he also shared the same concern as the Egyptian Minister over the Palestine matter, and he was hopeful that the whole matter could be postponed. I explained to the gentlemen that Secretary Hull was keeping closely in touch with the entire matter and I told them I appreciated their having come to express their views. 14 Neither found in Department files. 15 Supra. 16 Mahmoud Hassan and Ali Jawdat, respectively. E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS] 1 867N.01/2185: Telegram The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State BAGHDAD, February 14, 1944-7 p. m. [Received 7:23 p. m.] 31. Nuri Pasha 17 told me yesterday he would appreciate it if I would inform my Government by telegram of the deep concern of the Iraqi Government lest the pressure which the Zionists are exerting at present on the U.S. might result in responsible American officials or candidates for high office making commitments with regard to Palestine not in conformity with the principles which in past guided American foreign policy in general and which had been incorporated in the Atlantic Charter 18 and the declaration of the United Nations.19 As an illustration of Zionist activities he referred to a resolution introduced recently by Senator Wagner in the Senate which he understood had the backing of Senators Taft and Barkley 20 demanding that restrictions upon immigration to Palestine be lifted. He said the Arab world did not have the facilities available to the Zionists for presenting its side of the case to the American Senate, that he hoped that a resolution of the kind would not be passed since its passage would add to certain misconceptions of the Palestine problem which many people in the U.S. seem to have and would strengthen Axis propaganda in this area. He pointed out that the German radio broadcasts in the Arabic language was making wide use of this resolution in an endeavor to create a lack of confidence among the Arabs in the sincerity of purpose of the Allies and of Allied expressions of friendliness toward the Arab world; he and his colleagues sincerely hope that the Zionists will not be successful in making the future of Palestine a political issue during the coming electoral campaign. He added that it would be extremely helpful in combatting Axis propaganda and in stilling certain misgivings even among those Arabs most friendly to the Allied cause if assurances could be given that the Government of the U.S. would not decide on what its attitude on Palestine is to be until spokesmen for the Arabs are given a full opportunity to make clear the issues at stake. During conversation Nuri Pasha cited fact that it was Iraq Government's view that while papers [White Paper] would continue to govern Palestine situation until a final solution of problem could be found. HENDERSON 17 Nuri as-Said, Iraqi Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defense. 18 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. 19 Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, ibid., 1942, vol. I, p. 25. 867N.01/2185: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 21 WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944-6 p. m. 19. Your 31, February 14, 7 p. m. In any future conversations which you may have with Nuri relative to the resolutions introduced into each House of Congress regarding Palestine you should bear in mind that the passage of such resolutions by either or both Houses would be only an expression of the individual members of that House and would not be binding upon the executive branch or an expression of the foreign policy of the United States. STETTINIUS 867N.01/2197 : Telegram The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State BEIRUT, February 18, 1944-4 p. m.. [Received 7:33 p. m.] 36. My Iraqi colleague called today "to discuss as matter of courtesy" instructions received from Nuri regarding pro-Zionist resolutions referred to in your 318, February 16, 9 p. m., to Cairo.22 He is directed to inform Lebanese and [Syrian] Governments and Parliamentary leaders of nature of resolutions (which are described as advocating recognition of Palestine as a Jewish state) and to suggest that Arab cause would be served were they to follow Iraq's lead in telegraphing protests to American Government and Congress. He is to mention also representations made to Department by Ali Jawdat against Celler's speech impugning trustworthiness of Arab rulers and to inform them of Under Secretary's expression of regret and assurance to the effect that "the President's idea is to leave settlement of the Palestine problem for after the war". He assured me there is no intention of encouraging local Parliamentary discussion or inciting popular protest but rather that his démarche is motivated by belief that Arab-Allied relations will be troubled anew by present proZionist campaign and that our, as well as Arab, interests will be best served by reaffirmation of Arab solidarity in opposition to establishment of Jewish state or to further Jewish immigration into Palestine. No mention of resolutions has been made in local press (although Palestine Post, which has small circulation here, has referred to current hearings thereon) nor have any local leaders mentioned matter 21 Repeated to Cairo as telegram 318, February 16, 9 p. m., with the instruction that it be repeated in turn to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda. 23 See footnote 21, above. to me. It seems probable however that Foreign Minister 23 will do so after receiving Iraqi démarche. I should consequently appreciate receiving any directives (including perhaps texts of resolutions) which Department may see fit to send at this time. Repeated to Baghdad and Jerusalem. WADSWORTH 867N.01/2280 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1944. MR. SECRETARY: After Breck Long's 24 call to you on the Palestine question and the matter of making Mr. Stimson's letter public, Mr. Stimson, the President and I had a discussion, in which it was agreed that the War Department would try first to kill the resolution by executive session testimony by Army representatives. If this fails, Stimson will then give consideration to making his letter public. The strongest point in Mr. Stimson's mind was that General Marshall 25 had military considerations in mind and the effect the letter would have on the enemy. Breck has had a very satisfactory talk with Mr. Connally and Mr. Bloom and they both feel much better about the whole situation. I believe the situation is under control. Incidentally, Connally had in a few of the outstanding leaders of Jewry for a frank discussion. E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS] 867N.01/2282 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 26 [WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1944. At yesterday's Cabinet meeting the Palestine resolution was thoroughly discussed. The President expressed the opinion to Secretary Stimson that it was important for his letter on the matter to be made public.27 The Secretary replied that he first wished to try the executive session method and hoped that Mr. McCloy 28 and General Handy 29 would be able to stop the resolution in executive session. He 23 Jamil Mardam. 24 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State. 25 Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff. 26 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray), and the Deputy Director (Alling). 27 The letter (February 7, p. 563) was not made public. 28 John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. "Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of the War Department General Staff. |