867N.01/2231: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, March 4, 1944-11 a. m. [Received March 6-10:42 a. m.] 503. Following is essential part of communications left with me last night by El Sayyid Hussein El Kobsi, representative of King Yemen in recent Arab Union discussions, regarding proposed congressional resolution on Palestine: "His Majesty, The King of Yemen and Commander of the Faithful, Yehya Ibn Mohamed Hamid El Dine, and His Majesty's Government disapprove of the resolution submitted to the American Congress designed to remove restrictions imposed on the immigration of Jews into Palestine. His Majesty disapproves everything that causes trouble to the rightful owners of Palestine-Moslems, Christians and native Jews—and although he condemns every cruelty to which Jews in Europe are subjected he does not consider that it justifies the oppression of the Arabs of Palestine in their own legal abode." Text of communication was carried in this morning's Al Misri in verbatim form except for omission of phrase "Moslems, Christians, and Jews". Repeated to Jerusalem, Jidda, Baghdad and Beirut. KIRK 867N.01/2232: Telegram The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State BAGHDAD, March 4, 1944-11 p. m. [Received March 6-12:45 p. m.] 47. 1. The information contained in your 27, March 2 has been most helpful. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him this morning. The following contains the substance of some of the statements which he made to me: a. Iraqi Government deeply regrets the publicity which has been given in the last 3 days in the Iraqi press to Zionist activities in the United States and to the resolutions in particular. The Government had endeavored to keep the matter from becoming public but following announcements made by the BBC and Reuters 60 regarding the protest of the Egyptian Government it was compelled to issue its communiqué on March 1. b. The Government has since been under fire on the ground that it had failed to take stronger steps and that it had concealed a matter [of] so grave importance from the public. It had already been 60 British news agency. attacked in Parliament and was preparing to meet further attacks. It was handicapped because it could not divulge all that had taken place without adding fresh fuel to the flames. The Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that it had refused to accept for transmission a nonsympathetic message from Senator Wagner to the President of the Iraqi Senate. The message was reported to be coming through other channels but had not as yet been received. Since the matter had become public the Foreign Office was being bombarded with enquiries from all sides. The diplomatic representatives in Baghdad of other Arab States had been approaching it several times daily for information regarding developments. 3. I replied to the Foreign Minister along the lines suggested in second paragraph of telegram under reference. I said that the endeavors of the Government to prevent the matter from developing in a manner that might adversely affect Iraqi-American relations were appreciated. I pointed out, however, that it seemed to me that the Government was itself partly responsible for the embarrassment which it was experiencing. So far as I could see the Government had not made any real attempt to make the situation clear to the public. In Iraq for instance one of the leading papers of Baghdad in its leading editorial of March 1 had given the distinct impression to its readers that the United States was embarking on a policy to deprive the Arabs of their rights in Palestine. Relatively few of the numerous articles which had appeared in the last few days in Baghdad press had left the impression on the readers that the resolutions were thus far merely the expressions of the Congressmen who had introduced them and had no connection with the policy of the American Government. 4. The Foreign Minister promised that he would discuss my remarks with the Prime Minister and try to make the situation more clear for the public. 5. Beginning March 1 the resolutions and activities of the Zionists in the United States have been the chief topic of discussion of the Iraqi press and people with the result that in some quarters there is considerable feeling against the United States and even against the local Jews. Students of the secondary schools yesterday desired to make a demonstration before the Legation but the Government refused to permit them to do so. It was suggested to some of the Jewish students that they refrain from attending their schools yesterday since there was a danger that while en route they would be attacked by Arab students for whom Friday is a holiday. 6. Various rumors are current in the bazaars as to the real reasons behind this agitation. There is a tendency in some quarters as might be expected to credit the British with stirring up feeling against the United States in order (a) to make it difficult for the United States to exploit its oil concessions in fear of Arab hostility or (b) to place the onus on the United States for any decision unpleasant to the Arab world which Great Britain might reach in regard to Palestine. The Legation has not been able to find any evidence which I got [which might?] substantiate these rumors, however the British censorship in control of the local press has prohibited the publication of the articles in question. 7. It would appear from articles published today that the campaign is losing its anti-American tone and is developing into agitation for Arab unity and/or Arab control of Palestine. 8. Translation of the Government communiqué of March 1 the tone of which is mild in comparison with that of articles appearing in the press is being sent in telegram No. 48 of today's date.61 Paraphrases by pouch to Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut. HENDERSON 867N.01/2228: Telegram The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State BAGHDAD, March 4, 1944. [Received March 5-1 p. m.] 48. The following is the translation of the communiqué of the Iraq Government of March 1: "The Iraq Government has been informed of the endeavors of Zionist propagandists in the United States of America in regard the question immigration into Palestine with a view to obtaining support in the American Senate and Congress for a proposal to open the doors of immigration into Palestine for the Jews in contravention of the British White Paper. The Iraq Government has taken all necessary steps to defeat those endeavors (which are based on an attempt to exploit public sympathy in America and to enlighten public opinion about the real situation). Sayid Jamil Almadfai, President of the Senate, and Ridha Alshabibi, President of the Chamber of Deputies, have sent telegrams to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in America as well as the American Senators who submitted the proposal explaining the harmful repercussions and pointing out what [that?] it would transgress on the rights of the Arabs in Palestine. The Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon have taken similar action. These efforts have lead to satisfactory results." 01 Infra. 554-184-65-38 HENDERSON 867N.01/2233: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State CAIRO, March 4, 1944-noon. [Received March 5-11:08 a. m.] 510. My 503, March 4, 10 [11] a. m. In conversation preceding delivery of communication Yemen representative outlined its contents and I was afforded opportunity for explaining situation along lines of Department's telegrams on subject. Most of his conversation, however, was devoted to professions of sympathy of Moslems with democratic cause and more particularly to expressions of friendship toward United States with which he said it was desire of Yemen to become more closely associated after war owing to reputed interest without ulterior motives of United States in small states. KIRK 867N.01/2275a Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt 62 [WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1944. You will recall some weeks ago you and I had quite a discussion relative to the Palestine situation with the possibility of the British and ourselves issuing a joint statement.63 At that time you did not think you wished to take any action until later on. Since then there have been quite a number of new developments, which are summarized below, and I would urge that you have a talk with Colonel Hoskins 64 relative to the whole question if it is possible for you to do so in the relatively near future. I am attaching a paraphrase of telegram No. 57, February 27, 11 a. m., from our Legation at Jidda, which transmits a protest from 64a * Marginal notation: "ERS Jr. OK FDR". In a memorandum of March 8 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) the Under Secretary wrote: "The President has just returned to me the memorandum which I sent to him on March 4 regarding Palestine, copy of which I enclose herewith. "Would you be good enough to give the most careful thought to the question of exactly when and how we should take up with the British the issuance of a joint statement on Palestine." (867N.01/2275a) 63 Regarding the decision "to review from time to time the question of issuing a joint statement in regard to Palestine," made by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchhill at the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943, see telegram 6063, October 1, 1943, to London, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. Iv, p. 814; also the memorandum of August 21 and footnote 88, ibid., p. 804. Documentation concerning the First Quebec Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations. 64 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Special Representative of President Roosevelt on two missions to the Near East in 1942 and 1943; for correspondence relating to these missions, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 24 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. IV, bracketed note on p. 19. 64a For text of telegram, see p. 577. King Ibn Saud against the Palestine Resolutions in Congress. Protests have also been received from the Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian Governments. I am more and more convinced that the time has come to clarify the situation through the issuance of a joint American-British statement affirming (after a suitable introduction); (a) that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine will be taken without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews; (b) that if, prior to the conclusion of the war, the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts, such a development will be most welcome; and (c) that in the absence of such an understanding, there will be a review of the Palestine situation after the war has been won, with the objective of establishing a just and definitive solution equitable to all parties concerned. The British have indicated that they would welcome such a statement, and if you approve, I shall promptly take the matter up with them. I shall, of course, submit for your final approval the exact text which may be agreed upon with the British Foreign Office. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. 867N.01/2280 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1944. MR. SECRETARY: Last Saturday I forwarded to the President a memorandum suggesting that, in view of the concern manifested in the entire Arab world by the Palestine resolutions now before the Congress, it might be wise to consider taking up with the British the possibility of issuing a joint statement which would postpone the settlement of the Palestine question until after the war unless the interested Arab and Jewish parties could reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts. The President subsequently returned this memorandum to me with his approval. I wish you would consider whether the matter should be taken up now with the British Embassy with a view to issuing a statement before I leave for London or whether you would prefer to have Mr. Murray and me raise the question with the British in London.65 In view of Secretary Stimson's letter and General Marshall's statement 65 For correspondence regarding the Stettinius Mission to London, to engage in general and informal conversations with officers of the British Foreign Office, April 7-April 29, 1944, see vol. II, pp. 1 ff. |